ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE
THEOLOGICA
2020
Vol. 10, No. 2

THEME
Friendship in Patristic Literature

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
KAROLINUM PRESS

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ISSN 1804-5588 (Print)
ISSN 2336-3398 (Online)

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INTRODUCTION

As a relationship based on personal choice, not consanguinity, friendship is one of the most precious elements of human culture. The institution of friendship, both in private and social life, played a very important role in ancient literature and philosophy. The story of Achilles and Patroclus, the heroes of the Trojan War reported by Homer, remains unforgettable. Achilles grieving over Patroclus, 'his most beloved friend', who died in his armour and in his place, as it were, is among the most touching parts of the *Iliad* (XVIII,78–126) and of world literature in general. The friendship of Orestes and Pylades, narrated by Euripides in *Iphigenia in Tauris* and known, thanks to the drama of Marcus Pacuvius, to the Latin authors, including the Christian ones, had a similar meaning.

For most ancient philosophical schools, starting from Socrates, friendship was both the setting and the topic of philosophical discussions.

In the Bible, the institution of friendship is not unknown either. Besides many sayings on its value in the wisdom literature (e.g. Prov. 27:17; 27:6; Sir. 6:14–17; 7:18; 9:10), the Old Testament narrates the story of the friendship between David and Jonathan, which was even confirmed by a special agreement and by Jonathan giving David his clothing and his armour, too (1 Sam 18:1–4). As the New Testament witnesses, Jesus wept for his friend Lazarus after his death (J 11:11.35) and he called his disciples, including Judas (Mt 26:50), his friends (Lk 12:4; J 15:13–15). In the same vein, Abraham and Moses were even titled 'friends of God' (Is. 41:8; Jm. 2:23; Ex 33:11), as pointed out by Philo of Alexandria and the Christian authors after him.

Besides the theological application of the term of 'friendship', the patristic authors entered friendships – friendships between bishops seem to have been a special social instance – and they also referred to it in their correspondence, biographical or autobiographical narratives, and philosophical dialogues imitating Plato or Cicero.

The contributions which follow show different facets of friendship in patristic literature, including its indispensable inspiration in the work of the Jewish scholar Philo of Alexandria. They were presented at the conference 'Friends and Opponents: How did Church Fathers Write about Their Friends and Opponents', held on 20th – 21st September 2018 at the Theological Faculty of Trnava University in Bratislava, Slovakia. Besides this faculty, the other organisers of this conference, attended by twenty-six speakers from six countries, were the Slovak Patristic Society and the Patristic Society of the Czech Republic.

In what follows, we publish a selection of contributions from this conference, dealing with the friendship with God in Philo of Alexandria (Markéta Dudziková, Czech Republic), the friendship lived in the Christian community according to the Pseudo-Clementine writings (Jiří Hoblík, Czech Republic), the true and false friendships in the poetry of Gregory of Nazianzus (Erika Brodňanská, Slovakia), 'the friends of God' according to Theodoret of Cyrrhus, as interpreted by the Ukrainian theologian Dymytriy Tuptalo (Daria Morozova, Ukraine), and the role of friendship in Augustine's Confessions (Lenka Karfíková, Czech Republic).

Lenka Karfíková and Miloš Lichner

doi: 10.14712/23363398.2020.54

THEME
Friendship in Patristic Literature

FRIENDSHIP WITH GOD AS AN ULTIMATE IDEAL IN THE WRITINGS OF PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA[1]

MARKÉTA DUDZIKOVÁ

ABSTRACT

Philo of Alexandria wrote about what it meant to be a 'friend of God' in relation to key biblical figures. This article explores to what extent Philo's understanding of the human relationship to God was inspired by the Greek concept of friendship based on the equal reciprocation of similar goods. It also addresses the complexity of Philo's view of such a relationship and the notion that to become a friend of God is to realise an ideal state of being. I will also illustrate Philo's influence on early Christian authors Clement of Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa.

Keywords:

Friendship; Philo of Alexandria; Friend of God; Reciprocity; Moses; Abraham; Equality; Gregory of Nyssa

DOI: 10.14712/23363398.2020.55

Friendship with God is one of the most important themes not only in the writings of Philo of Alexandria, but also in the early Christian literature. But can it be claimed as a novel idea in the context of the Greek philosophical tradition?[2] The main objection to the

[1] This study was funded by the Czech Science Foundation (GA ČR 19-18046S: 'The relationship between the uncreated God and created beings according to Gregory of Nyssa as a follow-up to the Alexandrian biblical exegesis') and the Charles University Research Centre Programme (No. 204053).

[2] For ancient concepts of friendship, cf. Ludovic Dugas, *L'amitié antique* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1914²); Kurt Treu, 'Freundschaft,' in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, vol. 8, eds. Theodor Klauser et al. (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1972), col. 418–434; Jean-Claude Fraisse, *Philia. La notion d'amitié dans la philosophie antique. Essai sur un problème perdu et retrouvé* (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1974); Alfons Fürst,

possibility of friendship with God is the connection between friendship and equality. The idea that God brings together those who are similar or equal is to be found in the Odyssey XVII,218, which is quoted by both Plato and Aristotle within their discourses on friendship.[3] In the saying φιλίαν ἰσότητα, regarded as Pythagorean, friendship is even identified with equality.[4] The most elaborated theory of friendship as a peer-based relationship is to be found in Aristotle. To show the problematic character of calling a person 'a friend of God', I will briefly introduce Aristotle's objections against the possibility of friendship between a person and a god.

Aristotle's concept of friendship is discussed above all in the eighth and ninth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and in the seventh book of the *Eudemian Ethics*.[5] For Aristotle, friendship is so closely connected with equality that it renders impossible the idea that two persons who differ in important qualities such as virtue, power or wealth could ever become friends. Aristotle uses the term 'friendship is equality' (φιλότης ἰσότης)[6] to explain the nature of one type of relationship in which friends give each other what is equal in return.[7] Such typical friendships 'depend on an equality, since each gets the same things from the other, and they wish the same things to each other'.[8] But Aristotle also considers less typical friendships, those based on superiority. In these cases, equality is achieved through friendly affection that corresponds

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Streit unter Freunden: Ideal und Realität in der Freundschaftslehre der Antike (Stuttgart – Leipzig: Teubner, 1996); David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997); Suzanne Stern-Gillet and Gary M. Gurtler (eds.): *Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2014).

3 Cf. Homer, *Od.* XVII, 218 (ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον); Plato, *Lys.* 214a6; Aristotle, *Eth. Eud.* VII,1,1235a7; for a similar idea in the Bible, cf. *Sir* 13,15–16. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, cf. Fürst, *Streit unter Freunden*, 236–242.

4 The saying 'φιλίαν ἰσότητα' is attributed by Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae*, VIII,10, to Pythagorean philosopher Timaeus; cf. also *Vitae*, VIII,33; Plato, *Leg.* VI, 757a5–6.

5 For Aristotle's theory of friendship, cf. Fraisse, *Philia*, 89–286; Kelly Rogers, 'Aristotle on Loving Another for His Own Sake,' *Phronêsis* 39, no. 3 (1994): 291–302; Frederic M. Schroeder, 'Friendship in Aristotle and Some Peripatetic Philosophers,' in *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship*, 35–57; Gary M. Gurtler, 'Aristotle on Friendship: Insight from the Four Causes,' in *Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship*, 35–50; Suzanne Stern-Gillet, 'Souls Great and Small. Aristotle on Self-knowledge, Friendship, and Civic Engagement,' ibid., 51–83; Michael Pakaluk, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 257–285.

6 Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII,1157b36; 1159b2–3; 1168b8.

7 Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII,1157b35–36.

8 Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII,1158b1–3.

to worth.[9] However, if the equality between two persons becomes too imbalanced, the parties can no longer be considered friends.[10] Adhering to such a model, it would be entirely logical to dismiss the prospect of a mortal person befriending an immortal god.[11]

Considering this presumption of equality, it is perhaps unsurprising that Philo and others debated the admissibility of human friendship with God. In the Hellenistic period, however, friendship was also (though not exclusively) a political concept:[12] 'friend' was a term used to describe the advisor to a king or ruler. This relationship was based more on the political than the personal: because the 'friend' of a king cannot be equal in terms of power, status or wealth, equality is not strictly presupposed to the extent it is by classical scholars. Unlike the deceiver who flatters, the true friend of a ruler must care more about the king's prosperity than his own, but also must not shy away from offering frank criticism. In this way, the counsellor is afforded the right to speak openly (παρρησία) with his superior.[13] Accordingly, this relationship approximates a peer-based friendship.

The most comparable parallel to the Philonic concept of friendship with God is provided by Stoicism.[14] According to the Stoic philosophers, the whole world is understood as the only true city of people and gods, whose citizens are connected by love and friendship.[15] There was talk

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[9] Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII,1158b23–1159b4; cf. also Michael Pakaluk, 'Commentary,' in *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, 91–96.

[10] Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII,1158b33–1159a5.

[11] Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1159a5–12; cf. also Michael Pakaluk, *Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics: Books VIII and IX* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 91–99; Jens Timmermann, 'Why We Cannot Want Our Friends to be Gods: Comments on NE 1159a5–12,' *Phronêsis* 40, no. 2 (1995): 209–215.

[12] Cf. Peter Astbury Brunt, '"Amicitia" in the Late Roman Republic,' *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, no. 11 (191), (1965): 1–20, doi: 10.1017/S0068673500003163.

[13] For context to the Hellenistic debates on παρρησία, cf. Plutarch, *Quomodo adul.* Cf. also Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, 93–121; the same, 'Friendship, Frankness and Flattery,' in *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World*, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 7–19; Jiří Pavlík, 'Funkce výrazu παρρησία a charakteristické příklady jeho uplatnění v homiliích Jana Chrýsostoma na Skutky apoštolů,' *AUC Theologica* 6, no. 2 (2016): 91–117. doi: 10.14712/23363398.2016.16.

[14] For the Stoic concept of friendship, cf. Adolf Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet* (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1894), 106–109; Fraisse, *Philia*, 333–419; Bernard Collette-Dučić, 'Making Friends. The Stoic Conception of Love and Its Platonic Background,' in *Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship*, 87–115.

[15] Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* IV,26,172,2 (= *SVF* III,327). Cf. also Malcolm Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press,

of friendship between mortals and gods in Stoicism, but at the same time friendship only takes place among sages: according to Zeno, the founder of Stoic Philosophy, only the sage is citizen, friend, kin and free.[16] In calling the sages 'friends of gods',[17] the Stoics say more about wise persons than about the nature of friendship: Likened to the mythical phoenix,[18] the wise person is given exclusive status and acknowledged to be closest in equality to the divine.[19] As I will demonstrate,[20] Philo uses the term 'friend of God' alongside other unique characteristics of the Stoic sage in his portrayal of biblical figures.

The assumption that there exists a continuity between the Greek and Judeo-Christian concepts of friendship has been questioned by David Konstan.[21] In his article 'Problems in the History of Christian Friendship', Konstan provides an alternative view to Erik Peterson's study 'Der Gottesfreund: Beiträge zur Geschichte eines religiösen Terminus', published in 1923 yet 'still cited as the authoritative essay on the topic'.[22] In an effort to dispel the prevailing belief that the term 'friend of God' (*Gottesfreund*) is somehow primarily connected with 14th-century mysticism, Peterson offers an almost entirely unknown history of the term, starting with Xenophon and Plato in antiquity and ending in the Early Middle Ages.[23] Despite acknowledging Aristotle's objections to the possibility of a person becoming a friend of God,[24] Peterson's overview, on balance, argues for the absence of any discontinuity between

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1999[2]); René Brouwer, *The Stoic Sage. The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 90, note 128.

16 Cf. Zeno according to Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae*, VII,33 (= *SVF* I,222); for Stoic philosophy after Philo, cf. Epictetus, *Diss.* 2,22; cf. also Collette-Dučić, 'Making Friends,' 87–88.

17 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae*, VII,124 (= *SVF* III,631); Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Ep.* 81,12 (= *SVF* III,633); Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* I,26,168,4 (= *SVF* III,332); Margaret R. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion* (Chicago – London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 173–185.

18 Cf. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* 42,1; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato*, 28,199.

19 Cf. Philodemos, *De deis*, III, Col. c,1,17–18; cf. also Epictetus, *Diss.* 2,17,29; 4,3,9 and Hermann Diels, *Philodemos Über die Götter*, *Drittes Buch*, II: *Erklärungen des Textes* (Berlin: Verlag der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1917), 7–8; David Konstan, 'Problems in the History of Christian Friendship,' *The Journal of Early Christian Studies*, 4, no. 1 (1996): 87–113, here 94–95.

20 Cf. below, 20–23.

21 Cf. Konstan, 'Problems in the History of Christian Friendship'; cf. also the same, *Friendship in the Classical World*.

22 Erik Peterson, 'Der Gottesfreund: Beiträge zur Geschichte eines religiösen Terminus,' *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 42 (1923): 161–202.

23 Cf. Peterson, 'Der Gottesfreund,' 161.

24 Cf. Peterson, 'Der Gottesfreund,' 167.

the ancient Greek concept of friendship with God and that found in Judeo-Christian literature.

In his critical response to Peterson's study, Konstan focuses on different possible meanings of φίλος, the Greek word for friend, along with other words derived from the same root. He stresses the importance of making a distinction between the use of the word φίλος as a noun and as an adjective. Konstan shows how, particularly in connection with an adverbial modifier, the use of the dative and not of the genitive with the word φίλος (e.g. θεῷ/θεοῖς φίλος instead of θεοῦ φίλος) denotes the adjective, meaning 'dear' or 'friendly' rather than 'friend'.[25] In a book on the same topic, Konstan distinguishes φίλος from φίλια, an abstract noun used to describe a set of relationships not exclusively limited to friendship.[26] Based on the above distinction, Konstan shows that most of the classical instances of the term 'friend of God' quoted by Peterson in fact refer to persons who are either 'dear' to the gods or regard the gods as 'dear' to themselves. According to Konstan, the classical Greek concept of friendship presupposes relative equality between two individuals, thus making the notion of a person becoming a friend of God inconceivable.[27] For Konstan, moreover, the Christian view of friendship with God derives wholly from the Bible, 'ow[ing] little or nothing to classical views concerning friendship'. Within Christian thought, then, friendship with God does not 'imply equality or anything approaching equality'.[28]

Taking the work of Philo of Alexandria and the early Christian authors as my cue, I will question the validity of the assertion that the connection between friendship and equality is entirely absent from the Judeo-Christian concept of friendship with God.

1. God and people

Precisely whom was Philo of Alexandria referring to when speaking of 'a friend of God' (φίλος θεοῦ)? Did he deem it a common appellation

[25] Cf. Konstan, 'Problems in the History of Christian Friendship,' 92–93.

[26] Cf. Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, 9. Cf. also the same, 'Greek Friendship,' *The American Journal of Philology*, 117, no. 1 (1996): 71–94. For the semantic field of the verb φιλεῖν, cf. Veronika Černušková, 'Tři stupně lásky v řeckém jazyce? Výrazy „milovat" a „láska" v klasické řecké literatuře a u církevních otců,' *Studia Theologica*, 16, no. 1 (2014): 17–45. doi: 10.5507/sth.2014.002.

[27] Cf. Konstan, 'Problems in the History of Christian Friendship,' 91–95.

[28] Cf. Konstan, 'Problems in the History of Christian Friendship,' 96.

for every servant of God, or did he consider it a unique title? In his article on Philo's concept of friendship, Gregory Sterling argues strongly in favour of the former, teasing out similarities between the Stoic theory of friendship and Philo's.[29] Of importance here is the connection between friendship with God and the term φίλια, which refers, in an ideal sense, to all people. According to Philo, the bonds of φίλια should extend to all Israelites, even to proselytes.[30] Sterling argues that the basis of such a tie is friendship with God, citing figures whom Philo deems God's friends, especially Moses, Abraham and Jacob.[31] Sterling concludes that, for Philo, 'friendship meant the enlargement of Judaism to all who shared the same Friend.'[32]

If a mutual relationship among all people is contingent on all being friends of God, then to be a friend of God is (or should be) almost as common as being a friend of a human being. But did Philo really believe every Jew and proselyte to be a 'friend of God'? Heeding Konstan's warning against conflating all Greek words with the root φιλ-, I will examine Philo's references to friends of God and the nature of that friendship with Him.

In his statements on the general bond between Israelites and proselytes, Philo omits discussing friends of God *per se*, but rather speaks of 'friendship' (φίλια) among people. Although it is true that the basis of this friendship is religious, as a term it more precisely connotes the idea that all people worship and believe in the one God as opposed to the idea that they are each His friend.[33] One should also note that the honour and

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[29] Cf. Gregory E. Sterling, 'The Bond of Humanity: Friendship in Philo of Alexandria,' in *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship*, 203–223. According to Sterling, Philo is 'one of the most important extant witnesses to the Stoic view of friendship' ('The Bond of Humanity,' 205).

[30] In Philo's writings, the terms συγγενεῖς and φίλοι are closely connected. Cf. e.g. Philo of Alexandria, *De vit. Moys.* I,39; 303; 307; 322; cf. also Sterling, 'The Bond of Humanity,' 217, which gives more references.

[31] Cf. Sterling, 'The Bond of Humanity,' 217–218.

[32] Sterling, 'The Bond of Humanity,' 222.

[33] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De vit. Moys.* II,171: 'between the good there is no kinship and friendship (φιλίαν καὶ συγγένειαν) but godliness (ὁσιότητα).' In *De spec. leg.* I,52, Philo discusses friendship with proselytes, stating that 'the chain which binds indissolubly the goodwill which makes us one is to honour the one God (ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς θεοῦ τιμή).' Cf. also *De spec. leg.* I,317: 'For we should have one tie of affinity (μία οἰκειότης), one accepted sign of goodwill (φιλίας ἓν σύμβολον), namely the willingness to serve God (ἡ πρὸς θεὸν ἀρέσκεια) and that our every word and deed promotes the cause of piety.'; or *De spec. leg.* III,155: 'agreement to practise justice and every virtue (ἡ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὁμολογία) makes a closer kinship (συγγένεια) than that of blood.' In *De virt.* 35, the bond among Israelites is 'their creed of a single God' (ἡ περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς θεοῦ δόξα). For

respect paid to the Only Existent is a distinguishing mark of the Israelites[34] as much as it is of each proselyte who joins their ranks.

Philo addresses the theme of friendship with God in terms of the common bond between Israelites and proselytes in the sub-treatise *On Repentance* (*De paenitentia*; in Greek, Περὶ μετανοίας), which forms part of the treatise *De virtutibus*.[35] According to Philo, proselytes 'should be considered our closest friends and relations, having displayed a character friendly to God, the greatest route to friendship and kinship' (φιλτάτους καὶ συγγενεστάτους ὑποληπτέον, τὸ μέγιστον εἰς φιλίαν καὶ οἰκειότητα παρασχομένους θεοφιλὲς ἦθος).[36] Is it possible, then, that 'a character friendly to God' (θεοφιλὲς ἦθος) could infer a kind of friendship with God? Clearly, the words with the root φιλ- are variations. However, in Philo's writings, the term θεοφιλής has a wider meaning than just φίλος: Though often attributed to Moses,[37] sometimes in the superlative,[38] it is also used for inanimate objects.[39] At the beginning of his description of Moses as a high priest in *De vit. Moys.* II, 67, Philo uses the couple 'God-lover and God-beloved' (θεοφιλὴς καὶ φιλόθεος)[40] when remarking on Moses' honouring and worship of God (and being honoured by Him): Even here, the adjective θεοφιλής is more connected to honour and worship paid to God than to friendship with Him, a theme discussed elsewhere in the same treatise.[41] Therefore, it is probable that in *De virt.* 179 Philo intended to underscore that the common bond between Israelites and proselytes was their worship of the same God. The use of the phrase θεοφιλὲς ἦθος in this context appears to be an allusion to Plato's *Respublica*.[42]

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a new kinship based on virtues, cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De spec. leg.* II,73; cf. also Walter T. Wilson, 'Introduction,' in Philo of Alexandria, *On Virtues*, Introduction, Translation and Commentary Walter T. Wilson, *Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series*, 3 (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2010), 4–5.

34 Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De virt.* 34–35; 64–65. Philo's take on the etymology of the name 'Israel' is: the one who sees God, cf. e.g. *De congr. erud. grat.* 51.

35 Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De virt.* 175–186. For the structure and parts of the treatise, cf. Wilson, 'Introduction,' 10–23.

36 Philo of Alexandria, *De virt.* 179; English translation by Wilson (Philo of Alexandria, *On Virtues*, 79).

37 Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De sacr. Abel. et Caini*, 77; *De cher.* 49.

38 Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De migr. Abr.* 67.

39 Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De post. Caini*, 179 (θεοφιλὴς εὐχή); cf. also *De Abr.* 181; 247.

40 Francis Henry Colson, *LCL* 289, translates: [Moses] 'came to love God and be loved by Him'. Cf. also Philo of Alexandria, *De Abr.* 50, where it is used about Abraham, Isaak and Jacob.

41 Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De vit. Moys.* I,155–158.

42 Cf. Plato, *Resp.* 501c; 612e. Cf. Walter T. Wilson, 'Commentary,' in Philo of Alexandria, *On Virtues*, 368.

For Philo, then, a person's first fundamental attitude towards God is worship, a characteristic quality of the Israelites and the basis for their mutual φίλια. In addition, the common bond of φίλια is also available to anyone who forsakes polytheism for worship of the Only Existent One.

In *De paenitentia*, Philo explains that the move from polytheism to the right faith is the first decisive step, giving an example of the ideal proselyte who reaches a state of high perfection.[43] To truly worship God and be blessed in all the virtues, the proselyte must harmonise purpose to speech and action to intention,[44] while leading a life that is 'laudable and perfect'.[45] Only then can the proselyte, being 'at the same time beloved by God and a lover of God' (ὁμοῦ θεοφιλὴς καὶ φιλόθεος)[46] and 'equal in value to a whole nation' (ισότιμος ὅλῳ ἔθνει),[47] finally become 'a sage' (σοφός).[48]

For Philo, then, to become perfect, to establish an impeccable relationship with God is something even a proselyte can achieve. However, as we shall learn in the next chapter, this is no easy task; for not everyone who worships God does so to such an exalted level.

2. Worship of God for His sake alone

Of those who worship the One God, some are more perfect, dearer to Him. Using the example of God's visit to Abraham by the Oak of Mamre (Gen 18:1–15), in his treatise *De Abrahamo* Philo explains the differences between one whose relationship with God equates to true 'friendship' (φίλια) and one whose worship is less than perfect.[49] On the point of the biblical versions of this passage, however, especially the Septuagint translation to which Philo refers, it should be noted that it is not entirely clear whether Abraham is visited by a total of three persons or by the Lord alone.[50]

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[43] Cf. Wilson, 'Commentary,' 363–364.
[44] Cf. Deut 30:14.
[45] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De virt.* 184.
[46] Philo of Alexandria, *De virt.* 184. English translation by Wilson (Philo of Alexandria, *On Virtues*, 80). Philo quotes Deut 26:17–18 as a testimony.
[47] Philo of Alexandria, *De virt.* 185.
[48] Philo of Alexandria, *De virt.* 186.
[49] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De Abr.* 119–130.
[50] Cf. (in the *Septuagint*, to which Philo refers) the difference between 'God' (θεός) in Gen 18:1, 'three men' (τρεῖς ἄνδρες) in Gen 18:2 and Abraham's salutation 'Lord' (Κύριε) in Gen 18:3. Cf. also the variation in pronouns in the singular and plural in the subsequent verses. Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De Abr.* 132.

Philo interprets the passage as reinforcing his view that there exists a distinction between the Existent One and the two 'potencies' (δυνάμεις) that follow as 'shadows' (σκιαί).[51] But the passage itself deals with *three* people, according to which Philo proposes *three* ways a person might move toward God (i.e., toward His potencies and toward God Himself) or, more precisely, three ways a person might be motivated toward worshipping God.

Deserving of most admiration are those who worship God for His sake alone, followed by those who worship in the hope of a reward and, finally, those who do so for fear of being punished. Similarly, God can also be viewed (Philo uses the word 'vision', φαντασία) in three ways: as a true being, a creative potency or a kingly potency.[52]

But while these differences in motivation are clearly hierarchical, Philo is keen to give the two less disinterested forms of friendship their due. In an echo of the Hellenistic debates on freedom of speech (παρρησία), real friends and flatterers, Philo explains that, instead of distrusting those who offer friendship based on pretence, God in fact embraces all who honour Him regardless of motivation.[53] Nonetheless, only the person who remains entirely selfless, who worships God for His sake alone, can claim the ultimate reward: 'friendship' (φίλια) with God.[54] Interestingly, nowhere in the passage *De Abr.* 119–130 does the word 'friend' (φίλος) occur.

Intriguingly, Aristotle's teachings on friendship are also divided into three categories based on the motivating love for each friendship.[55] Just as 'not everything is loved, but only what is lovable, and this is either good, pleasant, or useful,'[56] there are also three kinds of friendship.[57]

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[51] 'Lord and God,' κύριος καὶ θεός, are two appellations used in the Septuagint text, which Philo interprets as two 'potencies' (δυνάμεις) of the Only Existent: the name 'Lord' (κύριος) indicates His kingly and ruling potency, whereas 'God' (θεός) represents a benefactor and saviour. Cf. e.g. Philo of Alexandria, *De conf. linguar.* 137; *Quaest. Exod.* II,62–68; *De plant.* 86; *De sobr.* 53–55.

[52] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De Abr.* 124: τρεῖς εἰσιν ἠθῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τάξεις, ὧν ἑκάστη διακεκλήρωται μίαν τῶν εἰρημένων φαντασιῶν. ('There are three classes of human temperaments, each of them so constituted that the vision presents itself in one of the three ways abovementioned,' English translation by Colson, *LCL* 289). Cf. also *De Abr.* 125; 128; *De vit. Moys.* I,289.

[53] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De Abr.* 126–130.

[54] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De Abr.* 128–129.

[55] Cf., e.g., Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1155b–1157b. A similar kind of division was known to Chrysippus; cf. *SVF* III,98; 723.

[56] Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII, 1155b18–19: οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον· Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is quoted in the English translation by Michael Pakaluk (*Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics: Books VIII and IX*).

[57] Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII,1156a7: τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη.

Some love each other on account of usefulness (διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον),[58] while others on account of pleasure (δι' ἡδονήν).[59] The third kind of friendship is based on the virtue (κατ' ἀρετήν)[60] of people who 'wish good things to each other as good', or rather, 'wish good things to their friends for their friend's sake'. Only these people are 'friends to the greatest degree'.[61]

To what extent, then, is Philo's distinction of these motivations comparable? Well, there are partial similarities. For example, both agree on two fundamental truths: (i) the true value of a relationship is contingent on the reason for forming it, and (ii) the most worthy kind of relationship should be solely on account of (διά) the other person.[62] But for all their similarities, the closest parallel to Philo's categorisation is, in fact, the Stoic teaching that virtue be attained for its own sake and not in hope or fear of something else.[63]

The comparison with the Stoics neatly demonstrates how Philo's distinction embraces two ways of understanding the relationship between God and a human being. For while God guarantees the order of the world, rewarding good behaviour and punishing that which is bad, this does not mean that He dismisses the possibility of friendship. The ultimate friend is not someone who worships God because He is creator and ruler of the world, but someone who does so simply for the fact of it being God Himself.[64] Only a person

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58 Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII,1156a10.

59 Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII,1156a12.

60 Cf. eg. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII,1158b7; cf. also 1162a25; 1162b7; 1163a21.

61 Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VIII,1156b7–10: Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ᾗ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὑτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· For the priority of the third kind of friendship, cf. *Eth. Nic.* VIII,1157a30–32 and John M. Cooper, 'Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship,' *Review of Metaphysics*, 30, no. 4 (1977): 619–648.

62 Cf. Philo's words τοῖς μὲν ἐμὲ τιμῶσι δι' ἐμέ in *De Abr.* 129 and Aristotle's description of the best kind of friends as δι' αὑτοὺς φίλοι in *Eth. Nic.* 1157b3. In Aristotle, nevertheless, it is not the only way how to describe that friends should be loved 'on their own sake' or 'on account of themselves'. On the different phrases used by Aristotle (esp. δι' αὑτούς, καθ' αὑτούς and ἐκείνων ἕνεκα) and their possible connection with subjective and objective aspects of love, cf. Rogers, 'Aristotle on Loving Another,' esp. note 3 on 292. The Stoics agree with Aristotle on the point that, in a true friendship, a friend is desirable for his own sake (δι' αὐτόν), cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae*, VII,124.

63 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* VII,89: τήν τε ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην· καὶ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτὴν εἶναι αἱρετήν, οὐ διά τινα φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἤ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν.

64 Cf. Aristotle's contention that to give goods to somebody for the recipient's sake alone (an important aspect of friendship) is an attitude possible only among animate beings, cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1155b27–31.

who establishes such a relationship with God can rightly claim His 'friendship' (φίλια).[65]

A similar idea can be found in the works of two Christian authors to be influenced by Philo: Clement of Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa.

Like Philo, Clement of Alexandria[66] distinguishes three motivations for a person's actions, whether it be the observance of the Law or the desire to know God: (i) fear of punishment, (ii) yearning after a reward or the hope of promised glory and (iii), the noblest of all, the desire to know God for His sake alone. To these categories, Clement assigns (i) servants, (ii) faithful servants and (iii) friends or sons of God.[67] For Clement, a person cannot be motivated by another good or being if that person can be said to truly love God. And if it is possible to choose between knowledge of God and eternal salvation, the perfect gnostic will always choose the former.[68] Clement posits that we are created as desirable simply for being ourselves[69] and that, similarly, God can only be known and loved for Himself alone.

Yet another variation on the threefold distinction is found at the end of Gregory of Nyssa's *Life of Moses* (*De vita Moysis*), a treatise strongly influenced by Philo.[70] As a way of inspiring the reader to reach a perfect state, Gregory uses the example of Moses befriending God in his final years.[71] Once again, as with Philo and Clement before him, Gregory considers different motivations that might drive friendship with God. The reason for choosing a virtuous life, Gregory writes, should not be fear of punishment or the hope of a reward, but only the desire to

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[65] An example of a group of people whose relationship with God is φίλια are the Therapeutae; cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De vit. contempl.* 90.

[66] I am grateful to Veronika Černušková for sharing her insights on Clement of Alexandria's theory of friendship.

[67] Cf., e.g., Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* I,27,173,6; IV,22,135 n.; VII,2,5,6; 3,19,2; 12,72,5.

[68] Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* IV,22,135,5. The choice is not possible because knowledge of God and eternal salvation are in fact one and the same thing.

[69] Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Paid.* I,3,8,1: Ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα ὃν πεποίηκεν ὁ θεός, δι' αὐτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστιν.

[70] Cf. esp. Jean Daniélou, 'Philon et Grégoire de Nysse,' in *Philon d'Alexandrie. Lyon 11–15 Septembre 1966*, eds. Roger Arnaldez et al. (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1967), 333–345; the same, 'Moïse exemple et figure chez Grégoire de Nysse,' in *Moïse, l'homme de l'alliance* (*Cahiers sioniens*, 8), (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1954), 267–282; Albert C. Geljon, *Moses as Example: The Philonic Background of Gregory of Nyssa's De vita Moysis* (Providence: Universiteit Leiden, 2000); the same, *Philonic Exegesis in Gregory of Nyssa's De vita Moysis* (Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2002).

[71] Cf. Helena Panczová, 'Mojžiš – Boží priateľ: Priateľstvo človeka s Bohom ako vrchol duchovného rozvoja (Gregor z Nyssy, *Život Mojžiša* II,319–321),' *Studia Theologica*, 22, no. 1 (2020): 41–59. doi: 10.5507/sth.2019.020.

become God's friend. The perfection of life consists in doing good, but only because of that desire and nothing else.[72]

God loves all people in the same way. Adopting a human attitude towards God is what makes all the difference. The only relationship that can be called friendship is a reciprocal one.[73] The only adequate response man can give to God's love is through the only perfect thing that can be offered: the motivation to love God for His sake alone.

Is it not reasonable to conclude, then, that a human being who loves God for Himself alone becomes in a way equal to Him? Laura Rizzerio, in her article on Clement's ethical theory, interprets this concept of friendship as advocating a kind of equality between God and a person, equality less of ontology and more of action: the answer to God's disinterested beneficence and philanthropy is effected through the recipient's own disinterested love for God and for other people. In this respect, the person becomes equal to God because no reward is sought for the reciprocation of love.[74]

In contrast to Rizzerio, I think there is no direct connection between loving God solely for His sake and equality with Him. For merely stating that human beings are able to love God for His sake alone (as Philo, Clement and Gregory would have it) is not enough to prove their equality with God; all it shows, rather, is a similarity of attitude. The next chapter reveals whether these authors succeeded in finding other ways of framing friendship with God as a personal, reciprocal relationship similar to that formed between peers.

3. 'Friend of God' (Φίλος θεοῦ)

Philo first and foremost interprets the term 'friend of God' in relation to key figures from the Scriptures. Let us look at two of the most

[72] Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *De vit. Moys.* II,320 (*GNO* VII/1,144,20–145,4). For the influence of Philo's Abraham treatise on Gregory's treatise on Moses, cf. Markéta Bendová, 'The Influence of Philo's De Abrahamo on Gregory of Nyssa's De Vita Moysis,' *AUC Theologica*, 8, no. 2 (2018): 91–109. doi: 10.14712/23363398.2018.52.

[73] Cf. David Konstan, 'Reciprocity and Friendship,' in *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*, eds. Christopher Gill, Norman Postlethwaite and Richard Seaford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 279–301.

[74] Cf. Laura Rizzerio, 'L'éthique de Clément et les philosophies grecques,' *Studia Patristica*, 41 (2006): 231–246. Cf. esp. 243: 'malgré les differences, une certaine égalité existe bien entre l'homme et Dieu. Cette égalité ne se situe pas au niveau de la substance, mais de l'action bienveillante.'

exemplary of these: Moses, the greatest and most perfect of men,[75] and Abraham.[76] The primary biblical evidence for Moses being a friend of God is found in Exod 33:11.[77] The case for Abraham is more complex, however. Although nowhere in the Septuagint translation of the Pentateuch is Abraham called God's φίλος, he is referred to as God's 'beloved' in later books.[78] Elsewhere, both in the New Testament[79] and in Philo, the term 'friend of God' is attributed to him.[80]

On one occasion in some of the allegorical running commentaries on the book of Genesis,[81] a citation by Philo differs from an alternate version found in the Septuagint: in *De sobrietate*, Philo quotes God's speech from Gen 18:17: μὴ ἐπικαλύψω ἐγὼ ἀπὸ Ἀβραὰμ τοῦ φίλου μου; ('Shall I hide anything from Abraham my friend?').[82] Compare this with the Septuagint version, where Abraham is not God's φίλος ('friend') but His παῖς ('child', 'son' or 'servant'). The context of Philo's quotation is an exegesis of Noah's prayer for his son Shem in Gen 9:26: 'Blessed is the Lord, the God of Shem.' (Εὐλογητὸς κύριος ὁ θεὸς Σημ.)[83] In Philo's interpretation of the prayer, He who is the Lord and God of the entire world turns only His loving and beneficent side towards a good person (represented by Shem). The reference to Abraham supports the idea that the relationship between God and a good person is based not on fear or servitude, but on love and friendship. The change was perhaps made by Philo himself.[84]

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[75] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De vit. Moys.* I,1.

[76] A less important and less frequent example of a friend of God is Jacob; cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De somn.* I,196.

[77] For Moses as a friend of God, cf. Philo of Alexandria, *Quis rerum div. her.* 21; *De somn.* I,193–194; *De vit. Moys.* I,155–157; *De sacr. Abel. et Caini*, 130; *De migr. Abr.* 45; *De sacr. Abel. et Caini*, 130.

[78] Cf. 2 Chron 20:7 (Αβρααμ τῷ ἠγαπημένῳ σου); Isa 41:8 (Αβρααμ, ὃν ἠγάπησα). For Abraham as a friend of God, cf. Peterson, 'Der Gottesfreund,' 172–176.

[79] Cf. James 2:23.

[80] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De somn.* I,193–195; *De Abr.* 273; *De sobr.* 55–57.

[81] For that part of Philo's exegetical works, cf. James R. Royse, 'The Works of Philo,' in: *The Cambridge Companion to Philo*, ed. Adam Kamesar (Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 32–64, here 38–45.

[82] Philo of Alexandria, *De sobr.* 55 (English translation Francis Henry Colson – George Herbert Whitaker, *LCL* 247).

[83] Philo of Alexandria, *De sobr.* 51.

[84] Cf. Peterson, 'Der Gottesfreund,' 172. Philo quotes the Septuagint wording in *Leg. all.* III,27. As there is no specific mention of Abraham in the Masoretic Hebrew text (neither 'son' nor 'friend' nor anything else), it is difficult to surmise the contents of the Hebrew original from which the Septuagint was translated.

The Alexandrian exegete's description of a friend of God is similar to the characteristics that the Stoics typically attributed to the wise person. A person like Abraham who becomes a friend of God, 'pass[ing] beyond the bounds of human happiness' (πέραν ὅρων ἀνθρωπίνης εὐδαιμονίας προελήλυθε), is the only king (μόνος βασιλεύς), alone and free (μόνος ἐλεύθερος).[85] Here, a close affinity can also be read between the title 'friend of God' and Philo's version of the Stoic concept of the sage.

Another of Philo's allegorical commentaries reports that 'all the wise are friends of God' (οἱ σοφοὶ πάντες φίλοι θεοῦ).[86] For Philo, the sage is a rare figure indeed,[87] a view that becomes evident in his treatise *On the Migration of Abraham*. Having laid eyes on the (Promised) Land, Moses is denied entry:[88]

> You must not think that this was said, as some unconsidering people suppose, to humiliate the all-wise leader; for indeed it is folly to imagine that the servants of God take precedence of His friends (πρὸ τῶν φίλων τοῦ θεοῦ) in receiving their portion in the land of virtue. No, what he wishes to bring home to you first of all is that children have one place and full-grown men another, the one named training, the other called wisdom.[89]

There are two groups of people: wise men and children in training. Only members of the first group are called friends of God.[90]

Notably, the term 'friend of God' features prominently in Philo's 'biographical' treatises on Abraham and Moses, *De Abrahamo* and *De vita Moysis*. Abraham is called a 'friend of God' at the very end of *De Abrahamo*, within the context of Philo's summary of his importance

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[85] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De sobr.* 56–57, which was incorporated into *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, III, *Chrysippi fragmenta moralia. Fragmenta successorum Chrysippi*, ed. Ioannes ab Arnim (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1964–1968) as *SVF* III,603. Cf. also *SVF* III,589–602.

[86] Philo of Alexandria, *Quis heres*, 21 (English translation Francis Henry Colson – George Herbert Whitaker, *LCL* 261).

[87] For the rareness of sages, cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De sacr. Abel. et Caini*, 111; cf. also Carlos Lévy, 'Philo's Ethics,' in: *The Cambridge Companion to Philo*, 146–171, here 159–161.

[88] Cf. Deut 34:4.

[89] Philo of Alexandria, *De migr. Abr.* 45–46 (English translation by Colson – Whitaker, *LCL* 261.)

[90] Philo also mentions those who are φίλους τῷ θεῷ, an example of which is Moses; cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De ebr.* 94. Such people share characteristics of God, cf. *Leg. all.* III,71; 204; *De somn.* II,219 (μόνῳ θεῷ τὸ ἀκλινὲς καὶ πάγιόν ἐστιν οἰκεῖον καὶ εἴ τις αὐτῷ φίλος) and *De somn.* II,297; a similar formulation is found in Plato, *Tim.* 53d6–7.

of Abraham.[91] In *De vita Moysis*, the term is used in connection with the Sinai revelation, which, for Philo, represents the pinnacle of Moses' life.[92]

In the writings of early Christian writers, 'friend of God' is a unique title. In Gregory of Nyssa's *De vita Moysis*, it is used as a testament to perfection. Gregory presents Moses as an example of perfect virtue, culminating in an account of his friendship with God. Supported by references to biblical events, Gregory contends that Moses was indeed a friend of God and treated as such, evidence that 'the life of Moses did ascend the highest mount of perfection.'[93] So, whatever connotations one gives to the notion of the perfect human being, the ample evidence would suggest that being given the title 'friend of God' is as close as one can get.

I believe the classical ideal of friendship was intrinsic to what Philo and his Christian adherents understood as constituting a 'friend of God'. Compare it with the title 'Son of God' when used about a Christian: this term cannot be understood without realising that, in its primary sense, 'son' denotes someone who shares the nature of his father and who will ultimately become his heir and successor. Similarly, it is always a little bit bold to call a human being 'a friend of God'.

4. The relationship between God and His φίλος

We have explored the various meanings of the title φίλος θεοῦ. But let us now focus on the character of the relationship between God and His φίλος. I will consider two aspects Philo addresses: (i) frankness and (ii) the reciprocal sharing of similar goods.

The insights Philo gained from Hellenistic discussions of the classical Greek theory of friendship are evident in his reflections on the frankness of speech (παρρησία). Like other Hellenistic philosophers, he criticises flatterers (κόλακες), connecting true friendship with

[91] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De Abr.* 273. I will return to the passage in the next chapter.

[92] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De vit. Moys.* I,155–158. For the passage's place within Philo's interpretation of Moses' life, cf. Burton L. Mack, 'Imitatio Mosis: Patterns of Cosmology and Soteriology in the Hellenistic Synagogue,' *Studia Philonica*, 1 (1972): 27–55, here 27–28. Mack draws attention to parallels between Philo's description of the Sinai theophany in *De vit. Moys.* I,158 and Philo's account of Moses's death in *Quaest. Exod.* II,29 and *De vit. Moys.* II,288–291.

[93] Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *De vit. Moys.* II,320 (*GNO* VII/1,144,20–145,4).

sincerity.[94] In an observation that echoes the Hellenistic discourse on the friends of kings,[95] Philo commends Moses and Abraham for their frankness (παρρησία) towards God, a trait he interprets not as a sign of arrogance but of true friendship.[96] He considers Moses and Abraham true friends of God who should be afforded the opportunity to speak openly with Him.[97]

Let us finally look once more at Philo's account of Abraham's friendship with God. In his remarkable interpretation of the Scripture, Philo considers a kind of reciprocity between God and Abraham whereby goods of the same kind are gifted and returned.

At the very end of *De Abrahamo*, Philo offers one of several proofs of Abraham's pre-eminence as a friend:

> That God marvelling at Abraham's faith in Him (τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν πίστεως) repaid him with faithfulness (πίστιν) by confirming with an oath the gifts which He had promised, and here He no longer talked with him as God with man but as a friend with a familiar (ὡς φίλος γνωρίμῳ). For He, with Whom a word is an oath, yet says 'By Myself have I sworn,'[98] so that his mind might be established more securely and firmly even than it was before.[99]

There is a play on words in the Greek text: Philo uses πίστις to denote two different meanings (Francis Henry Colson translates it as 'faith' and 'faithfulness'). Marvelling at Abraham's 'faith' (πίστις),[100] God repays him by pledging His 'assurance' (πίστις).[101] In the Septuagint translation of Gen 15:6, Abraham (called Abram) 'believed' (ἐπίστευσεν)

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[94] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *De plant.* 106; *Leg. all.* II,10; III,182.

[95] Cf. Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, 93–121 and above, 11.

[96] Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *Quis rerum div. her.* 5–7; 21. Cf. also Panczová, 'Mojžiš – Boží priateľ, 46–47.

[97] For the meaning of the term παρρησία in Christian literature, esp. in Gregory of Nyssa, cf. M. Marunová, 'Řehořův výklad modlitby Otče náš. Kázání, nebo filosofické pojednání?,' in Řehoř z Nyssy, *Otče náš*, transl. and comm. M. Marunová (Praha: Oikúmené, 2019), 7–26, here 21–23.

[98] Gen 22:16.

[99] Philo of Alexandria, *De Abr.* 273: ὃς τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν πίστεως ἀγάμενος τὸν ἄνδρα πίστιν ἀντιδίδωσιν αὐτῷ, τὴν δι' ὅρκου βεβαίωσιν ὧν ὑπέσχετο δωρεῶν, οὐκέτι μόνον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ θεός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς φίλος γνωρίμῳ διαλεγόμενος· φησὶ γὰρ 'κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ὤμοσα,' παρ' ᾧ ὁ λόγος ὅρκος ἐστίν, ἵνενα τοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀκλινῶς καὶ παγίως ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ἐρηρεῖσθαι. (English translation by Colson, *LCL* 289.)

[100] Cf. Gen 15:6.

[101] For a translation of πίστις as 'pledge', cf. Charles D. Yonge, *The Works of Philo: Complete und Unabridged* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2002), 434.

in God. As Philo would have it, the 'assurance' (πίστις) God gives Abraham underscores God's oath from Gen 22:16.[102] Here, Philo highlights this mutual exchange and reciprocation of the same kind of goods: God bestows upon Abraham πίστις in exchange for πίστις, meaning God no longer speaks with Abraham as the Creator to His creation, but 'as a friend with a familiar' (ὡς φίλος γνωρίμῳ).

Conclusion

We have seen how Philo believed a relationship of perfection between God and a person to be more or less akin to the classical idea of friendship. The ultimate example of this is the friendship between God and Moses, whom the Pentateuch calls a 'friend of God'. The same title, Philo argues, can also be applied to Abraham or, indeed, any person who displays sagacious qualities. The basic prerequisite for the formation of such a 'friendship' (φίλια) is that, in return for God's love, a person worships God for His sake alone.

Philo's concept of friendship with God was inspired by the defining characteristics of friendship advanced by the Greeks. As such, the more perfect the relationship between a person and God, the closer it mirrors a reciprocal and mutual exchange between equals.

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[102] In a similar way, Philo provides commentary on God's oath in *Leg. all.* III,203–210.

PSEUDO-CLEMENTINE WRITINGS AS EVIDENCE OF FRIENDSHIP, CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, AND POLEMICS IN THE EARLY CHURCH[1]

JIŘÍ HOBLÍK

ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the Pseudo-Clementine writings as examples of Jewish-Christian literature between the second and fourth centuries CE. In view of their mutual antagonism and friendship, it interprets them as an attempt at orthodoxy, an instance of the line which led from Paul's mission to the Nicaean Council. On the one hand, the Pseudo-Clementines introduce peculiar rationalist Christology, while at the same time opposing both Gnosticism and paganism, as well as coming to terms with other early Christian schools. They also use the image of family to represent the Christian community connected by love, in which relationships acquire a new quality as compared to friendship.

Keywords:

Pseudo-Clementines; Friendship; Love; Church; Opponents; Jewish Christianity; Christology

DOI: 10.14712/23363398.2020.56

The history of early Christianity is marked by the polarity of affiliation and controversy. The Christian movement at that time was still at an early stage of structure forming and the Pseudo-Clementines, representing Jewish Christianity as one of its parts, are distinguished by their firm stand against its opponents, especially Gentiles and Gnostics. Their strong polemical interest goes hand in hand with

[1] This study is a result of research funded by the Czech Science Foundation within the GA ČR 19–02741S project, 'The Transmission and Transformation of Ideas in Hellenism, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity'.

the fictitious story of the future Bishop Clement of Rome, which in turn aimed to show his friendly relationship with the Apostle Peter in his role as a bishop and the reunion of Clement's family as the image of the Church and community of love. As far as possible, our study will attempt to explain some specific features of the Pseudo-Clementines regarding both these objectives, the former of which is mainly embodied in speeches and dialogues, whereas the latter in narration. We would like to suggest that the enmity Clement and Peter experienced contrasts with their personal friendship, and that this friendship corresponds to some ancient notions of friendship, but also that it is only a stage of a path leading to a more deeply based (as relating to Christ) and more fundamentally focused (in terms of salvation) Christian community.

From the early Christian collection of Pseudo-Clementines, two most important writings stand out: first, the novel ὁμιλίαι (*Hom.*; Homilies), supplemented at the beginning by Peter's Letter to James, James' Reply (*Cont.*), and Clement's Letter to James, and secondly, *Recognitiones* (*Rec.*; Recognitions, an originally Greek version of the previous letter, surviving only in Latin), the Second Letter of Clement, and two ἐπιτομαί in Greek.

The story of the Homilies and Recognitions takes place in the first century, in the time of Clement and Peter, but their attribution to Clement as the historical Bishop of Rome (cf. Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 3.3.3 [SC 211:36.51]) can only be pseudo-epigraphic. Jewish Christianity, as portrayed in the Pseudo-Clementines, had already diverted from its original embrace of the partisans of the synagogue professing Christ.

In any case, the material of the Pseudo-Clementines is markedly pre-Nicaean. Although some scholars have identified Arian theology in the Homilies,[2] Oscar Cullmann attributed the purportedly Arian passages to Jewish Christians.[3] On the other hand, the Homilies were probably written not long before the outbreak of the Arian dispute, i.e. 318 CE.[4] As a translation, the Recognitions is already post-Nicae-

[2] Cf. Charles Bigg, *Clementine Homilies* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1890), 167.191–192.

[3] Cf. Oscar Cullmann, *Le problème littéraire et historique du roman pseudo-clémentin, étude sur le rapport entre le gnosticisme et le judéo-christianisme* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1930), 161.

[4] Annette Yoshiko Reed puts Homiliai in 300–320, cf. 'Heresiology and the (Jewish-) Christian Novel: Narrativized Polemics in the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies,' in *Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity*, ed. Eduard Iricinschi, and Holger M. Zellentin (Tübingen: Mohr, 2008), 273–298, 273.

an. It was accomplished in the fifth century CE by Tyrannius Rufinus (ca 345–411/412), who is probably also responsible for some of the adjustments motivated by conformity with anti-Arianism.[5]

1. Narrative, Friendship, and Opponents

The narrative forms only a minor part of the two main Pseudo-Clementine writings, the majority of it consisting of extensive theological speeches. Rather than being written at one instance as a whole, it was inspired by an older narration about two main opponents, Peter and Simon (written after 190 CE).[6]

It is particularly important in combining speeches and pictures of rigmaroles and crises of life, culminating in the happy reunion of Clement's family. It also evidences the significance of church authorities, specifically the authority of Bishop Peter, who is portrayed as both a charismatic personality and a pilgrim. He is both Clement's spiritual teacher and personal friend, i.e. he cares for him and wants the best for him (Peter calls Clement a friend in *Hom.* I 16; II 36; *Rec.* I 21.22).

This image of friendship corresponds materially to Aristotle's concept of perfect friendship, which

> is that between the good, and those who resemble each other in virtue. For these friends wish each alike the other's good in respect of their goodness, and they are good in themselves; but it is those who wish the good of their friends for their friends' sake who are friends in the fullest sense since they love each other for themselves and not accidentally (*Eth. Nic.* 1156b6).

By analogy, Peter's friendship to Clement ensues from the former's character and the nature of his own mission.

The introductory passage describes Clement's education and conversion (*Hom.* I 1-6; *Rec.* I 1-3). We learn that Clement was intrigued by serious matters from his youth (which is an obvious literary tropus): whether the world was created, what was before creation, what will be after the destruction of the world, and whether there is individual

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[5] Cf. F. Stanley Jones. *An Ancient Jewish Christian Source on the History of Christianity*: *Pseudo-Clementine 'Recognitions' 1.27–71* (Atlanta, Ga: Scholar Press 1995), 42–44.

[6] Cf. Jürgen Wehnert. *Pseudoklementinische Homilien: Einführung und Übersetzung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 32.

existence after death.[7] However, he was not satisfied with the answers provided by contemporary philosophy; in its place, he found mere sophistry (*Hom.* I 3.1-4; *Rec.* I 3.1,3; cf. e.g. *Phaedo* 89d$_1$–90c$_7$).[8] Having been told about a prophet of the East he traveled to Alexandria, where he took the advice of Barnabas, a Christian orator, and accompanied him to Caesarea Maritima.

In Caesarea, Clement met the Apostle Peter (*Hom.* I 15) who had arrived shortly before him to confront his opponent, Simon Magus (*Hom.* I 15), a celebrity of his time already mentioned in the Book of Acts (8:9). He seems to have been a Gnostic who considered himself an incarnation of the divine (*θεῖος ἀνήρ*, 'divine man') or messiah.[9] Peter's conflict with this arch-heretic defines a certain line of thought and action culminating at the end of the story in Simon's defeat and escape (*Hom.* XX 13).

After the moment Clement and Peter meet, the story of Clement's journey blends with the second storyline, namely Peter's journey from Caesarea along the Syrian coast to Antioch on the Orontes. During this journey, Clement meets all his lost family members one by one, thus coming to recognition (gr. *ἀναγνωρισμός*, lat. *recognitio*). The story of recognition is actually a sort of narrative Platonism, presenting a polemic alternative to Gnosticism and, most importantly, advocating personal relationship to Christ – 'the Prophet of the truth' (s.b.). The names of Clement's father (*Φαῦστος*, Faustus, in *Rec. Faustinianus*) and two brothers (*Φαυστίνος*, Faustinus and *Φαυστινιανος*, Faustinianus, in *Rec. Faustinus* and *Faustus*) are reminiscent of the Latin expression *faustus* (happy, the one who brings good luck), thus anticipating the fate of their bearers. This is to show that happiness or good luck is conferred neither by Fortune (upon which Faustus had previously relied) nor by a timetable encoded in the stars, but rather by the fulfilment of the true goal of life, pursued by the Christian community. Thus true knowledge is a road to happiness. The conversion of family members is not only a turning point in their personal conviction but also the discovery of a new perspective in life, wherein the renewal of family ties means a surprising fulfilment of an almost forsaken hope, but also

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[7] Cf. Nicole Kelley, *Knowledge and Religious Authority in the Pseudo-Clementines: Situating the Recognitions in Fourth-century Syria* (Tübingen: Mohr, 2006), 8 note 27.

[8] See Kelley, *Knowledge*, 46–49.

[9] Cf. Kurt Rudolf, *Gnosis: The Nature and History of Gnosticism*, trans. McLachlan Wilson, reprint 2th ed. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998), 294–298.

the defence of traditional family structures and benefit of the children. This requires moral integrity; however, the defence of the family is not intended to be just a moral example. The image of a good family is also an ideal image of the Christian community and mutual affectionate relationships between its members beyond the notion of friendship.

The *Homilies* use the term *φιλία* (cf. lat. *amicitia* in the *Recognitions*), 'friendship', in its usual sense of interpersonal relations and only exceptionally as a theoretical subject, e.g. in *Hom.* XII 25.26 on the superiority of philanthropy (*φιλανθρωπία*, universal love) over friendship (reciprocity and mutual benefit). The etymological affinity of these two terms calls for comparison. However, the latter is one of the major themes of the Pseudo-Clementines and overlaps to a large extent with the notion of love. One of the constituents (*μέρος*) of philanthropy is love (*ἀγάπη* in XII 32)[10] for everyone; it is manifested by doing well even to enemies. It is evident that the traditional Greek notion of philanthropy is conceived in the light of the *ἀγάπη*, 'love' in the NT sense. Besides, the subject matter here is only certain specific forms of love, not the concept of love in its entirety (love that determines and fulfils human life, cf. God's love for humans, I 39, love for God, III 8, but also love for truth, I 10, etc.). Although the Homilies also know ἀγάπη as a term for love, they mention the noun only seven times, while the verb ἀγαπάω occurs exactly eight times as more often. The verb refers, not surprisingly, to the love for God (*Hom.* III 37.59; XII 33; XVII 11.12; XIX 6; cf. ἀγάπη in XVII 12), for one's neighbours as discussed particularly in the twelfth homily (*Hom.* XII 2.26.32.33, cf. III 69) and even for one's enemies (*Hom.* III 19; XII 32). In this, the Homilies only follow Christian usage. It is interesting, however, that the verb is also used for relationships in Clement's family (XIII 5.10; XIV 7.9.10; XVIII 22; XX 20), which supports our assumption that this family embodies a Christian community of love.

The relationship of love and friendship does not mean the same thing. Friendship is the relationship of God to a person who does his will (*Hom.* VIII 10; *Rec.* I 26; III 71; V 26.28.29; cf. *Wis* 7:27). In this case, it is rather an expression for a favourable relationship: God becomes a friend to humans, or even makes them friends 'for his Son' (*Rec.* IX 4; cf. also IX 9). Christ also has merit for God's friendship with people (cf. *Hom.* VIII 10; *Rec.* IV 9; IX 3) so that friendship becomes an

[10] The other of the two constituents is compassion.

interesting concept in terms of Christology (cf. the apostles as 'friends' of the Lord in *Hom.* III 71 and *John* 15:15). According to the Pseudo-Clementines, Peter's preaching also helps God's friendship if its content is imprinted in the listeners' memory (*Rec.* I 26). Even Abraham was honoured by him (*Hom.* XVIII 13; Aphrahat in *Hom.* XVII 3). On the level of interpersonal relationships (cf. e.g. *Hom.* II 1; IV 1; XIII 8; XIV 11; XV 2; XX 11.14.15.21; *Rec.* VI 15; VII 4; X 52.55.58.62.63) it is true that a friend is favoured, and this title is also his appreciation (in the Recognitions, sometimes the term *familiaris* 'acquaintance, familiar' occurs as parallel to 'friend', e.g. VII 23). The aspect of favour can then be recognized in a distorted form in the 'friends of demons' (*Rec.* IX 33; 'a friend of the prince of this world, and of all demons' in VI 9), in Simon's friends (*Hom.* II 18.20 .28; VII 3.11; XVI 1; XVIII 23; XIX 25; *Rec.* X 68), in his pretence of friendship (*Rec.* II 8) or in the false friendship of yet another enemy, Apion (*Hom.* IV 8; V 2). Thus friendship is not an abstract value, but it also depends on who the friend is. In comparison with all these mentions of friendship, however, the friendship between Clement and Peter, which is constitutive of the story and thus deserves special attention, seems to be the most significant.

The concept of friendship in the Pseudo-Clementines, it may be asserted, is better illustrated by the narrative than by theory: although the relationship between Peter and Clement epitomizes friendship, the main thing is what this relationship leads to, namely the superiority of Christian love over friendship. This friendly relationship between the teacher and the pupil is also closely related to the conflict of their two opponents, from which Clemens himself is supposed to learn a lesson.

Although this is not obvious from our own considerations, the proper hero of the story is Simon Peter, who is invariably portrayed as a representative and advocate of pure and simple Christianity – as contrasted with his opponent, enemy, fraudster and heretic Simon Magus. The latter character unifies several polemical objectives. This synthesis is evident in the speech of Peter's companion Akylas when they meet Clement in *Hom.* II 22. The character of Simon displays the features of the historical character of Simon Magus in aspiring to greater power than God's and thinking himself to be the Christ. He was also 'opposed to Jerusalem', preferring Mount Gerizim over it as Samaritans did, as he actually came from Samaria (his Samaritan origin is confirmed e.g. by Justin Martyr, *1 Apol.* 26 [PG 6, 368A]; for the anti-Samaritan polemics cf. *Rec.* I 54.4–5, I 57.1). He is also reminiscent of Marcion who denied

the Creator as the supreme God, placing beside him God the Lawgiver (cf. also III 2; V 2; XVI 1–21). In that, he embodies heresy as a contrasting figure in relation to Peter and as his opponent (*Hom.* XVI 21), Peter himself represents the Jewish-Christian form of orthodoxy.

This distinction applies in a confusing situation of struggle in which distinction must be made between friends and enemies, as is clear from what Peter says about Simon:

> … if he were known, he would not be believed; but now, not being known, he is improperly believed; and though his deeds are those of a hater, he is loved; and though an enemy, he is received as a friend; and though he be death, he is desired as a savior; and though fire, he is esteemed as light; and though a deceiver, he is believed as a speaker of truth (*Hom.* II 18).

2. The Pseudo-Clementines as evidence of the differentiation of Jewish Christianity and opposition to Paulinism

Our question of friendly relationships and coming to terms with one's opponents as presented in the Pseudo-Clementines is part of the Judeo-Christian frame of mind, as it historically developed in its variegated forms. Unsurprisingly, this type of Christianity was at home, mainly in Syria. This geographic area is suggested both by the scene of the story and the above-mentioned testimony by Eusebius, but also by the surviving Syrian translation of one of the Greek *ἐπιτομαί*. The social base was represented by a not very large but not negligible circle of adherents with their own independent literary tradition.[11]

The Pseudo-Clementines incorporate allusions to various Christian writings,[12] although a direct dependence on early Christian movements (e.g. Elcesaites[13] and Ebionites)[14] is debatable. The Elcesaites were a Jewish-Christian movement with strong apocalyptic features, tracing its roots to a certain prophetic preacher called Elchasai. It was

[11] See also Walter Bauer and Georg Strecker, *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum*, 2th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1964), 183.

[12] Cf. Wehnert, *Homilien*, 36.

[13] Cf. Gerhard Uhlhorn, *Die Homilien und Recognitionen des Clemens Romanus nach ihrem Ursprung und Inhalt dargestellt* (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1854), 399.401.

[14] Cf. Adolph Schliemann, *Die Clementinen nebst den verwandten Schriften und des Ebionitismus, ein Beitrag zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte der ersten Jahrhunderte* (Hamburg: Perthes, 1844), 201.

established at the turn of the first and second centuries in Transjordan and later became widespread in Syria.[15] According to Epiphanius of Salamina (ca 315 to 403), the Ebionites were influenced by the Elcesaites, were neither Jews nor Christians, and accepted three writings, viz. the *Gospel of the Hebrews (τὸ καθ' Ἑβραίους εὐαγγέλιον)*, the *Circuits of Peter (περίοδοι Πέτρου)* and the *Ascents of James (αναβαθμοί Ιακώβου)* (*Panarion* 29.7.5 [GCS 25:330]). The *Gospel of the Hebrews* was said to be a broken and falsified gospel. According to it, Jesus was a man naturally born, who was entered into by Christ in the form of a dove and who refused to eat meat (*Panarion* 30.13; 14; 22 [GCS 25:350.351.263]). The *Circuits of Peter* allegedly spoke about the Ebionite teaching of Christ's birth as a human and his being created as one of the Archangels, designed to be their ruler, refusing to eat meat and rejecting sacrifices (*Hom.* XXX 15.1–4; 16.1–5). As compared to these Christological speculations, the Pseudo-Clementines are much more sober, as can be seen especially in their Christology.[16] The *Ascents of James* allegedly advocated the Jerusalem form of Judeo-Christianity, anti-Paulinian in character (*Hom.* XXX 16.6–9; cf. *Rec.* I 27–71) but apparently of Jewish origin.[17]

The connection between the Pseudo-Clementines and the Jewish Christianity is materially attested by their mutual features, viz. restraint in identifying Jesus with God, high valuation of the Law, and limited meat consumption (cf. *Hom.* VII 8). However, circumcision was no longer practiced – with the exception of native Jews, according to *Cont.* 1,1.[18] Another notable mark of their Jewish-Christian origin is the evaluation of Peter and James, 'the Brother of the Lord'. These two were closer to the Jewish Christians than the 'apostle of the Gentiles', Paul of Tarsus, who is not even mentioned by name and actually becomes an implicit object of criticism under the thin disguise of Simon Magus. This

[15] Cf. Hans-Joachim Schoeps, *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1949), 327.

[16] Parallels are also sought for in their relation to the Samaritans, and their cosmology is reminiscent of the already mentioned movement of the Bardaisanites (turn of the second and third centuries) of Syrian Gnostic origin and yet not unrelated to Christianity. Cf. Bernhard Rehn, 'Bardesanes in den Pseudoclementinen,' *Philologus* 93, no. 1–2 (December 1938): 218–247.

[17] Cf. Christfried Böttrich and Sabine Fahl, *Leiter Jakobs* (Gütesloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2015), 79.

[18] Cf. Gerd Lüdemann, *Paulus, der Heidenapostel: Antipaulinismus im frühen Christentum*, II. *Antipaulinismus im frühen Christentum*, 2th ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990), 244.256.

is particularly clear in the polemics with Simon in *Hom.* XVII 13–20 (cf. *Gal* 1:11–12), where Peter casts doubts on visions and dreams as external means of revelation as it is not clear where they come from. Thus he indirectly questions the apostolic legitimacy of Paul,[19] who unlike Peter was not a direct disciple of Jesus (cf. *Rec.* II 55). *Rec.* II 54 apparently alludes to Paul when Peter chastises Simon for bending the Law to suit his own agenda.

The alleged anti-Paulinian character of the Pseudo-Clementines is still a hotly debated issue,[20] and we prefer to withhold our judgment in this respect. From the Christology and soteriology of the Pseudo-Clementines we can infer their distinctiveness of thought as compared to Paul's theory of vicarious death, bringing about reconciliation between God and humans (cf. *Rom* 3:25; *2Cor* 5:18–20, etc.), although the vicariousness of Christ's suffering is not directly denied. Rather, the Pseudo-Clementines disagree with Paul's *sola fide* accent, emphasizing the need of good conduct for salvation.[21] Nevertheless, they claim that 'human love for God' (ἡ εἰς θεόν ἀνθρώπων στοργή) is enough for salvation (*Hom.* III 8), which does not need to be opposed to the previous principle, no more than a mere 'justification by works' needs to be read into them. After all, they seem to be dealing mainly with Gnosticism and Marcionism. Although undoubtedly opposed to Paul, the Pseudo-Clementines only hint at some of his peculiar features and thought patterns in painting a negative picture of Simon. Moreover, it is sometimes rightfully pointed out that the actual subject of controversy is Marcion, or Marcion's interpretation of Paul.[22] In this context, it should also be noted that the theme of friendship plays a minimal role in Paul (there is no instance of the noun φιλία in his letters and the verb φιλέω occurs only in *1Cor* 16:22).

As we can see, the Pseudo-Clementines deviate from Judaism and also from other Jewish-Christian movements, but they are not in opposition to either: Simon is perceived as a more serious adversary.

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19 Cf. Lüdemann, *Paulus*, 251.

20 Cf. F. Stanley Jones, 'The Pseudo-Clementines: A History of Research, Part I and II,' in *Pseudoclementina Elchasaiticaque inter Judeochristiana: Collected Studies* (Leuven: Peeters, 2012), 81–*113*. For evidence of anti-Paulinism in the Pseudo-Clementines, cf. Lüdemann, *Paulus*, 228–257.

21 Cf. Marcel Simon Strasbourg, 'On Some Aspects of Early Christian Soteriology' in *Man and His Salvation: Studies in Memory of S. G. F. Brandon*, ed. Eric J. Sharpe, and John R. Hinnels (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1973), 263–280.

22 Cf. Stanley Jones, 'The Pseudo-Clementines,' 152–171.

3. The Christology of the Pseudo-Clementines

As we have seen, the story of the Pseudo-Clementines conceives friendship as the initial form of an interpersonal relationship that connects people for the sake of a good goal, but which is ultimately transcended by the bond of Christian love that reflects the path of salvation. In our view, this is rooted in a specific Christology.

Jesus is portrayed as a prophet *par excellence*. He is called 'our Lord and prophet' (*κύριος ἡμῶν καὶ προφήτης*, cf. *Hom.* XI 35) and acknowledged as a 'prophet of the truth' (*ὁ τῆς ἀηθείας προφήτης*, cf. e.g. *Hom.* I 20,4; II 5,3; 6,1; 9,1) or 'the true prophet' (*ὁ ἀληθής προφήτης*, cf. e.g. *Hom.* II 17,4; III 11,2; 13,2; lat. *verus propheta* e.g. in *Rec.* I 16,1.2.4; 17,2.4.6). Clemens himself was interested in the 'teaching of the prophet' (*ὁ περὶ προφήτου λόγος*, *Hom.* II 4,3), which he perceived as a beacon leading him through the jumble of teachings and in the direction that the prophet Jesus embodied. For the Pseudo-Clementines, the true prophet is the highest authority. He is justified in the fulfilment of his prophecies (cf. *Hom.* II 10,1; VIII 4,1 i.a.), and the Pseudo-Clementines claim that ancient prophecies have been fulfilled in Jesus' person (cf. *Hom.* III 53,3; *Rec.* I 40,4). Thus we can say that for the Pseudo-Clementines, Jesus is a messianic prophet. The Pseudo-Clementines share the idea of a messianic prophet with other Jewish religious movements (e.g. the Essenes), the only difference being that for the Pseudo-Clementines, the messiah had already come.[23]

Jesus as the true prophet is considered to be an interpreter of the Law (cf. *Hom.* III 51; XVIII 3; XX 9,2 and *doctor legis*, 'the teacher of the Law' in *Rec.* I 62,3), which is reflected not only in the emphasis on knowledge related to him (see below), but also in the title of Jesus as a teacher (*διδάσκαλος*, cf. *Rec.* I 62,3), although he is also said to have come 'for the salvation (*σωτηρία*) of the whole world' (*Hom.* XII 7,5; cf. XX 19,3; *Rec.* II 19,7; 28,3; 35,2; V 11,3; 61,3; VII 7,5). The concept of salvation is associated with eternal life (*ζωή αἰώνιος*) as proclaimed by Jesus (cf. e.g. *Hom.* I 7,2; II 5,2; III 18,3; *Rec.* I 7,3; 41,2; II 20,5; 22,5) who also receives 'the key of the kingdom, which is knowledge, which alone can open the gate of life, through which alone is the entrance to eternal life' (*Hom.* III 18,3).

[23] Cf. Hans-Joachim Schoeps, *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums*, 87. For Jesus as a new Adam and new Moses, see also p. 98–99.

Due to this distinctive Christology, Christianity differs from traditional Judaism in its notion of salvation. On the other hand, this difference is not particularly emphasized in Peter's sermon about the relationship between Jesus and Moses (cf. *Hom.* VIII 4–7; *Rec.* IV 4–6). Apart from this Jewish-Christian trait, the attitude voiced in *Hom.* VIII 7 is more explicitly Jewish-Christian: the Jews can be saved through their faith in Moses although they have never heard about Jesus, and similarly, Christians can be saved through their faith in Jesus, without ever having heard about Moses. Moses is viewed as a prophet (*ὁ προφήτης Μωυσῆς*, *Hom.* II 38,1; XI 22,2) and the recipient of the divine Law (*Hom.* III 47,1).[24]

However, the theme of salvation is not fully developed. While speaking about *σωτηρία* several times, the *Homiliai* never mention the related expressions *σταυρὸς* (cross) and *ἀνασταυρόω* (crucify), whereas *ἀνάστασις* in the meaning of resurrection is mentioned only once (*Hom.* XVII 16,5). Jesus is titled as Christ and expected in his second coming (e.g. *Hom.* II 17,4–5).[25] Yet the life 'in this world' seems to be more important, and Jesus is portrayed as a prophet and guide on this journey. This is made clear by the expression 'authoritative prophetic teaching' (*Hom.* II 15,5). In particular, the 'prophet' preaches the doctrine of the two ways (*Hom.* VII 7), as we know it e.g. from the Gospel of Matthew 7:13–14 and from the beginning of the early Christian treatise *Didache* (I–V, FC 1: 98–117).

It would be misleading to understand the Pseudo-Clementine Jesus as a mere guarantor of doctrine; as 'the true prophet', he actually transforms personal experience and perception. He alone is 'able to enlighten human souls so that they may see in their own eyes the path of eternal salvation' (*Hom.* I 19,1). He is indispensable because no principle is either true or false in itself, but only relative to the speaker (*Hom.* I 19,3–4). Without him, people have no access to the *πιστὸς*, 'reliable/certain' (*Hom.* I 19,8) and he alone bestows the knowledge of immortality and other Christian doctrines, which is a prerequisite of their attainment (*Hom.* II 5,2). This can be seen as evidence of personal attachment to Christ as a mediator between people and God, an attachment constitutive of the Christian community.

[24] Chapter 47 justifies the thesis that the Law was not written by Moses, e.g. whether it was possible for Moses to write that Moses had died, cf. *Hom.* III 47,3.

[25] For the Jewish-Christian understanding cf. Schoeps, *Theologie*, 78–82.

In contrast to traditional Judaism, the Pseudo-Clementines insist that Jesus is the Son of God; on the other hand, this is exactly what he is: the Son of God as distinct from God (cf. e.g. *Hom.* I 7,2.7; 8,4; 9,2; XVI 15 and XVIII 13). If Jesus is God then only in so far as all people are (*Hom.* XVI 15,2; cf. 16,1–4). This restraint in identifying Jesus with God, open at the same time to overcoming the mutual distance between the two, can be viewed as one of the characteristic features of Jewish Christianity. It is also a testimony about the time before the First Council of Nicaea and the need to defend monotheism.

In the Pseudo-Clementines, monotheism is not only a concept of theology but also a touchstone of religious practice and lifestyle, a way to understand reality and the meaning of life. This can be clearly seen in the anti-Gentile metaphor (albeit not an original one) of monarchy and polyarchy. The superiority of monarchy over polyarchy rests in the fact that 'monarchy is capable of creating unity' (IX 2,3); unity does not fight against itself, whereas polyarchy has a tendency to mutual wars (IX 2,1). By analogy, God's unity corresponds to social unity on earth: the restored unity of Clement's family as an image of the unity of the Church. This unity in love is centred on Christ and focused on its fulfilment in salvation, which makes love, in the language of the Pseudo-Clementines, far superior to friendship.

Christology plays an important role in the Pseudo-Clementines as an interpretation tool of the distinguishing feature of Christianity (focus on Christ), which is to be of interest to members of the Christian community and which is itself the very source of their interest. The intention of these writings to educate the reader is rooted in Christology, so that in a controversy with their opponents and in the difficulties of their own lives, in which both friends and enemies play a role, they can succeed in reliance on the source of truth. The concept of friendship connects theology, Christology, and ethics of the Pseudo-Clementines with the Greek world, but its use is differentiated because it depends on whether the source of favour is God, or whether it is a real or even an apparent friend.

Concluding remarks

The ambiguity of the Pseudo-Clementines results from the fact that they do not represent a distinctive orthodoxy but rather a peculiar attempt at orthodoxy, leading to a distinctive soteriology which is both

rational and *interpersonal*, e.g. in the dialogical relationship between friends and within the family as a *communio christiana* and in relation to Christ, who is the common point of reference by which the human view transcends to the source of truth, with its benefits for humans. The doctrine that also included this type of Christology was thus meant not only to be proclaimed but also practically applied in social relationships and differences – including both friends and opponents. At the same time, Peter and Clement were opponents of Gnosticism, Marcionism, and Paganism, yet their story involved much more than just a refutation of certain doctrines.

The Christology of the Pseudo-Clementines is therefore fairly rationalist. Jesus is the Savior mainly in that he communicates to people the path of salvation. The motif of the journey is markedly expressed in the pilgrimage of Peter and Clement, but also in the wandering and reunion of members of Clement's family, so his whole story involves the direction towards salvation that the united family is to embody and foreshadow. The concept of a rational path to salvation is important because the Savior is not only a salvific agent of an objective spiritual reality but also a counterpart of humans, whereas people are conscious and responsible recipients of salvation. Thus the rationalist interpersonal Christology is well suited to the image of the family as a communion of love, in which also philanthropy has its starting point.

Knowledge as a fundamental prerequisite of salvation is not a human exercise but a gift. The *recognitio* as the principle of Clement's story expresses the promise of salvation in the form of renewal and rehabilitation of humanity in its social dimension. This illustrates the attitude of the Pseudo-Clementines: in them, orthodoxy is not only a doctrine but also and foremost a lifestyle. Needless to say, the retrieval of what had been lost as an aspect of salvation is already a part of Jesus' teaching, his parable of the lost sheep (*L* 15:4–7). The role of inter-personality and social dimension in the process of salvation shows that the concept of 'friendly' relationships does not suffice to describe the existentially necessary aspects of fellow-humanity, threatened as they are by destruction and hopelessness beyond the human potential.

In light of this, the concept of friendship ought to be understood: in the Pseudo-Clementines, it is fundamentally related to the whole. The friendship between Clement and Peter is the starting point and a constitutive feature of the story, in which the image of friendship is surpassed by the community of love. The contrast with the adversaries,

radically excluded from the community, thus appears to be even more pungent. On the other hand, in other relationships, the concept of friendship does not play such a strong, profiled, and distinctive role (e.g. Clement's relatives are mentioned as friends only occasionally and God's 'friendship' expresses only a partial view of God's relationship to humans). The friendship between Clement and Peter thus starts to work as a paradigm, showing that Christians need a trustworthy partner on their path of salvation, in the midst of a confused and conflicting world, to reach the saving knowledge from the 'prophet of truth'. Thus, the restoration of the family and the settlement of hostile doctrines is an image of salvation and the presence of salvation in this world.

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ON FRIENDS AND FALSE FRIENDSHIP IN THE POETRY OF GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS[1]

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ABSTRACT

Unlike family relations, friendships are based primarily on deliberate personal decisions. In some cases, however, they can be marked not only by sympathy and positive emotions but also by opportunism and conflicts. The relationship between two Church Fathers and close friends, St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. Basil the Great, went through a whole range of emotions. A portrayal of this relationship, as well as several others (e.g. the one with Maximus the Cynic), is to be found in St. Gregory's autobiographical poem *De vita sua*. Some details on the saint's friends can also be perceived from his letters in verses, addressed to a group of more or less close friends from his surroundings. The variety and seriousness of the matters that St. Gregory discusses in these texts mirror the depth or superficiality of each particular relationship. In his letters in verses, Gregory of Nazianzus asks his friends for special favours (e.g. Hellenius), praises their deeds (e.g. some members of the monastic community in Caesarea), encourages them (e.g. Nemesius) or reprimands them (e.g. Vitalianus). A significant indicator of the level of friendship with the persons involved is the way St. Gregory addresses them. The salutations he uses are often very courteous, but in a couple of cases, marks of enmity can be found as well.

Keywords:

Gregory of Nazianzus; Poetry; Friends; St. Basil the Great; Cynic Maximus; Peraequator Hellenius

DOI: 10.14712/23363398.2020.57

The life of St. Gregory of Nazianzus was constant strife between active life and desire for contemplative seclusion. This inner

[1] This contribution was created as part of the implementation of the project VEGA 1/0114/17 Poemata moralia of Gregory of Nazianzus.

struggle is conspicuous in many of Gregory's writings, foremost in the poetry written by the end of his life, reflecting author's experiences, opinions and convictions. The perception of Christian values and their significance for the world inspired the poems with moral undertone,[2] in which he is comparing the worldly and the spiritual life. Gregory reflects upon human virtues, moral integrity, restraint, patience, but also human nature in general. He denounces excessive wealth, envy, laziness, or the beauty of women, encourages people to turn away from idols and focus on God. He does not evade issues such as anger, lust for property or false friends.[3]

Two short poems bear upon the theme of fake friendship. They are written in iambic trimeter[4] that lets the poet easily adapt various moods.

I, II, 22 De falsis amicis	**I, II, 23 De eodem argumento**[6]
Δεινὸν τὸ πάσχειν. Ἂν δὲ καὶ φίλων ὕπο, **ὡς χεῖρον. Ἂν δὲ καὶ λαθραίοις δήγμασι,** **τοῦτ' οὐ φορητόν. Ἂν δὲ καὶ. πιστῶν ὕπο,** **ἐπίσχες. Ἂν δὲ καὶ Θεοῦ παραστατῶν,** **ποῖ τις τράπηται; Πῶς φύγῃ κακῶν φοράν;**[5]	**Δεινὸν τὸ λυποῦν. Ἂν δὲ καὶ λυπῇ φίλος,** **ἀνδραποδῶδες. Ἂν δὲ καὶ δάκνῃ λάθρα,** **ὡς θηριῶδες. Ἂν δὲ καὶ γυνὴ λάλος,** **δαίμων σύνοικος. Ἂν δὲ καὶ δικασπόλος,** **χρεία κεραυνῶν. Ἂν δὲ καὶ θυηπόλος,,** **ἄκουε, Χριστὲ, καὶ δίκαζε τὴν δίκην.**[7]

[2] The criteria for organizing Gregory's poetic work, as proposed by *Patrologia Graeca* (*Patrologiae cursus completus*, accurante J.P. Migne, series graeca (PG) 35–38), are the theme of individual poems and the intended audience, even though we have little information on the latter. The poetry of Gregory of Nazianzus is in the 37th volume of *PG* and is divided into two books (*poemata theologica*, *poemata historica*). Both books are further subdivided into two parts: I, I *Poemata dogmatica*; I, II *Poemata moralia*; II, I *Poemata de se ipso*; II, II *Poemata quae spectant ad alios*.

[3] Erika Brodňanská, *Gregor z Nazianzu: Listy vo veršoch* (Prešov: Prešovská univerzita, 2012), 37.

[4] Greeks considered iambic meter to be appropriate for the narrative literature because of its resemblance with spoken language (Bernard von Wyss, 'Gregor von Nazianz. Ein griechisch-christlicher Dichter des 4. Jahrhunderts,' *Museum Helveticum* 6, (1949): 192). As for the use of iambic meter, Gregory drew inspiration from Euripides' and Sophocles' tragedies, but also from the more recent works of Menandros, whose influence is evident especially in moralizing passages.

[5] It is hard to suffer, but it is ever harder if it is by the hand of a friend. It is intolerable when they bite you unexpectedly. What if it is those who are faithful? Endure it. And what if you suffer from the hands of those who are close to God? Where to seek assistance and how to escape the evil?

[6] There has been incertitude concerning the origin of the poem. While Robert Keydell ('Die Unechtheit der Gregor von Nazianz zugeschriebenen Exhortatio ad virgines,' *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 43, no. 2 (1950): 334, note 1) asserts Gregory to be the author, H. Werhahn ('Dubia und Spuria unter den Gedichten Gregors von Nazianz,' *Studia patristica* VII (1966): 342) expresses doubts concerning the poem's authenticity.

[7] Disgrace is a big burden. If a friend humiliates you, it is vile. If he debases you behind your back it is beastly. If your reputation is sullied by a gossiping woman you are

The poems share the theme and the meter, but broader similarities concern specific ideas expressed in the verses as well as the word choice. Gregory thus emphasizes the importance of the message: the words *Ἄν δὲ καὶ* are repeated in the middle of the verses and the poems are concluded by the mention of the people ranking highest on the imaginary credibility scale.

The poem I, II, 22 warrants the impression that Gregory could write it under the influence of disillusionment with St. Basil the Great's friendship. The author briefly and clearly reiterates what he detailed in the autobiographical poem *De vita sua* (II, I, 11).[8]

Gregory and Basil had already met during their studies in Cappadocia, but their friendly relationship – as we learn from Gregory's verses – had deepened later, at the Plato's Academy in Athens:[9]

> Basil, of course, it was, the great ornament of our generation. In studies, in lodgings, in discussions I had him as companion. We made a team, if I may boast a little, that was celebrated throughout Greece. We had all things in common, and a single soul, as it were, bound together our two distinct bodies. But above all it was God, of course, and a mutual desire for higher things, that drew us to each other. As a result we reached such a pitch of confidence that we revealed the depths of our hearts, becoming ever more united in our yearning[10] (II, I, 11, 226-235; PG 37, 1045).

The relation between the two friends continued after their return home from studies. While Gregory had been torn between a constant urge of social responsibility that pushed him to engage in public life and the desire to retreat, Basil was visiting the centres of monasticism in Palestine, Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia. Basil later settled in Annisoi in Pontus, where he tried to live a life of an eremite. Under the influence of his friend, Gregory tried to practice ascetism, but he was

facing a demon. Yet if the humiliation comes from a judge it is like being struck by a thunder. If the perpetrator is the servant of God, Jesus, listen and judge.

[8] Gregory's friendship with Basil the Great, its intensity, development and unexpected turns resonate in other Gregory's works, be it poetry, lyrics, or letters.

[9] Gregory of Nazianzus spent about seven years in Athens (350–356/358). His teachers were rhetoricians Himerius and Prohairesius, and classmate, apart from Basil the Great even the future Emperor Julian, also known as Julian the Apostate. (Kristoffel Demoen, *Pagan and Biblical Exempla in Gregory Nazianzen* (Brepols, 1996), 19).

[10] English translation cited from: Denis Molaise Meehan, *Saint Gregory of Nazianzus: Three Poems* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1987), 83–84.

not convinced that it was his vocation. Nonetheless, Gregory dealt with his life crises by escaping to Basil in Pontus (II, I, 11, 351-356; PG 37, 1053-1054):

> Like an ox stricken by the gadfly I made for Pontus, anxious to have the most godly of my friends as medicine for my agitation. For there, hidden in that cloud, like one of the sages of old, practising union with God, was Basil, who is now with the angels. With him I soothed my agony of spirit.[11]

The reversal in the long-term friendship happened in 370, when Basil became the Bishop of Caesarea Bishop and Metropolitan of the entire Cappadocia. Gregory felt that the sense of necessity of the friendship had been lost, and that Basil betrayed his commitment to being devoted to philosophical life,[12] that is to say to apply religious theory into everyday life and practice.[13] The relationship worsened when Basil ordained Gregory Bishop of Sasima (nowadays Silifka), situated in a relatively inhospitable region. Gregory accepted the ordination, but did not approve of Basil's decision (II, I, 11, 389-394; PG 37, 1056):

> Basil, the closest of our friends, came to visit us. (I should like to pass over intervening events in silence, lest I seem to speak in insulting terms about a man whose eulogy I've just pronounced.) He came, alas for the story, but I must tell it all the same. He was to prove another father to me, and a far more burdensome one. My real father, even though he tyrannized over me, I must shelter; but no such duty holds in his case, where friendship actually brought injury instead of deliverance from trouble.[14]

While Gregory's views on friendship were sentimental and emotional, Basil's approach was more formal, since he viewed it as a means of reaching goals.[15] Moreover, Gregory perceived friendship with Basil through the prism of his respect for the classical culture and the love of Athens that brought them together. However, for Basil, the time spent

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[11] English translation cited from: Meehan, *Saint Gregory of Nazianzus*, 87.
[12] Cf. Caroline White, *Gregory of Nazianzus: Autobiographical poems* (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), XV.
[13] Cf. Helena Panczová, *Sv. Makrína, Melánia a Olympia* (Trnava: Dobrá kniha, 2008), 11.
[14] English translation cited from: Meehan, *Saint Gregory of Nazianzus*, 88.
[15] Raymond Van Dam, *Families and Friends in Late Roman Cappadocia* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2003), 165.

studying in Athens did not mean much. He perceived it to be rather vain and worthless.[16] Despite personal differences and later aversion, Gregory never ceased hoping for the restoration of the old friendship.[17]

However, let's return to Gregory's poem I, II, 22. We can clearly see the parallels between Gregor Nazianzus' relationship with Basil and its portrayal in his autobiographical poem. Gregory was reluctant to recover from his friend's "betrayal" (*Δεινὸν τὸ πάσχειν. Ἂν δὲ καὶ φίλων ὕπο, ὡς χεῖρον.*[18]): Basil ordained Gregory Bishop of Sasima[19] (*Ἂν δὲ καὶ λαθραίοις δήγμασι, τοῦτ' οὐ φορητόν.*[20]). The blow was all the more difficult to bear that Basil was his confidant and close friend[21] (*Ἂν δὲ καὶ. πιστῶν ὕπο, ἐπίσχες.*[22]), a fraternal figure and himself a bishop[23] (*Ἂν δὲ καὶ Θεοῦ παραστατῶν, ποῖ τις τράπηται; Πῶς φύγῃ κακῶν φοράν;*[24]). Poems I, II, 22 *De falsis amicis* and II, I, 11 *De vita sua* use the same meter – iambic trimeter – and therefore they could be considered as versified speech, easily accessible to both, readers and listeners.

St. Basil the Great was not the only friend who disappointed Gregory of Nazianzus. In the poem *De vita sua*, he also refers to Cynic[25] Maximus who, after conversion to Christianity, came to Constantinople from Egypt at the end of the year 379 or the beginning of the year 380. Gregory welcomed him wholeheartedly and provided hospitality for him. In one of the speeches (*Or.* 25), Gregory even praised Maximus as an excellent Christian philosopher and a hero in the struggle for Nicene Creed.[26] Gregory did not know that Maximus' friendship was not honest

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16 Van Dam, *Families and Friends*, 171–172.

17 Van Dam, *Families and Friends*, 184.

18 It is hard to suffer, but it is ever harder if it is by the hand of a friend. (I, II, 22, 1–2a; PG 37, 789).

19 *Carm.* II, I, 11, 389–394 (PG 37, 1056).

20 It can hardly be borne when they unexpectedly die. (I, II, 22, 2b–3a; PG 37, 789).

21 *Carm.* II, I, 11, 226–235 (PG 37, 1045).

22 What if it is those who are faithful? Endure it. (I, II, 22, 3b–4a; PG 37, 789).

23 *Carm.* II, I, 11, 351–356 (PG 37, 1053–1054).

24 And what if you suffer from the hands of those who are close to God? Where to seek assistance and how to escape the evil? (I, II, 22, 4b–5; PG 37, 789).

25 Cynicism was a school of thought in ancient Greek philosophy. For the Cynics, living a happy and virtuous life means despising social norms, rejecting wealth, glory, all sensuous enjoyment, achievement of independence and inner freedom. Cynicism was an exclusively ethical movement with no aspiration to resolve the greater truth of existence, nor a developed systematic teaching or theoretical framework to study empiric reality. (Lívia Flachbartová, *Diogenovský kynizmus ako spôsob života* (Prešov: Filozofická fakulta Prešovskej univerzity, 2015), 11).

26 John A. McGuckin, *St. Gregory of Nazianzus. An Intellectual Biography* (New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001), 311; *Carm.* II, I, 11, 978 (PG 37, 1096).

and that he only wanted his own benefit: Maximus was to be secretly ordained by the Alexandrian priests as the bishop of Constantinople although at that time the position was held by Gregory himself. After being disillusioned by Maximus, Gregory describes him as follows (II, I, 11, 750–756; PG 37, 1081):

> At that time the city harbored an Egyptian freak. He was of dubious sex, a raging pest, a dog, a cynic, a street-lounger, an Ares, an inarticulate nuisance, a colossal monster. Fair? dark? curly? straight-haired? He had been one way, then recently he had contrived[27] to be the other – the coiffeur's art could do him all over again.[28]

In the other verses, Gregory confesses being ashamed[29] of being fooled by Maximus as well as for praising him the shame that he has left him, and it has been praised by him (II, I, 11, 952b-967; PG 37, 1094-1095):

> Personally, though I've been wronged by him, his previous record convulses me with shame. "O come now, was he not, only yesterday, a friend of yours? Didn't you consider him worthy of the greatest praise?" It's easy to run across people who know the details, and find fault with my naiveté at the time, in showing respect to the most inferior of Cynics. Indeed the ignorance I displayed deserves censure. Like Adam I was undone by the nasty taste. To look at, the fruit that was really bitter seemed ripe. A style of conversation and protestations of loyalty that were skin deep only led me astray. For a trusting person is the easiest in the world to persuade since he is impulsively drawn to goodness, real or counterfeit. We are very conveniently constituted. To be sure each of us thinks what he wants to think.[30]

A comprehensive description of all the events surrounding Maximus was presented by Gregor in the poem within the span of about 360 verses.[31] In the end, Gregory asks his readers for forgiveness for

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[27] Maximus took meticulous care of his hair and changed his hairstyle in the course of events.

[28] English translation cited from: Meehan, *Saint Gregory of Nazianzus*, 98.

[29] For more information on emotions in the poetry of Gregory z Nazianzus, see Christos Simelidis, 'Emotions in the Poetry of Gregory of Nazianzus,' *Studia Patristica* LXXXIII, (2017), 91–101.

[30] English translation cited from Meehan, Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, 103–104.

[31] *Carm.* II, I, 11, 750–1112 (PG 37, 1081–1105).

his naiveté and for making similar mistakes because of his generosity when estimating other people.[32]

However, there are not only pointed statements against enemies and false friends in Gregory's poetry. To the contrary, verses taken from various poems indicate the preciousness of friendship. As examples of more general statements, one gnomic[33] poem (I, II, 33[34]) could be mentioned, dealing with different ethical questions while teaching how to live a proper life[35]:

> Nothing is worthy of a devoted friend,
> Tested by the storms of time,
> He would give you only what is useful.
> Know the limits of enmity, but not the boundaries of friendship. (I, II, 33, 177–180; PG 37, 941)

Aristotle in the 8th and 9th books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* deals with friendship in a similar way. He states a few proverbs pertaining to friendship (one soul; friends share everything, friendship is equality; etc.)[36] and characterizes friendship as something essential and beautiful. Aristotle considers as good friends those who wish the best for the friends themselves.[37] Similar statements are found in Cicero: *Amicitia est voluntas bona erga aliquem causa illius.*[38] The same words are present, in a modified form, in the works of St. Augustine (*De div. quaest.* LXXXIII, 31, 3).

Reading Gregory of Nazianzus' gnomic poetry, one can ask whether he was only a theoretician and a 'moralist', or whether he had been able to apply the recommendations from the verses in his own life. To some extent, the answer can be found in his autobiographical poem *De vita sua*, but also in the poems, poetic letters addressed to the people who surrounded him (*poemata quae spectant ad alios*). In them, he

[32] McGuckin, *St. Gregory of Nazianzus*, 319.
[33] Gnomic poetry is when a saying is put into verse, expressing an ethical guidance.
[34] *Carm.* I, II, 33 (PG 37, 927-945) *Tetrastichae sententiae* (Sayings in quatrains).
[35] Gregory of Nazianzus took up gnomic poetry as the first of the Christian authors. He had probably been inspired by lesser-known authors such as Naumachios and Fokylides. Only fragments of their works have been preserved. (Hendrik Leonardus Davids,: *De Gnomologieën van sint Gregorius van Nazianze* (Nijmegen – Utrecht: Dekker & Van de Vegt N.V., 1940), 13).
[36] Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 9, 8.
[37] Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 8, 4.
[38] Cicero, *De inv.* II, 55, 166.

revealed a deep relationship to his mother, a complicated relationship to his father, a close relationship with his siblings, but presented as well a variety of relationships with his friends, showing, among other things, his generosity. Through the letters in verses he asks friends for kindness (e.g. Hellenius and Julian, II, II, 1; 2), he praises the deeds (e.g. selected personalities of the Caesarean community, II, II, 1), he encourages them (Nemesius II, II, 7), but also reprimands (e.g., Vitalian II, II, 3).

Particularly interesting of these poems on friendship is the one addressed to Hellenius (II, II, 1). It is, to a certain extent, a source of information on Gregory's relationship to Hellenius, and, at the same time, it reveals the author's links to members of the monastic community in Diocaesarea in Cappadocia.

The addressee, Hellenius, belonged to a circle of friends formed by Gregory and Basil the Great during their studies in Athens.[39] Hellenius came from a rich family from Armenia, he was a Christian, and in Athens, he studied rhetorics. Basil knew him from Pontus because he was one of the pupils of Basil's father. Basil described Hellenius in two of his letters (*Epp.* 71; 98) as 'the venerable brother Hellenius'.[40] When Hellenios became a peraequator[41] in Nazianzus, he also received a letter in verses from Gregory himself (*Ad Hellenium pro monachis exhortatorium*) asking for relief from taxes for local monks[42] (II, II, 1, 281-286; PG 37, 1471):

> Show your compassion, my friend. It will bring little benefit to me, but you will gain a lot. It will bring you an enduring gift you can share and treasure with your wife and children, for it is the promise of a better life.
> If you happened to recall how friendly we used to treat each other, you would know that of all the friends I had, you were my dearest.[43]

When we want to speak of Gregory's letters on friends and addressed to friends, we have to recognize that the current meaning of the words

[39] Van Dam, *Families and Friends,* 139–140.
[40] Daniel Škoviera (transl.), *Sv. Batil Veľký: Povzbudenie mladým. Listy I. (R. 357–374)* (Trnava: Fakulta humanistiky Trnavskej university v Trnave, 1999), 146 and 178.
[41] Peraequator's office appeared in the Roman Empire for the first time under the rule of Emperor Constantine and was established to guarantee honesty in the census. Peraequator's role was to listen to objections against the estimates of tax liability.
[42] Cf. Van Dam, *Families and Friends,* 145.
[43] Erika Brodňanská, *Gregor z Nazianzu: Listy vo veršoch*, 115.

friend and *friendship* does not completely overlap with their meaning in Antiquity. On the one hand, they indicated the close relationship between two or more people, but on the other, they were often used in a pure formal setting. In the correspondence, e.g. in a business exchange, the word *friend* often referred to a person to whom the writer did not feel any particular personal sympathy.[44] Hence, other means of indicating the nature of the relationship were put in place, especially adjectives referring to the addressee,[45] which is also the case of the poetic letter to Hellenius.

In literature, we encounter different forms of address in the works of Homer, especially in his *Iliad*, and in the drama, where it originates in the richness of dialogues. It is important to note, that in contrast to epics, the addresses in drama often display shifts in meaning. The poetic letters of classically educated Gregory of Nazianzus are influenced by both[46] traditions, and the letter to Hellenius is not an exception. Addresses appear in the prologue of the letter in which Gregory used the adjectival form *ἄριστε*[47] (the best), and in the epilogue and verses 281–356, in which Hellenius asked for tax relief for monks. Within the span of 11 verses, Gregory addresses Hellenius three times: *φέριστε*[48] (beloved), *ἀγανώτατε ἑτάρων*[49] (most precious of friends) a *ὦ μάκαρ*[50] (blessed). In the epilogue, two adjectives and one proper noun are used: *πανάριστε* (the best), *Ἑλλήνιε*, *φέριστε*. [51] While Gregory used the traditional *ἄριστε* known since Homeric times,[52] the form *πανάριστε* could be found in Lukianos' satire *Fugitivi* (2nd century CE) and later authors.[53] The adjective *μάκαρ* signified respectful

[44] Heikki Koskenniemi, *Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr.* (Helsinki: Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, 1956), 115–116.

[45] Our knowledge of the ways of addressing people and expressions of politeness in letters of the 4th century CE consists mainly in knowing the letters of that period, whether pagan (e.g. from the rhetorician Libanius or Emperor Julian) or from the letters of the Church Fathers. The choice of means of addressing depends on the traditional, Classical usage. (Henrik Ziliacus, *Untersuchungen zu den abstrakten Anredeformen und Höflichkeitstiteln im Griechischen* (Helsinfors, 1949) 30–35, 58–60).

[46] Erika Brodňanská, 'Formy oslovenia v básnických listoch Gregora z Nazianzu,' in Úvod do štúdia gréckej filológie, ed. Ján Zozuľak (Prešov: Datapress, 2011), 17–18.

[47] *Carm.* II, II, 1, 17 (PG 37, 1453).

[48] *Carm.* II, II, 1, 281 (PG 37, 1471).

[49] *Carm.* II, II, 1, 285 (PG 37, 1472).

[50] *Carm.* II, II, 1, 292 (PG 37, 1472).

[51] *Carm.* II, II, 1, 357; 359; 365 (PG 37, 1476–1477).

[52] Homeros, Il. III, 39; XIII, 769; XVII, 142; XXIII, 483.

[53] Brodňanská, 'Formy oslovenia,' 20.

tone in the tragedies, and *φέριστε* indicated duty rather than devotion since Homer's[54] epics.[55]

What is the meaning of all these words in Gregory's poetic letter? They reveal a relationship based on mutual respect and common past more than of a deep friendship. This inference is supported by the fact that whereas not a single of Gregory's letters written in prose was dedicated to Hellenius, several letters (as well as epitaphs) were addressed to the men mentioned in the poem. Gregory took advantage of his old acquaintance from student days, to lobby for the men who were obviously much closer to him.

The assumption that the relationship between Gregory and Hellenius was not too close is supported by the prologue of Gregory's poem. The reason Gregory wrote the poem was not only his effort to lower the monetary burden of monks, but probably also Hellenius' request to Gregory where he asks him to write a major work, although Hellenius himself did not intend to do so (II, II, 1, 1-10; PG 37, 1451-1452):

> Do you want to hear how eloquent am I? There is no eloquence left in me.
> For I have abandoned the art of rhetoricians.
> Instead I laid on my shoulders the pleasant burden of the cross, which is my salvation.
> Christ, our Lord, has replaced all that was made by the hand of men.
> Expressing sweet words of praise is no longer my ambition
> For in the precious Word of God there is no liking in it.
> I will never praise neither your kin nor your wealth that leave others in awe,
> I will never glorify your eloquent voice stronger than a thunder,
> I will never retell the fabulous tales about you and your brother that you cherish,
> Because you are both, skillfully wielding power over cities.

Gregory apparently made a conscious choice of meter, since he wrote the poem using elegiac couplet that has been known to be the used for elegies, grave inscriptions, aphorisms, epigrams as well as parainetic poems advising on bravery, defense of the homeland, or the proper management and enjoyment of one's life. Therefore, the poem to Hellenius is primarily an encouraging letter in verses, but at the

[54] Homeros, Il. VI, 123; XV, 247; XXIV, 387; *Od.* I, 405; IX, 269.
[55] Ziliacus, *Untersuchungen*, 14–15, 20.

same time it expresses a certain amount of trust in Hellenius as well as Gregory's affection for the members of the monastic community who have been entrusted to him.

Although the men were mostly wealthy and successful, they gradually changed their lifestyle, renounced their possessions and started a life of abjection. It is not entirely clear how and when they created a community in Diocaesarea, but from the names listed in the poem one can assume that they followed Gregory as their teacher, or they belonged to the circle of his closest people, although not all of them had direct ties to the church in Nazianzus and not all were ordained priests.[56] Gregory presents the men belonging to the community to Hellenius by name, offering more or less detailed information on all of them. He talks about the loving Cledonius the Presbyter[57] who provided for the needy and who consecrated his life to Christ. Gregory then speaks of the brothers Eulalius[58] and Helladius,[59] to whom he refers to in one of his prosaic letters (15,4) as his noble cousins. Gregory does not forget to mention Karterius[60] one of his first teachers in Nazianzus, who also accompanied him during his studies abroad and later became a clergyman or monk. He dedicates almost 30 verses to Nicomedes, who was his relative. Gregory praises Nicomedes for nurturing his children and bringing them to God, as well as for devoting himself to life in poverty because Nicomedes donated all his possessions to the

[56] Cf. Neil McLynn, 'Among the Hellenists: Gregory and the sofists,' in *Gregory of Nazianzus: Images and Reflections*, eds. Bøtnes, J. – Hägg, T. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2006), 230–231.

[57] He held a high office that he gave up to become a priest. Some authors associate him with Cledonius the Presbyter, to whom Gregory addressed the letters 101 and 102 concerning the 'fight' against apollinarists. (Cf. Marie-Madelaine Hauser-Meury, *Prosopographie zu den Schriften Gregors von Nazianz* (Bonn, 1960), 55; A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale and J. Morrris, *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, Volume 1, A.D. 260-395 (Cambridge – London – New York – Melbourne, 1975), 213).

[58] Eulalius lost his brother before the year 372 and in the same year he was already listed as one of the monks of Nazianzus. At that time, he tended for his mother. Since 373, he has served under Gregory as a bishop and eventually became Gregory's successor in Nazianzus. Gregory addressed him three letters (116, 117, 158) (Cf. Hauser-Meury, *Prosopographie*, 70; Michael Wittig, *Gregor von Nazianz. Briefe* (Stuttgart: Hiersemenn, 1981), 152, 175, 249).

[59] Helladius led a monastic way of life with his brother Eulalius. He died young, shortly before Gregory wrote a poem to Hellenius (Cf. Hauser-Meury, *Prosopographie*, 96). In memory of Helladius, Gregory wrote 3 epitaphs (37–39).

[60] In memory of Karterius, Gregory wrote 4 epitaphs (115–118). Karterius probably did not belong to the community around Gregory of Nazianzus (cf. verse 139). He died after 374 CE. (Cf. Hauser-Meury, *Prosopographie*, 52).

building of a church.[61] In addition to these, Gregory presents the silent and loving Theognis, the pure-hearted Euandrus, the reasonable Asterius, his pupils of Philadelphius and Makrobius, the noble Rhegius, the wise Leontius and Heliodorus. Each of them excels in something else, but as Gregory states, together they are the building blocks of a great temple (II, II, 1, 119–224, PG 37, 1460–1467). When describing their qualities, Gregory widely uses metaphors. He emphasizes thus the importance of these men, his relationship to them, as well as the importance and the urgency of their demand to reduce taxes. The men are referred to as *a pearl between rocks* (μάργαρος ἐν λάεσσιν[62]), *another Morning Star in the sky* (ἐν ἀστράσι φωσφόρος ἄλλος[63]), or like *a noble eagle* (αἰετὸς ὠκυπέτης[64]).

When talking about the men, it is interesting to note, that Gregory, in an attempt to influence Hellenius' decision, compares the deeds of two of his friends, Nicomedes and Theognis, to the most prominent figures of the Old Testament, to Abraham[65] (Gen 22,1–13) and James[66] (Gen 28,12–15). Just as Abraham did not hesitate to sacrifice to God his son Isaac, neither Nicomedes hesitated to offer the best of him in sacrificing his own children. Although he was not asked to kill the children, their consecration had a similar effect – Nicomedes gave up the opportunity to see the continuation of his lineage. When referring to Theogonis, Gregory emphasizes his kindness and rapid advances concerning virtues. An explicit expression of this fact can be found in the poem in which Gregory references the dream of Isaac's son James from the Old Testament Book of Genesis, in which he saw a ladder connecting heaven and earth, with ascending and descending angels. A ladder symbolizes communication between heaven and earth and, simultaneously, God's closeness. The steps of the ladder represent virtues that can bring people to heaven.[67]

Although Gregory does not explicitly point out the nature of the relationship to the men of the monastic community, and he does not refer

[61] See Hauser-Meury, *Prosopographie*, 133. In memory of Nicomedes Gregory wrote 3 epitaphs (112–114).
[62] *Carm.* II, II, 1, 125 (PG 37, 1460).
[63] *Carm.* II, II, 1, 125 (PG 37, 1460).
[64] *Carm.* II, II, 1, 160 (PG 37, 1463).
[65] *Carm.* II, II, 1, 143–147 (PG 37, 1462).
[66] *Carm.* II, II, 1, 171–188 (PG 37, 1464–1465).
[67] Peter Dubovský (ed.), *Genezis. Komentár k Starému zákonu* (Trnava: Dobrá kniha, 2008), 556–557.

to any of them by the word *friend*, the poetic devices used to describe them are eloquent enough. The tone Gregory uses when portraying men belonging to the community (the wider community of friends) and the way he is addressing Hellenius, are diametrically different. In the space of a single poem he reveals a whole range of possible shades of friendship, based on a common goal of seeking God and wisdom, as well as in applying religious theory in practice. After all, Aristotle has already expressed the opinion that friendship is based on the community and sharing of its members.[68]

In the poetry of Gregory of Nazianzus, there are many other instances of referring to his relationship to other people. His stance is straightforward. Gregory's personal poetry reveals his feelings; he openly admits his sympathy and affection to loved ones, and at the same time he is not avoiding writing about emotions like anger, shame, disillusionment or disappointment. The personal pain and experience of being betrayed by a friend (especially by Basil the Great) is so hurtful that at the end of the poem I, II, 22 *De malis amicis* as well as in the autobiographical poem II, I, 11 *De vita sua* Gregory opens up and shares his innermost pain and injuries with the recipient. It is clear though that Gregory himself knows how to address this pain – by turning to God, while speaking out about it and warning that a friend can be false and malevolent. Though, Gregory can revert into an impersonal mode. When addressing the general audience (e.g. *poemata quae spectant ad alios*), he treats the themes and ideas that resonated in the works of ancient authors and are perceived as *loci communes*. Nevertheless, even in such cases, he takes a clear stance, points out the ethical values and the importance of friendship, all the while condemning enemies or fake friends. Of all, he ascribes the highest importance to the friendship that is straightforward and without any side thoughts. For Gregory, living the life of a philosopher meant to be utterly, in actions and thought, devoted to the Christian way of life.

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[68] Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 8, 11.

SYRIAC FRIENDS OF ST. THEODORET OF CYRRHUS IN THE UKRAINIAN SYNAXARION OF ST. DYMYTRIY TUPTALO

DARIA MOROZOVA

ABSTRACT

Composing the first Ukrainian Synaxarion (Chetii-Minei), the great Ukrainian theologian, scholar and hagiographer St. Dymytriy Tuptalo (1651–1709) relied on different sources, including Slavonic, Greek, Latin, and Polish. Thanks to an Antiochian Patericon by the Greek Syrian author Theodoret of Cyrrhus – *History of the Friends of God*, Dymytriy could introduce Theodoret's holy friends to a Ukrainian readership, creating a bridge between the School of Antioch and Kyivan theological tradition.

Introducing the Vitae of Syriac Saints into the Ukrainian and Russian Church calendar, Dymytriy to a considerable extent adopted Theodoret's views on asceticism, Christian anthropology, and Church history. Thus, he may be called an ally of the Antiochian school, which was to a great extent marginalized in Byzantium since the 5th century and later on. Moreover, St. Dymytriy venerated Theodoret himself as one of those Saints despite incessant debates around his name initiated by his opponents at the Second Council of Constantinople.

Keywords:
Hagiography; Synaxarion; Theodoret of Cyrrhus; Dymytriy Tuptalo

DOI: 10.14712/23363398.2020.58

One of the most famous hagiographical sources of late antiquity, the Antiochian Patericon of Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus,[1]

[1] Nikolay Glubokovsky convincingly shows that it was written around 444AD. See his book: *Историческое значение личности Феодорита, епископа Киррскаго* [Historical meaning of the person of Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus] (Moscow: Universitetskaya tipografiya, 1911), I. 414–416.

is entitled *The History of the Friends of God*[2] – and for a reason. The text is a memoir of the outstanding thinker of the Antiochian School about the Saints of Northern Syria – mainly about his own friends and teachers. It raises interest not only as a personal testimony but also as a Greek-speaking testimony on Syriac Saints and as an attempt to introduce the Syriac mode of holiness into the Hellenistic world. Thus, it may be considered as a certain globalization of that kind of holiness.

It is quite surprising that the leading student of this Antiochian Patericon, Pierre Canivet, having done extensive research on the subject,[3] believed that this text 'occupies a modest place in Theodoret's *oeuvre*' (p. 9). Meanwhile, Papadogiannakis[4] observed a close interconnection between this work and such famous texts by Theodoret as *Healing of the Greek Diseases* and the *Homilies on Providence*; he demonstrates their deep influence upon medieval Byzantine and Renaissance scholars (pp. 9–11). Theodoret's Patericon is thoroughly analyzed as an important paradigm showing how a Christian image of sanctity is constructed,[5] sometimes with an emphasis on the Syriac mode of holiness.[6]

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[2] Φιλόθεος Ἱστορία ἡ Ἀσκητική Πολιτεία = *Hist. relig.* (PG 82,1283–1544; SC 234).

[3] Pierre Canivet, 'Théodoret et le monachisme syrien avant le concile de Chalcédoine,' In *Théologie de la vie monastique. Études sur la tradition patristique* (Paris: Aubier, 1961), 241–282; Pierre Canivet, 'La tradition manuscrite du Περὶ τῆς θείας ἀγαπῆς (recherche d'une méthode mathématique de classement des manuscrits et critique textuelle),' *Byzantion* 34 (1964) : 385–413; Pierre Canivet 'Le Περὶ ἀγάπης de Théodoret de Cyr, postface de l'Histoire Philothée,' *Studia Patristica* 7 (1966) : 143–158; Pierre Canivet, 'Catégories sociales et titulature laïque et ecclésiastique dans l'Histoire Philothée de Théodoret de Cyr,' *Byzantion* 39, (1969): 209–250; Pierre Canivet, *Le monachisme syrien selon Théodoret de Cyr* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977).

[4] Yannis Papadogiannakis, *Christianity and Hellenism in the Fifth-century Greek East: Theodoret's Apologetics against the Greeks in Context* (Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2012).

[5] Peter Brown, 'The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity,' *Journal of Roman Studies* 61 (1971): 80–101; Jean Gribomont, 'Théodoret et les vies des Pères,' *Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa* 17 (1981) : 45–48; Konstantin P. Charalampidis, '*Peregrinatio* in der Religiosa Historia Theodoreti Episcopi Cyrensis,' *Studi di Antichità Cristiana* 52 (1995): 645–649; Dina Boero, *Symeon and the Making of the Stylite: The Construction of Sanctity in Late Antique Syria* (University of Southern California, 2015).

[6] Samuel A. M. Adshead and Kate Adshead, 'Topography and Sanctity in the North Syrian Corridor,' *Oriens Christianus* 75 (1991) : 113–122; Cristian Nicolae Gaşpar, 'Theodoret of Cyrhus and the Glory of the Syrian Ascetics: Epic Terminology in Hagiographic Context,' *Archaeus: Études d'Histoire des Religions* 4, no.1–2 (2000): 211–240 and 4, no. 4 (2000): 151–178; M.-A. Calvet-Sebasti, 'Miracles à Antioche d'après *l'Histoire Philotée* de Théodoret de Cyr,' in *Antioche de Syrie: histoire, images et traces de la ville antique*, eds. B. Cabouret, P.-L. Gaşpar et al. (Lyon: Maison de l'Orient Méditerranéen / Paris: De Boccard, 2004), 507–517.

However, as far as I know, it was never specially studied as a source of influence on Slavonic – and especially Ukrainian – holiness.[7]

This paper is devoted to Theodoret's account of his friendship with the holy men and to the paraphrase of these stories about holy friendship in the *Synaxarion* of St. Dymytriy Tuptalo (1651–1709). The Ukrainian 'retelling' of the Greek narrations about the Syrian bishop's friends is interesting as an attempt to introduce a number of Syriac saints into local Kyivan tradition.

1. *History of the Friends of God* as a witness

1.1 Name

As Canivet observes (p. 10; MST 44), Theodoret himself calls his Patericon in three different ways: *The Ascetical Life* (ἀσκετικῇ πολιτεία, Prol. 10.2), *History of the Monks* (μοναχῶν ἱστορίᾳ, XVII.11.4), and *Life of the Saints* (ἁγίων τὴν πολιτείαν / βίος, Prol. 9.1; *On Divine love* 19; *Ep.* 82). However, it is widely known throughout the world under the name Φιλόθεος Ιστορία, which is rather deliberately translated into Latin as *Historia religiosa*, and more exactly into Church-Slavonic as *Исторія Боголюбцевъ*. My personal favourite is the English translation of the title: *History of the Friends of God*. This variant stresses the special connotations of the root φῖλία, which does not mean any love, but a selective love towards a certain person, an 'affectionate regard', a love-respect, or a love-friendship.[8] This emphasis is surely intrinsic to the work of Theodoret, who does desire to depict his heroes as personal friends of God.

1.2 Is *φῖλία* a friendship?

However, Theodoret' usage of φῖλία is not so unambiguous. Often it seems to be quite far from what we mean by the notion of friendship today. The two main meanings of φῖλία in his text refer 1) to aspiration towards God, and 2) to the mutual sympathy of physical elements. He rarely applies this term concerning the relations between people. So,

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[7] Although Glubokovsky touches on an attitude of Slavonic believers towards Theodoret himself, and Sidorov cites the short history of Russian translation of *Historia religiosa* in his Introduction to his edition of this book (Moscow: Pravoslavnyi palomnik, 1996, 133–134).

[8] Henry G. Liddel, Robert Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, ed. H.S. Jones (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1934; see also: Yuriy Vestel, 'Друг, другой, ближний в библейских языках [Friend, other, neighbor in the Biblical languages],' In *Druzhba: ee formy, ispytaniya i dary* (Kyiv: Dukh i Litera, 2007), 209–244.

the terminology is not very helpful in investigating the latter topic in his works.

However, before turning to our main subject, let us review the above-mentioned types of Theodoret's usage of φῐλία, which are also quite interesting. Both of them are rather ambiguous and contradictory, wavering between the Platonic mysticism and the Antiochian sociological approach. The first mode describes man's love for God. On the one hand, φῐλία here seems to function as a synonym of Platonic ἔρως. In such an Origenist text as Theodoret's *On Divine love*[9] (which is usually combined with *Historia religiosa* in the manuscripts), this feeling is graphically associated with the mystic *eros* of Scriptural tradition. Christ appears here as the Bridegroom of the *Song of songs*. The captivating fragrancy and splendour of His 'flowering youthfulness' urge the 'young souls' to 'submit to divine love' (19). Indeed, the notion of 'submitting oneself' plays a central role in Theodoret's view of such kind of friendship. Its law (ὅρος φιλίας) demands to 'love the same things and to hate the same things (ταὐτὰ φιλεῖν, καὶ ταὐτὰ μισεῖν)' as the Friend does (21). This friendship requires the infinite pursuit of the Friend, similar to the endeavour of the Biblical Bride, and despising everything other, similarly to Abraham who willingly left everything[10] and followed Him 'in spite of the numerous difficulties' (17).

Notwithstanding, in the other works by Theodoret, this Platonic portrait of the divine φιλία is balanced with the more 'peer' view. His language here points not only to the 'bonds of love' and 'captivation' of the Lord's magnificence but also to mutual affection between God and His friends. Justifying God's management in his *De providentia,* Theodoret explains at length that all the deeds of the Lord are 'friendly' and not 'hostile' to His creations. Correspondingly, he ends this cycle of sermons with an invocation to cancel the hostility towards God's providence and to 'start a friendship with the Creator, so that He would guide us as His friends, and would not throw us away from the boat as His enemies'.[11] So, God figures here not as a demanding Bridegroom, but as an inconspicuous and caring Friend, amiably directing His creatures towards their good.

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[9] Oratio de divina et sancta charitate = *Hist.relig.*31 (PG 82,1498–1521).

[10] τὰ ἄλλα πάντα δεύτερα τῆς ἐκείνου φιλίας ἐδοκίμασε θέσθαι, *Hist.relig.*31 (PG 82, 1516A).

[11] Σπείσασθε πρὸς τὸν Πεποιηκότα φιλίαν, ἵν' ὡς φίλους ἡμᾶς κυβερνήσῃ, καὶ μὴ ὡς πολεμίους ἔξω βάλῃ τοῦ σκάφους, *De prov.* 9 (PG 83,740).

'Hostility' and 'friendship' – this pair clearly refers to Empedocles' cosmogonic theory of the four elements (στοιχεῖον), which are either united by Love (φιλότης) or divided by Strife (νεῖκος). Theodoret clearly shows his acquaintance with this tradition[12] and develops this antique teaching. So, the second modus of his use of φιλία is in line with natural philosophy. He speaks of 'friendship' among inanimate creatures (ἄψυχα) – for instance, the fiery skies and the waters above the firmament (PG 83, 564), the steady earth and the sea, the coldness of winter and the heat of summer (PG 83, 572). Yet, in spite of the antique materialists, the bishop of Cyrrhus presents overcoming the strife (πολέμια) between the opposite elements (ἐναντίας φύσεις) not in relation to the impersonal laws of nature, but to the personal Creator, the Governor of every human life.

Simultaneously, Theodoret easily switches from physics to sociological, political, and ethical reflections, the traditional domain of the Antiochian theologians. For instance, the fact that the sea connects the distant lands and brings them to friendship (εἰς φιλίαν συναγομένας), is a physical observation. However, this helps people to travel to the faraway countries, developing exchange of the goods, skills, and wealth (an economical observation). And the necessity to exchange with the others, sharing one's wealth, prompts people – and peoples – to have friendly relations (a political and ethical idea). Thus, the Creator dispensed His gifts among all the lands not to let 'abundance damage friendship (φιλίᾳ). For glut amounts to arrogance (Ὑβριστὴς) and is the parent of mess' (PG 83, 584–5). This way, Theodoret easily proceeds from the antique materialistic theory of friendship of the four elements – to the Christian, and specifically Antiochian, vision of society.

So, only in rare cases does Theodoret apply φιλίᾳ to 'friendship' as we understand it now (both friendship with God and friendship with fellow humans). In order to further research his vision of friendship, we need to leave the domain of linguistics, proceeding to a more integral approach to Theodoret's text, where the Holy men figure as good friends of God (*φιλόθεοι*).

1.3 Heroes

Depicting his heroes as personal friends of God, Theodoret, simultaneously, is proud and delighted to stress that many – though not

[12] *Throughout Graec. affect. cur.* (PG 83,775–1153).

all – of them are friends of his own. The testimony of *Φιλόθεος Ἱστορία* is extremely personal, which all scholars working on this text have noticed. Surely, it is not completely bereft of rhetorical figures since Theodoret was one the greatest orators of the famous rhetorical School of Antioch. Nor is it devoid of certain legendary details that entered his Patericon from the previous tradition, written and oral, for the saints of the previous generation, like St. Jacob of Nisibin, had already begun to turn into legends. However, what absolutely prevails in the *Φιλόθεος Ἱστορία* is the atmosphere of vivid memoirs and testimony of an eye-witness. Actually, Theodoret recommends his book as a kind of medicine for sclerosis, prepared to save good deeds from oblivion.[13]

As a bishop of Cyrrhus and an informal leader of the School of Antioch of his age, Theodoret travelled a lot and frequently encountered many of the Northern-Syrian ascetics, observing their life for many years. In sixteen cases[14] out of thirty-six, he was writing about living Saints, his contemporaries, often his own teachers or friends. This conditioned an interesting feature of his hagiographies: many chapters lack the traditional ending like, 'the Saint rested in peace with God in a certain year.'[15] So his editors – St. Dymytriy among them – had to introduce such endings by themselves.[16] Moreover, Theodoret heard the stories about the great ascetic teachers of the previous generation from their immediate pupils. For instance, he got some details about Julian Saba from Acacius (II.9, 16, 22); Jacob and Polychronios told him about Maron and Zebinas;[17] and concerning Marcian (III) he sought information from the Saint's relatives – a noble family from his episcopal town Cyrrhus.

Among the most interesting sources of *Φιλόθεος Ἱστορία* were the narrations of the author's own mother – a Syriac noblewoman who admired visiting holy elders (although in her youth she ignored the

[13] Theodoret. *Hist. relig.* (PG 82, 1285).

[14] Jacob of Cyrrhus; Thalassios and Limneus; John, Moses, Antioch and Antoninus; Zebinas and Polychronius; Asclepius and Jacob; Symeon Stylite; Baradat; Thalaleus; Marana and Kyra; Domnina (cap. 21–30).

[15] For instance, Eusebe (IV), Publius (V), Thalassios (XXII) etc. Concerning Jacob of Cyrrhus he notes that, 'if the blessed one outlives our narration and adds new feats to the previous ones' – then somebody will create a new account of his deeds, *Hist. relig.* 21.35 (PG 82, 1452).

[16] The report on the death of Symeon the Stylite was added to his Vita by the editor, which led some to doubt its authenticity. Glubokovsky, *Historical meaning*, I. 413.

[17] *Hist. relig.* 16.3; 21.3; 24.2. Canivet, *Le monachisme syrien*, 76.

rules of pilgrimage and once even had to receive a reprimand for her impious outlook, IX.6). She had fertility problems, so Theodoret was actually born due to the prayers of St. Macedonius, whom he viewed as his spiritual father. Besides these two Saints, his mother acquainted him with Symeon the Elder and Afrahat.

Theodoret often emphasizes his own participation in the described events. His personal testimonies are introduced with formulae like: 'I learned this not only through the gossip but also through my own experience' (IV.10), 'In my own eyes I saw and heard' (XXVI. 14). For instance, the bishop testifies that for St. Eusebe he was the only interlocutor, so the Saint often did not let him go away, continuing to talk to him on Heavenly matters (XVIII.2). Similarly, he describes his own impression of the eternally calm face of another St. Eusebe, who, during the whole week of their communication, never abandoned his 'internal harmony' despite offences by his enemies (IV.10). One of his visits to St. Symeon's pillar endangered Theodoret's life because the Saint told his numerous Bedouin pupils that the bishop's blessing would bring them great spiritual profit, so they almost strangled him in their arms (XXVI. 14). As for St. Limnaios, the hagiographer witnessed that his cell had a door that was always daubed with dirt, and Theodoret was the only person for whom he would open it, which is why numerous local citizens usually tried to enter there together with the bishop (XXII. 3). And St. Domnina, kissing the bishop's hand, often made it wet with her tears (XXX.2).

The memories of their friendship were much more precious for Theodoret than observing the hagiographic canons. That is why his internal censor did not prevent him from writing down some quite shocking evidence concerning these saints. For instance, the holy anchorite (St. Macedonius), ordained a priest against his will, by deception, finds out what happened to him, becomes furious and he runs away, fearing that on the next liturgy he may be ordained once again! Theodoret acknowledged that he was telling something rather strange about the sacred priestly ministry ('I know that you will not admire my account,' he says), but he was moved by the desire to show the real character of St. Macedonius, whom he calls 'his divine teacher' (XIII. 4–5).

Thus, even without applying the term φῐλία itself, Theodoret expresses his vision of the holy friendship very clearly throughout his Patericon.

1.4 Hellenization of Syriac Saints

Scholars have pointed at the apparent Hellenization of Syrian sanctity in Theodoret's accounts. That was necessary for, so to say, globalization of the local saints, because Syriac asceticism used to have a rather ambiguous reputation. It was known for its extreme practices like living on a pillar, living out-of-doors or wearing chains, and, what is worse, for its weird ideas like condemnation of marriage and other Gnostic influences.[18] All of that was probably not more acceptable for the late-antique Greeks than for us today. The bishop of Cyrrhus, an ethnic Syrian as he was,[19] *culturally* belonged to the same Hellenized milieu and seems to have regarded these extremities in the same way. So, being proud of his holy friends, he, however, tried sometimes to soften and retouch in his account some rather weird features of their asceticism. With this purpose Theodoret, as Canivet observed, 'attributes to his heroes of endurance' features characteristic of the Greek philosophers, like 'moderation, common sense, equilibrium and serenity'.[20] And, what is of great importance, Theodoret, as Canivet notes, proceeds from the unconditional and categorical metaphor of the invisible struggle between the divine and demonic powers to the Hellenic metaphors of sports competitions, philosophical training,[21] and spiritual medicine (we may add).

Moreover, not only did Theodoret describe his ascetical friends in the 'proper', Hellenized, terms *post factum*. He also tried to influence their ambiguous practices as a bishop and as a friend. Sometimes he insisted that the sick monk should moderate his diet (XXI.11), sometimes he prevented them from superfluous mortification of the flesh – even using cunning tricks. Once he even fulfilled the cherished dream of an anchorite – St. Maris the Chanter – who desired to take part in a Eucharist, but did not allow himself come out of his cell: the bishop held a liturgy inside his small shelter, using the hands of his deacons instead of the altar. The Saint confessed that he had never experienced such a joy in his whole life (XX.4). This

[18] *Иоанн Мейендорф, Единство империи и разделения христиан. Церковь в 450–680 гг.* [The Unity of Empire and Divisions among Christians. Church in 450–680] (Moskow, 2012).

[19] See Theresa Urbainczyk, '"The Devil Spoke Syriac to Me": Theodoret in Syria,' In *Ethnicity and Culture in Late Antiquity*, eds. S. Mitchell and G. Greatrex (London: Duckworth / The Classical Press of Wales, 2000), 253–265.

[20] Canivet, Introduction to SC 234, 47.

[21] Canivet, Introduction to SC 234.

episode is but one testimony of how Theodoret's Antiochian piety, Eucharistic and Christocentric, influenced the Syriac holiness by means of friendship.

1.5 Influence

History of the Friends of God is just one document which testifies to the nature of Theodoret's life-long mission, which was to introduce Syriac spirituality into the framework of the universal Church. One has to admit that this mission did not fail. Theodoret's book was warmly accepted in most parts of the Christian world. The Patericon was very popular in the Byzantine milieu, it spread in numerous copies, and was cited by some Byzantine intellectuals (Theodore Anagnost,[22] St. John Damascene,[23] and Nicephore Kallistos, among others). The Greek hagiographers included some parts of it in their Synaxaria: for instance, Symeon Metaphrastes borrowed from this text the Life of St. Symeon the Stylite. Theodoret's Lives were included in the *Synaxarion* of Basil the Second (end of the 10th century): thus, despite certain suspicion towards Syriac Christianity, widespread in Byzantium, all the heroes of the treatise entered the calendar of the Orthodox Church.[24]

Simultaneously, Theodoret's Hellenistic adaptation of Syriac holiness was not rejected by Eastern Christians themselves, who knew his book in early Syriac translation.[25] However, despite a rather high reputation of Theodoret in the Western Church, his Patericon was not translated into Latin until the 16th century when it was published by Joachim Camerarius (1539) and Gentian Hervetus (1556). And the first publication of the Greek original of *Historia religiosa* was also made in the West, by Jacques Sirmond (1642).

Now let us see, how, in one and a half millennia, those universalized Syriac portraits entered another local tradition – the tradition of the Kyivan Church.

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[22] *Theodori Lect. Hist. eccl.* I. 10–11 (PG 86a,172).
[23] *Damascene. Or. III adversas eos, qui sacras imagines abjiciunt*, 42 (PG 94, 1365B). cf. *Hist. relig.* 26. This is the second citation read on the 7th Ecumenical Council.
[24] Glubokovsky, *Historical meaning*, I. 417.
[25] Assemani, *Bibl. orient*, III. 1, 49.

2. Syriac friends of God in the Baroque-age Ukraine

2.1 Dymytriy's Chetii-Mineyi in Ukrainian culture

Slavonic readers could acquaint themselves with the holy friends of Theodoret thanks to the Synaxarion (*Chetii-Minei*) composed by the great Ukrainian theologian, scholar and hagiographer St. Dymytriy Tuptalo (1651–1709) at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries (1689–1705). As metropolitan Hilarion Ogienko notes, Dymytriy's Lives 'were the favourite reading for the whole Ukraine, up until the modern times, so that generations of readers were brought up upon them'.[26] This work, whose first three volumes were composed in Ukraine (and only the last one in Russia), was the last Kyivan edition printed without the permission of the Moscow patriarch.[27] Certainly, in Moscow, it was at first approached with suspicion due to supposed Western influences. The Patriarch even ordered to take out certain pages from the already printed edition.[28] Nevertheless, these *Chetii-Minei* became a real best-seller throughout the whole Russian empire: only during the 18th century, they were reissued ten times. As the Ukrainian chronographer of that time noted, the issue of this 'God-inspired' work 'filled the hearts of the curious educated readers with spiritual joy'.[29]

Indeed, St. Dymytriy completed an astonishing task, for which he had to accumulate one of the largest libraries in the Eastern Europe of his time.[30] Defining his method, Yakov Krotov states that Dymytriy was 'a missing link between the uncritical naïveté and the injudicious skepticism'.

2.2 Authorship, genre, and style

The questions of genre, rhetorical style and the authorship of Dymytriy's *Chetii-Mineyi* have been widely discussed by scholars[31]

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[26] Hilarion Ogienko, *Канонізація святих в Українській Церкві* [Canonization of the Saints in Ukrainian Church] (Winnipeg: Nasha kul'tura, 1965), 184.

[27] Dmytro Tuptalo, *Житія святих* [Lives of the Saints]. Book 1 (Lviv: Svichado, 2005), 5.

[28] Yakov Krotov, *Димитрий Ростовский* [Dymytriy of Rostov]: https://web.archive.org/web/20130323001212/http://krotov.info/yakov/history/18_bio_moi/Dymytriy_rost.htm. (15. 01. 2019).

[29] 'Третяя книга житий святых, трудами богодухновеннаго мужа иеромонаха Дмитриа Савича Тупталенка составленная, на свет вышла и любопытствующих человеков книжных духовною радостью сердца наполнила.'

[30] Maryna Bolgarova, 'Туптало Дмитро. Житія святих. Книга 1 (Lviv, Svichado, 2005) [Review of the new edition of Tuptalo's Synaxarion],' *Dukh i litera* 17–18 (2007), 529.

[31] Dariya Syroyid, 'Author and Authorship in Dymytriy Tuptalo's Lives of the Saints,' *Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal* 2 (2015): 99–108; Dariya Syroyid, 'Жанр житія

because in such compiled works it is always difficult to estimate the contribution of the author, who may just be viewed as an editor-in-chief.

Composing the first Ukrainian Synaxarion, St. Dymytriy relied on different sources, including Church Slavonic, Greek, Polish, and Latin. The thorough investigations, beginning with the 19th century works by A. Gorsky[32] and I. Shliapkin,[33] allow us to assert with certainty that the Latin editions were the foremost important sources for Dymytriy. Certainly, he avoided direct mention of his Catholic colleagues in the final version of his text, either referencing the original authors of the *Vitae*, or some mysterious 'Greek copyists' (отъ греческихъ рукописцевъ[34]), or eliding any reference at all. Nevertheless, as Alexander Derzhavin observed,[35] the marginalia of Dymytriy's drafts show the great trust which he felt in relation to the *Acta Sanctorum* published by the Bollandist Society,[36] Caesar Baronius,[37] Laurence Surius,[38] Piotr Skarga,[39] etc. As. Fr. Antoine Lambrechts has shown, through those sources Dymytriy also acquainted himself with the Lives of the Catholic Saints, whom he sometimes cited (surely without any precise references), as was the case with the 13th-century Flemish Cistercian nun St. Lutgardis.[40]

It is noteworthy that the Greek sources are also cited by Dymytriy through the Latin translations – although Dymytriy knew Greek and admired this language above others[41]. Such, in particular, was the way of his acquaintance with Theodoret's *History of the Friends of God*. St.

в *Четьїх-Мінеях* свт. Димитрія Туптала [Genre of life in Chetii-Minei by St. Dymytriy Tuptalo],' *L'vivs'ka mediyevistyka*, 42–49.

32 A. Gorsky (based on the student works by Nechaev and Barsky). *Святитель Димитрий, митрополит Ростовский* [St. Dymytriy, the Metropolitan of Rostov] (1849).

33 I. Shliapkin, *Святитель Димитрий и его время* [St. Dymytiy and his time] (1891).

34 Derzhavin counted twenty-six such references.

35 Alexander Derzhavin, '*Четии-Минеи* святителя Димитрия, митрополита Ростовского, как церковноисторический и литературный памятник [*Chetii-Minei* by st. Dymytriy, Metropolitan of Rostov, as a church historic and literary treatise],' *Bogoslovskie Trudy* 15 (1976), 61.

36 He could use only the first volumes of the series.

37 *Annales ecclesiastici a Christo nato ad annum 1198* (1607).

38 *De vitis sanctorum omnium nationum, ordinum et temporum* (1605).

39 *Żywoty świętych* (1579).

40 Hieromonk Antoine Lambrechts, 'Ярмарка драгоценных жемчужин Востока и Запада в проповеди св. Димитрия Ростовского [Market of precious pearls of East and West in the homily by St. Dymytriy of Rostov],' In *Pamiat' i istoriya: na perekrestke kul'tur* (Kyiv: Dukh i Litera, 2009), 65–76.

41 Krotov, *Dymytiy*, ch. 8.

Dymytriy studied it in the edition of H. Rosweyde, which was included in *Acta Sanctorum*.[42] And that was the Latin edition of Theodoret's famous *Church History* that helped Dymytriy to correct some other Byzantine *Vitae*. Having synthesized three or more great traditions: Byzantine, Latin, Slavonic (in its Kyivan, Northern, and Polish variants), Dymytriy, as Yakov Krotov observes, 'created his own special style (later pitifully retouched by his editors) – laconic, vivid, and clear'.[43]

Despite Derzhavin's statement that Dymytriy copied Theodoret's book 'nearly in full…and mostly without any changes, in the literal translation from Latin', this is not true. The first edition of the Synaxarion (1689–1705) – the only one published during his lifetime – contains only a part of the *Lives*.[44] Moreover, most of the *Vitae* from the *History of the Friends of God* are significantly shortened and reworked by the Ukrainian hagiographer. So Dymytriy may be justly called a new author of these *Lives*. By contrast with Derzhavin, Krotov believes that Dymytriy filled the lifeless ancient lives with energy, feelings, and contradictions – everything that his contemporaries needed.[45] That may be true in relation to the metaphrastic tradition – but in the case of Theodoret's *Lives*, we find quite the opposite tendency. Dymytriy excluded most of the personal and emotional elements from Theodoret's texts and normalized them according to his own idea of hagiographical canon.

2.3 Local specific context

Paraphrasing Theodoret's memoirs, Dymytriy, certainly, viewed them with the eye of a 17th-century Ukrainian. He used to imagine the Syriac ascetics' life in his own habitual categories. Thus, he settles St. Jacob of Nisibis in a 'forest', making him hide from the 'frost' in a cave,[46] while in the original there were only bushes (λόχμαις[47]), and, surely, no winter frost was mentioned (I.2). In the same Vita, Jacob meets the shameless pagan girls who are washing their clothes in the river with naked legs and do not hurry to take a more decent posture

[42] Heribert Rosweyde, *Vitae Sanctorum Patrum*, ed. Balthazar Moret (1615, reprinted in PG 74). However, he first seems to have encountered a part of it (namely, Vita of St. Symeon the Stylite) in Surius (I, 120).

[43] Krotov, *Dymytiy*, ch.7.

[44] The rest of them were added later on, probably by the Moscow editors.

[45] Krotov, *Dymytiy*.

[46] 'В зимѣ же вхождаше в некую Пещеру, в нейже от мраза сохраняшеся' (f.418).

[47] *Hist. relig* I.2 (PG 82, 1293C). However, this corruption is already present in Rosweyde's translation, where we have 'silvis' instead of λόχμαις (PL 74, 15C).

in view of a monk (I.4). Dymytriy adds another detail to the image of the girls: they are curiously gazing at 'anchorite wearing the strange clothes'[48] – although the 4th-century monks did not have any special habit.

2.4 Attitude

Dymytriy introduced into the Ukrainian and Russian Church calendar the Vitae of the Syriac Saints, adopting Theodoret's views on asceticism, Christian anthropology, and history of the Church. In the preface to his Synaxarion, a contemporary hagiographer (Fr. Macarius of Simonopetra) stresses that through this book the reader may get acquainted with different Saints, some of whom may become his or her real friends. This means that St. Dymytriy provided Ukrainian readers with the possibility to make friends with the Syriac Saints.

Moreover, St. Dymytriy venerated Theodoret himself as one of these Saints – and even reckoned him among the Holy Fathers, together with St. Gregory of Nyssa[49] – despite the incessant debates around his name caused by his opponents at the Second Council of Constantinople. That is why he may be called an ally of the Antiochian School, which was to a great extent marginalized in Byzantium since the 5th century and later on.

Conclusion

Although St. Theodoret's usage of the term φῐλία is quite contradictory, and often far from the modern idea of friendship, his accounts of the Syriac monks, his friends and teachers (or teachers of his friends), create a vivid portrait of friendship. Friendship figures here as a mutual affection of people, united by the same longing for God. This bond lets them fully trust each other, sharing with friends the most concealed spiritual experience. The confidence in a friend sometime provides a person with more freedom, allowing us to change habitual stereotypes and creating space for a new experience.

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[48] 'Смотряху нань яко на странна, и необычное одѣянїе носяща' (f. 418v). In this case Rosweyde does not change the original: 'impudentibus oculis divinum hominem aspiciebant' (PL 74, 16A); so, the addition belongs to St. Dymytriy.

[49] 'With the holy Fathers – Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret and others we argue' that the tree, which sweetened the waters of Marah, was a prototype of the cross. Cited by: Glubokovsky, *Historical meaning*, I, 349, #197.

The new experience of holiness, captured in Theodoret's Patericon, reached Slavonic readership through the Synaxarion of St. Dymytriy Tuptalo. Introducing to the Ukrainian and Russian Church calendar the *Vitae* of Syriac Saints, Dymytriy considerably adopted Theodoret's views on asceticism, Christian anthropology, and history of the Church. So he may be called an ally of the Antiochian school, which was to a great extent marginalized in Byzantium since the 5th century and later on. He even venerated Theodoret himself as one of those saints, despite the incessant debates around his name caused by his opponents at the Second Council of Constantinople. Introducing his readers with Theodoret's accounts of his holy friendship, Dymytriy gave Ukrainians a chance to make friends with the Syriac saints.

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FRATER CORDIS MEI: FRIENDSHIP IN AUGUSTINE'S *CONFESSIONS*[1]

LENKA KARFÍKOVÁ

ABSTRACT

In Augustine's *Confessions*, friendship not only has two forms, an individual and a communitarian one, but it also has two faces, a positive and a negative one. On the one hand, we find philosophical friendship which loves *gratis* (i.e. without thinking about any profit) and shares the common effort in search for wisdom. As Augustine puts it, such a friendship is based on a community of souls ascending to God. In his eyes, to love one's friend 'in God' is even a necessary element of a true friendship. Besides an individual form of friendship, we also meet a broader community of friends in Augustine's *Confessions* who even plan a common life devoted to philosophical leisure and later to religious service.

On the other hand, both individual and communitarian forms of friendship also have their negative sides. Friendship is not necessarily a common search for wisdom, it can also become a substitute for such an effort. Even more harmful is the impact of what Augustine calls the 'unfriendly friendship' which makes 'shame not to be shameless'. We meet this behaviour in a group, even in a mob, several times in *Confessions* and find Augustine playing the role of both the seduced and the seducer.

Keywords:
Augustine; Confessions; Friendship; Early Christian thinking

DOI: 10.14712/23363398.2020.59

Friendship is to want good things for someone, just because we love him, while he or she wants the same for us.'[2] In his collection

[1] The enlarged Czech version of this study is prepared for being published in Vyšehrad publishing house in Prague.

[2] Cicero, *De inv.* II,55,166: *… amicitia voluntas erga aliquem rerum bonarum, illius ipsius causa quem diligit cum eius pari voluntate.*

of *Eighty-Three Different Questions*, Augustine copied down this quote from Cicero, since it seemed to provide an apt description of his own idea of friendship as mutual goodwill which is motivated by nothing but only love for the friend.[3]

Since the ancient Pythagoreans, Plato's *Lysis*, and especially Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (Books 8–9), friendship was a part of philosophical reflections, not only as a topic but also as a setting of philosophical discussions.[4] Both these aspects of friendship were known to Augustine, most immediately from Cicero, whose philosophical dialogues served as a model for Augustine's early works shaped as discussions with his friends (e.g. the Cassiciacum dialogues *Against Academicians*, *On the Happy Life*, *On Order*, and, later on, *On the Greatness of the Soul* and *On Free Choice of the Will*).

Augustine's *Confessions*, too – even though this work is open to many different interpretations – is to be considered one of the most important books on friendship in European literature. What Augustine is saying here about his friends is, primarily, a statement about himself and a testimony to God's influence in his own life and theirs. In this paper, I will follow the idea of friendship in the course of the *Confessions*. It is presented here as being based on Augustine's life experience rather than as an ideal or a doctrine.

1. *Seducebamur et seducebamus* (The Pernicious Influence of Friends)

The first thing we learn about Augustine's friends is the detrimental influence they had on him when he was sixteen. At this age, together they committed theft of pears from someone's tree – a rather innocent story which, nevertheless, serves Augustine not only as an illustration of 'evil for its own sake'[5] but, at the same time, as evidence of 'an unfriendly friendship' (*inimica amicitia*) and 'a shame not to

[3] Augustine, *De div. quaest. LXXXIII*, 31,3 (*CCL* 44A, 44); see further *ibid.* 71,5–6 (*CCL* 44A, 205f).

[4] While for Plato or Cicero, the dialogue of friends seems to be the very setting of philosophy, Aristotle just mentions the philosophical debate as one of the possibilities for how friends spend their time together (*EN* IX,12, 1172a1–8); but for him, too, the common life of human beings is based on the exchange of words and thoughts (*EN* IX,9, 1170b11–13).

[5] *Conf.* II,4,9 (*CCL* 27, 22): … *ut essem gratis malus et malitiae meae causa nulla esset nisi malitia.*

be shameless' to which a group of friends can seduce one. Augustine would never commit such a prank alone; it only delighted him in a group of friends.[6]

Roughly in the same period, Augustine experienced erotic desire and in this field, too, the society of friends proved pernicious. Again, they tempted him into committing 'disgraceful acts' which he, under their influence, was not just not ashamed to commit but would even be ashamed not to commit. Augustine imitated his friends, 'not for the pleasure's sake only, but for the praise' (*non solum libidine facti verum etiam laudis*).[7] His desire 'to love and be beloved' (*amare et amari*) became, under the detrimental influence of his companions (*comites*),[8] 'the darkness of lust', rather than a friendship 'of one soul to another'.[9] He thus 'defiled the spring of friendship (*venam amicitiae*) with the filth of concupiscence and beclouded its brightness with the hell of lustfulness'.[10] When Augustine avoided the misconduct of his companions in some respects – he especially withdrew from bullying younger pupils in the school – then, on the one hand, he dreaded their behaviour but, on the other, he fretted in 'shameless shame' (*pudore impudenti*) not to be like them.[11]

In the society of his coevals, Augustine was not only a victim, but also corrupted others. As 'seduced he seduced', and being 'deceived he deceived others' (*seducebamur et seducebamus falsi atque fallentes*).[12] So at least he describes this social mechanism while remembering how he, from the age of nineteen up to twenty-eight, used to teach rhetoric and frequent a community of Manicheans as a catechumen (*auditor*). From his later point of view, both were the propagation of deceit and destruction.

2. *Dimidium animae meae* (The Nameless Friend of Augustine's Youth)

From among Augustine's school companions, who seem to create an anonymous crowd in his memories, there rises up a figure of his

[6] *Conf.* II,9,17 (*CCL* 27, 26).
[7] *Conf.* II,3,7 (*CCL* 27, 21).
[8] *Conf.* II,3,8 (*CCL* 27, 21).
[9] *Conf.* II,2,2 (*CCL* 27, 18).
[10] *Conf.* III,1,1 (*CCL* 27, 27).
[11] *Conf.* III,3,6 (*CCL* 27, 29).
[12] *Conf.* IV,1,1 (*CCL* 27, 40).

close friend to whom Augustine was later – as he was already starting to teach – connected even by a very personal and quite exclusive relationship. Nevertheless, this friend, too, remains anonymous.[13]

When writing his *Confessions* many years later, Augustine does not dare to call this relationship a true friendship (*vera amicitia*), since there is no real friendship in his eyes, except that in which God Himself 'links together those who cleave to Him by that love which has been poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit'.[14] Augustine, on the contrary, turned his friend away from Christianity and recruited him for Manicheism,[15] and during his fatal illness, Augustine mocked the baptism accorded to him.[16]

His friend's subsequent death affected Augustine terribly. He could not even bear to see things which reminded him of his friend and 'became a riddle to himself',[17] 'a hapless spot, where he could neither stay, nor escape from thence'.[18] Augustine dreaded death, which took his friend away from him, but, at the same time, he hated his lonely life. Nevertheless, he was not quite sure that he would be able to die for his friend, as the inseparable friends of ancient tragedy Orestes and Pylades were. His own 'poor life' was still 'dearer' to him 'than his dead friend'.[19] At the same time, Augustine could not imagine his life without his friend, as he, with Horatius, considered him to be 'half of his soul' (*dimidium animae suae*) and himself, with Cicero, 'the other self of his friend' (*ille alter eram*). They were, as Ovidius puts it, 'only one soul in two bodies' (*unam fuisse animam in duobus corporibus*), and Augustine

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[13] *Conf.* IV,4,7 (*CCL* 27, 43).

[14] Conf. IV,4,7 (*CCL* 27, 43). Cf. Rom 5,5. See further *C. Faust.* XXII,78 (*CSEL* 25/1, 678); *Ser.* 336,2,2 (*PL* 38, 1472); *Ep.* 258,4 (*CSEL* 57, 608f.). Cf. J. T. Lienhard, 'Friendship with God, Friendship in God: Traces in St. Augustine,' in *Augustine Mystic and Mystagogue: Collectanea Augustiniana*, ed. Frederick van Fleteren et alii (New York: Lang, 1994), 207–229.

[15] *Conf.* IV,4,7 (*CCL* 27, 43).

[16] *Conf.* IV,4,8 (*CCL* 27, 43f.).

[17] *Conf.* IV,4,9 (*CCL* 27, 44): *Factus eram ipse mihi magna quaestio.*

[18] *Conf.* IV,7,12 (*CCL* 27, 46): *… et ego mihi remanseram infelix locus, ubi nec esse possem nec inde recedere.* In Augustine's grief, some interpreters see Freudian melancholy or narcissism. Cf. Richard B. Miller, 'Evil, Friendship, and Iconic Realism in Augustine's *Confessions*,' *Harvard Theological Review* 104 (2011): 387–409, here 393–395.

[19] *Conf.* IV,6,11 (*CCL* 27, 45). According to Euripides' version (*Iphig. Taur.* 598–608 and 674–686), Orestes offers his life for Pylades, who does not wish to live without him either. The lost drama of Marcus Pacuvius on this topic (probably *Chryses*) is quoted by Cicero, *De amic.* 7,24; *De fin.* II,79; V,63; and Ambrose of Milan, *De off.* I,41,207 (*CCL* 15, 77).

was not willing to live just half of a life. Perhaps he dreaded his own death to prevent his friend from dying completely.[20]

In his *Retractions* later on, Augustine calls this exposition exaggerated and inept.[21] Not even in the *Confessions* is its sense quite positive; Augustine rather wants to illustrate how pernicious it can be to cling to a mortal friend 'as if he would never die' (*quem quasi non moriturum dilexeram*),[22] and thus 'pour out one's soul upon the sand'.[23] These comments by the author of *Confessions* are not intended to be cynical but they should prepare another notion of friendship, as Augustine came to it in the meantime, i.e. friendship as a community of souls in God, a relationship which cannot be finished by physical death.

3. *Animos unum facere* (Comfort from Philosophical Discussions)

For the time being, it was not eternity but time which healed Augustine's painful loss of his friend – the time that 'loses no time, nor does it roll idly through our senses but works marvellous operations on the mind'.[24] What particularly helped Augustine to forget was the consolation of other friends (*aliorum amicorum solacia*), their common Manichean beliefs, their philosophical discussions, and their common readings.[25] He can remember discussing the topic of beauty with them and writing down his first work, entitled *De pulchro et apto*.[26]

Speaking about this community of friends, Augustine again uses the Ciceronian metaphor of many friends becoming only 'one soul' (*ex pluribus unum facere* [*animum*]).[27] However, not even this friendship based on mutual love seems to be a real one in his eyes, as the prerequisite of a common love of the Christian God was missing. 'Blessed who love You, and his friend in You (*in te*), and his enemy for You (*propter te*).

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[20] *Conf.* IV,6,11 (*CCL* 27, 45f). Cf. Horatius, *Carm.* I,3,8; Cicero, *De amic.* 21,80; *Ad fam.* 7,5; Ovidius, *Tristia*, IV,4,72. The idea of a friend as 'another self' (ἄλλος αὐτός) was already known to Aristotle: *EN* IX,4, 1166a31–32; see also *EN* IX,9, 1169b6–7; 1170b6–7 (ἕτερος αὐτός), and *EN* IX,8, 1168b7 (μία ψυχή).

[21] *Retr.* II,6,2 (*CCL* 57, 94).

[22] *Conf.* IV,6,11 (*CCL* 27, 45).

[23] *Conf.* IV,8,13 (*CCL* 27, 47): *… fuderam in harenam animam meam diligendo morituram acsi non moriturum.*

[24] *Conf.* IV,8,13 (*CCL* 27, 46).

[25] *Conf.* IV,8,13 (*CCL* 27, 47).

[26] *Conf.* IV,13,20 (*CCL* 27, 51).

[27] *Conf.* IV,8,13 (*CCL* 27, 47). Cf. Cicero, *De amic.* 25,92; *De off.* I,56.

For he alone loses none dear to him, to whom all are dear in Him who cannot be lost.'[28] But this kind of love was still unknown to Augustine and his friends.

4. *Amabam ex hominum iudicio* (The Love of Hierius Based on His Fame)

Augustine dedicated his writing *De pulchro et apto* to a famous Roman rhetorician of Syrian origin, Hierius, whom he loved, not knowing him by his face (*amatur absens*),[29] only because others judged him worthy of love (*amabam … ex hominum iudicio*).[30] Augustine observes that his admiration for this famous rhetorician differs from the success of popular actors, gladiators, or charioteers, because it includes his desire to equal this man or at least to be praised by him and attract his attention.[31]

Augustine's relationship to Hierius, whom he 'loved for the fame of his teaching' (*amaveram ex doctrinae fama*),[32] surely cannot be considered a real friendship. But it presents a very interesting supplement to the above-mentioned influence exercised by his coevals. Even admiration and love can be caused by the opinion of others or, more precisely, can be brought about by the supposed sincerity of their feelings.

5. *Benigne ac paterne monuit* (The Paternal Friendship of Vindicianus)

A much more personal relationship than that to Hierius connected Augustine to a famous physician, Vindicianus, who, as a proconsul, decorated him with a winner's wreath in a competition of poets. Augustine describes him as an old man who encouraged him 'very kindly and in a fatherly manner' (*benigne ac paterne monuit*).[33] His speech was not decorated with rhetorical skills but rather with a serious and lively character. Probably that was why Augustine liked to listen to him and

[28] *Conf.* IV,9,14 (*CCL* 27, 47).
[29] *Conf.* IV,14,21 (*CCL* 27, 51).
[30] *Conf.* IV,14,22 (*CCL* 27, 51).
[31] *Conf.* IV,14,22–23 (*CCL* 27, 51f.).
[32] *Conf.* IV,14,21 (*CCL* 27, 51).
[33] *Conf.* IV,3,5 (*CCL* 27, 42).

even became 'familiar' with him.[34] In spite of his authority, Vindicianus was not successful, at least not immediately, in turning Augustine away from the confidence he had at that time in astrological predictions.[35] A much more important role in this issue was played, unknowingly, by Augustine's friend Firminus, remembered in the *Confessions* almost exclusively because of this merit, without being much estimated as a friend after the passage of the years.[36]

Augustine also had a relationship of veneration and admiration with Ambrose, the bishop of Milan and a very famous man. Like Vindicianus, Ambrose also showed a very kind and fatherly interest in Augustine's spiritual development, and the young man liked to listen to him, in this case thanks to the rhetorical perfection of Ambrose's homilies, rather than to their content, which Augustine only came to esteem later.[37] As some interpreters surmise, Ambrose might have kept his distance from his catechumen because of Augustine's Manichean past, a suspicion of careerism, or the very different characters of both men.[38] According to the third book of his treatise *De officiis*, Ambrose drew his idea of friendship from Cicero and that is why it also comes very close to Augustine's. In addition, the bishop of Milan supplemented his exposition with a number of biblical testimonies on friendship.[39]

Another paternal figure in Augustine's early life – particularly when he lost his own father Patricius – was an esteemed citizen of Thagaste and perhaps Augustine's relative, Romanianus, who also became his patron.[40] In his African years and later on, Augustine found in Romanianus a fatherly and, according to one of his letters,

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[34] *Conf.* IV,3,5 (*CCL* 27, 42); VII,6,8 (*CCL* 27, 97).
[35] *Conf.* IV,3,5–6 (*CCL* 27, 42f.).
[36] *Conf.* VII,6,8–9 (*CCL* 27, 97–99).
[37] *Conf.* V,13,23 (*CCL* 27, 70).
[38] See Marie A. McNamara, *Friendship in Saint Augustine* (Fribourg: Univ. Press, 1958), 68–77; Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 81–87; Dagmar Kiesel, *Lieben im Irdischen. Freundschaft, Frauen und Familie bei Augustin* (Freiburg – München: Alber, 2008), 203f.
[39] Ambrose of Milan, *De off.* III,21,125 – 22,138 (*CCL* 15, 200–206). See Carolinne White, *Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), 111–128; Luigi Pizzolato, *L'idea di amicizia nel mondo antico classico e cristiano* (Torino: G. Einaudi, 1993), 269–275; David Konstan, 'Problems in the History of Christian Friendship,' *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 4 (1996): 87–113, here 106–113.
[40] *C. Acad.* II,2,3 (*CCL* 29, 19f.). On Romanianus, see McNamara, *Friendship*, 78–83; André Mandouze, *Prosopographie de l'Afrique Chrétienne (303–533)*, I (Paris: CNRS, 1982), 994–997.

very close friend (*familiariter amicissimus*).[41] However, it seems to have been Augustine who influenced Romanianus, rather than the other way round. At first, he converted his patron to Manicheism,[42] and later on he also tried to attract his attention to philosophy[43] and to involve him in his philosophical plans. He was almost successful in the case of Romanianus' sponsoring a philosophical community in Milan[44] but probably less so in his conversion to Christianity, as far as we know.

Last but not least, a very important personality in Augustine's story was the Manichean bishop Faustus. Augustine expected a great deal from the arrival of this famous man in Carthage in 382, because he hoped to obtain answers to his philosophical and astronomical questions from him. The discussion with the eloquent but not very speculative and rather practically oriented, and in theoretical questions even sceptical Faustus disappointed the young adept of Manicheism. Nevertheless, this man with a reputation for holiness and with a good deal of personal charm and modest comportment left a powerful impression on Augustine.[45] Faustus did not strengthen Augustine's Manichean belief but might have converted him to scepticism for some time.[46] Their common reading of classical authors, for which Faustus asked Augustine,[47] and his supposed help in Augustine's looking for Manichean contacts in Rome[48] attest to, if not friendship, then surely mutual trust and respect between both men. Given the persecution of Manicheans in Africa, Augustine, even in his anti-Manichean polemics written later, never attacked Faustus directly during his lifetime. The thirty-three books *Against Faustus*, refuting the doctrinal treatise *Capitula* of the Manichean bishop, were only published after Faustus' death.[49]

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41 *Ep.* 27,4 (*CSEL* 34/1, 99).
42 *C. Acad.* I,1,3 (*CCL* 29,5).
43 *C. Acad.* I,1,1 (*CCL* 29, 3); II,2,3 (*CCL* 29, 19).
44 *Conf.* VI,14,24 (*CCL* 27, 89).
45 *Conf.* V,6,10–7,12 (*CCL* 27, 61–63).
46 *Conf.* V,6,10 (*CCL* 27, 62,15–17). Augustine recalls his sceptical period in *Conf.* V,10,19 (*CCL* 27, 68).
47 *Conf.* V,7,13 (*CCL* 27, 63).
48 *Conf.* V,8,14 (*CCL* 27, 64).
49 Cf. Jason D. BeDuhn, *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma*, I: *Conversion and Apostasy, 373–388 C.E.* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 106–134.

6. *Gratis amare* (Philosophical Friendship with Alypius and Nebridius)

Augustine's closest friends in his Italian years were his African compatriots Alypius and Nebridius. Even though Augustine does not say so directly, it might have been these two young men who helped him to overcome his pain caused by the loss of his nameless young friend. And it might also have been them with whom Augustine thought about beauty. In any case, Augustine remembers having discussed with them 'on the ends of good and evil' (*de finibus bonorum et malorum*), probably having read Cicero's writing of the same name. Their preference then inclined to the Epicurean good found in pleasure, excepting the circumstance that there is no place for the immortality of the soul and no possible reward for human merits after death in Epicurean philosophy.[50]

Augustine could have learned Epicurean ideas especially from Cicero, as he also learned from him the ideal of friendship which loves and is beloved for its own sake (*amicitia per se et propter se expetita*).[51] Augustine called such a friendship *gratis diligere*,[52] i.e. 'to love for free', 'selflessly', or 'for nothing' (probably alluding to the biblical line Job 1:9).[53]

But as he also remembers, he appreciated the pleasure he had when involved in discussion with his friends, although he did not know its source and was not thinking of the inner light of 'beauty which deserves to be embraced for its own sake (*gratis amplectendae pulchritudinis*)'. Nor could he appreciate the role played by friendship in the happiness he was searching for.[54] It was very probably the aspect of a gratuity which escaped Augustine as his search for happiness was quite aim-oriented. He imagined a happy life in a 'corporeal way', as he also says in this context.

He was connected to his friends Alypius and Nebridius by the same desire for a happy life and the same helplessness as to how to search for it.[55] 'Thus we were like three indigent mouths, sighing out their

[50] *Conf.* VI,16,26 (*CCL* 27, 90).
[51] Cicero, *De amic.* 21,80. See also *De amic.* 27,100 ; *De leg.* I,18,49.
[52] *Conf.* VI,16,26 (*CCL* 27, 91).
[53] *Enarr. Ps.* 55,20 (*CSEL* 94/1, 218f.); *De cat.* 27,55,12 (*CCL* 46, 177,64–66).
[54] *Conf.* VI,16,26 (*CCL* 27, 90).
[55] *Conf.* VI,10,17 (*CCL* 27, 85).

wants and *looking to You to give us our food at the proper time*,' as he remembers.[56]

7. *Nebridius, dulcis amicus meus*

The attention Augustine pays to Alypius and Nebridius in the *Confessions* is not equal, and nor was the time he was allowed to spend with one or the other. For Augustine, the prematurely deceased Nebridius, this young man of moral integrity, who was extremely intelligent and meditative,[57] remained connected to the search for happiness in his early years, to the Neo-Platonising period of his thinking, and to the ideal of philosophical friendship they shared then. So we can surmise from the passages Augustine dedicated to Nebridius in his *Confessions*, as well as the correspondence he maintained with him until Nebridius' death, which includes twelve letters of predominantly philosophical content.[58]

On the day Augustine and Alypius converted to an ascetic life in the Milanese garden, Nebridius was absent – 'I do not remember why,' admits Augustine.[59] He did not join his friends in their becoming catechumens and being baptised in Milan but received baptism later on, under circumstances not specified by Augustine in his narrative.[60] Neither did Nebridius share their decision to embark on an ascetic life – being moderate by his very nature[61] – or their later ecclesiastical careers. That is why he remained a tireless seeker and inquirer in Augustine's memory, a friend from a time when both of them had

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[56] *Conf.* VI,10,17 (*CCL* 27, 85): *Et erant ora trium egentium et inopiam suam sibimet invicem anhelantium et ad te expectantium, ut dares eis 'escam in tempore opportuno.'* Cf. Ps 103(104),27.

[57] *Conf.* IV,3,6 (*CCL* 27, 43); VI,10,17 (*CCL* 27, 85). On Nebridius, see Marie de Gonzague, 'Un correspondent de Saint Augustin: Nebridius,' in *Augustinus Magister: Congrès international augustinien, Paris, 21-24 sept. 1954*, I (Paris: Études augustiniennes 1954), 93–99; McNamara, *Friendship*, 46–52; Mandouze, *Prosopographie*, 774–776.

[58] *Ep.* 3–14 (*CSEL* 34/1, 4–35). On Augustine's correspondence with Nebridius, see Georges Folliet, 'La correspondance entre Augustin et Nébridius,' in *L'opera letteraria di Agostino tra Cassiciacum e Milano. Agostino nelle terre di Ambrogio*, ed. Giovanni Reale et alii (Palermo: Augustinus, 1987), 191–215; Emmanuel Bermon, 'Lettres 3 à 14: Introduction,' in Augustin, *Lettres 1–30*, *BA* 40/A (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 2011), 213–228, here 213–219.

[59] *Conf.* VIII,6,14 (*CCL* 27, 121).

[60] *Conf.* IX,3,6 (*CCL* 27, 85).

[61] *Conf.* IX,3,6 (*CCL* 27, 136).

leisure for their questions: *ab otioso quaerebat otiosus*, as Augustine puts it later.[62]

His 'sweet friend Nebridius' (*dulcis amicus meus*), as Augustine calls him,[63] tried to shake Augustine's confidence in astrology[64] – like Vindicianus before him – and he also wanted to turn Augustine away from his belief in Manichean ideas about God being menaced by the reign of darkness.[65] In Milan, Nebridius became an assistant to the grammarian Verecundus, who wished to have one of Augustine's friends in this position.[66] Probably because of his duties as an assistant – or his individualism – Nebridius did not partake in the shared holidays (*otium*) at Verecundus' farm at Cassiciacum in 386,[67] from where Augustine addressed his first surviving letters to him.[68] Although in this correspondence Augustine clearly plays the role of the teacher – Nebridius even takes his words as a representation of 'Christ, Plato or Plotinus'[69] – he does not hesitate to consult his pupil in matters of Latin grammar.[70]

On all the above-mentioned occasions Nebridius proved to be an independent young man in his thinking, one who did not succumb to the fashions and moods that dominated his companions, and was rather a loner even in relation to his friends. In his moral integrity, Nebridius is introduced in the *Confessions* as the very opposite to Augustine, with his turbulent life, though Nebridius' intellectual search was no less persistent than Augustine's, and he was not immune to theological errors either, specifically to Docetism.[71]

During Nebridius' serious illness, when Augustine was not able (or not willing to find time) to visit his friend in his loneliness,[72] he at least sent Nebridius a consolatory letter explaining the community of souls which ascended to God:

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62 *Ep.* 98,8 (*CSEL* 34/2, 529f.).
63 *Conf.* IX,3,6 (*CCL* 27, 136).
64 *Conf.* IV,3,6 (*CCL* 27, 43); VII,6,8 (*CCL* 27, 97).
65 *Conf.* VII,2,3 (*CCL* 27, 93).
66 *Conf.* VIII,6,13 (*CCL* 27, 121).
67 *Ep.* 4,1 (*CSEL* 34/1, 10).
68 *Conf.* IX,4,7 (*CCL* 27, 136). Cf. *Ep.* 3,1 (*CSEL* 34/1, 5); *Ep.* 4,1 (*CSEL* 34/1, 9 n.); see Bermon, 'Lettres 3 à 14', *BA* 40/A, 220–222.
69 *Ep.* 6,1 (*CSEL* 34/1, 12,1f.).
70 *Ep.* 3,5 (*CSEL* 34/1, 9,7–16).
71 *Conf.* IX,3,6 (*CCL* 27, 135f.).
72 *Ep.* 10,1 (*CSEL* 34/1, 23); 11,1 (*CSEL* 34/1, 25). See Kiesel, *Lieben im Irdischen*, 107.

> Retire into your soul and lift it up to God as far as you can. There you will surely find us, not by means of corporeal images such as our memory is obliged to use, but by that power of thought by which you understand that we are connected but not in a place (*non loco esse nos simul*).[73]

This community of souls in God is perhaps a Christianised version of the Neoplatonic idea of a community of souls in the Intellect as presupposed by Plotinus[74] or in the 'whole soul' known to Porphyry.[75] As Augustine wrote to Nebridius, so did Porphyry to his wife Marcella; if she 'ascends to herself' (εἰς σεαυτὴν ἀναβαίνειν), she will also find him as 'present and connected to her' (τῆς συνουσίας καὶ μηδὲ χωρισθῆναι οἵου τε ὄντος), even though his 'shadow and appearing image' might be absent from her.[76]

After Nebridius' death (probably 388–390), Augustine imagines his friend living in 'Abraham's bosom' (cf. Luke 16,22), and their friendship continuing as God Himself keeps them both in His memory (*nostri sis memor*).[77]

8. *Alypius, frater cordis mei* ('Alypius, the Brother of my Heart')

Unlike Nebridius, Alypius is far from appearing as an idealised figure in Augustine's narrative. In spite of his firm character in some respects,[78] he is presented much more as a victim of the pernicious influence his friends (including Augustine) had on him and of his own weakness. Augustine promised to tell Alypius' story in a letter addressed to Paulinus of Nola; subsequently, he introduced him in the *Confessions* as his closest friend, perhaps using this previous narrative.[79]

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[73] *Ep.* 9,1 (*CSEL* 34/1, 20): *Confer te ad tuum animum, et illum in Deum leva, quantum potes. Ibi enim certius habes et nos, non per corporeas imagines, quibus nunc in nostra recordatione uti necesse est; sed per illam cogitationem, qua intellegis non loco esse nos simul.*

[74] Plotinus, *Enn.* VI,4(22),14,1–22; VI,5(23),7,1–11. On the community of souls, see also *Enn.* IV,9(8).

[75] Porphyry, *Sent.* 37,1–12 (Brisson 354–356).

[76] Porphyry, *Ad Marc.* 10 (des Places 111,5–11).

[77] *Conf.* IX,3,6 (*CCL* 27, 136). Cf. Ps 135(136),23.

[78] *Conf.* VI,10,16 (*CCL* 27, 84f.).

[79] *Ep.* 27,5 (*CSEL* 34/1, 100f.). Cf. Pierre Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin* (Paris: Boccard, ²1968), 29–31; Aimé Solignac, 'Introduction aux Confessions,' in *BA* 13 (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962), 7–270, here 27f.; Colin Starnes, *Augustines's Conversion: A Guide to the Argument of Confessions I–IX* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, 1990), 154.

Alypius was born in the same town as Augustine, i.e. Thagaste, into a family of the highest rank. He became Augustine's student, first at Thagaste, and afterwards at Carthage. Augustine esteemed him for his 'innate love of virtue' but regretted his weakness for the 'madness' of gladiatorial games, these 'frivolous spectacles so hotly followed' in Carthage.[80] Augustine remembers having turned Alypius away from this unhappy pastime by an occasional note during a lecture and attracting him again as his listener in spite of resistance in Alypius' family.[81] Before Augustine, Alypius left Africa for Rome to study law, and here again he succumbed to the detrimental influence of his friends persuading him to visit the bloody amphitheatres. They took him there with the use of violence and in spite of closing his eyes, he was pulled down into the vertex of his previous passion by just hearing the roar of the crowd incited by the fall of a gladiator.

> Nor was he now the same as when he came in, but was one of the throngs he came unto, and a true companion (*socius*) of those who had brought him thither. Why need I say more? He looked, shouted, was excited, and carried away with him the madness which would stimulate him to return, not only with those who first enticed him, but also before them, yea, and to draw in others.[82]

This scene seems to be the pinnacle of the pernicious influence friends may have, as Augustine presents it in the *Confessions*. But even Augustine himself influenced his younger friend in a way which was far from unambiguous. On the one hand, he turned him away from the 'madness' of the arena; but on the other, he temped him into becoming ensnared by the sensual passion which then captured Augustine himself. In his innocence, poor Alypius was eager to learn what was so

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[80] *Conf.* VI,7,11 (*CCL* 27, 80f.). On Alypius see Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, 'Happiness and Friendship,' in: *Cambridge Companion to Augustine's Confessions*, ed. Tarmo Toom (Cambridge: University Press, 2020), 138–153, here 150–152; Eadem, 'Alypius, L'ami sceptique d'Augustin?,' in *Augustin philosophe et prédicateur: Hommage à Goulven Madec (Actes du colloque international organisé à Paris les 8 et 9 septembre 2011)*, ed. Isabelle Bochet (Paris: Institut d'Études augustiniennes, 2012), 295–314, here 302–314.

[81] *Conf.* VI,7,12 (*CCL* 27, 81f.).

[82] *Conf.* VI,8,13 (*CCL* 27, 83): *Et non erat iam ille, qui venerat, sed unus de turba, ad quam venerat, et verus eorum socius, a quibus adductus erat. Quid plura? Spectavit, clamavit, exarsit, abstulit inde secum insaniam, qua stimularetur redire non tantum cum illis, a quibus prius abstractus est, sed etiam prae illis et alios trahens.*

important for his admired teacher, and he was thus captured by Augustine's captivity: 'For his mind, free from that chain, was astounded at my slavery, and through that astonishment was going on to a desire to try it…'[83]

This discussion, in which Augustine became a seducer of Alypius rather than his trustworthy teacher, was motivated by the idea of a common life devoted to philosophy (*simul in amore sapientiae vivere*), such as both friends longed for for a long time.[84] It was the very reason why both Alypius and Nebridius joined Augustine at Milan;[85] but his planned marriage, imposed upon Augustine by his mother,[86] seemed to jeopardise their intention. Augustine tried to dispel such fears, pointing out the examples of those who, as married men, had loved wisdom and kept up faithfully with their friends.[87] However, their plan of a commune of ten philosophers, including the very rich Romanianus, who would pool their possessions together and create a communal household, finally fell through because of this very circumstance: 'But when we began to reflect on whether the wives which some of us had already, and others hoped to have, would permit this, all that plan, which was being so well framed, broke to pieces in our hands, and was utterly wrecked and cast aside.'[88]

To be able to put his dreamed-of commune of seekers for wisdom into practice, Augustine first had to opt for an ascetic life, which seemed to be a much more difficult decision than to return to the Christian religion of his pious mother. It was this conversion to an ascetic life which Augustine depicted in such masterly style in the scene of the Milanese garden and in which he was accompanied and followed by Alypius. Together with Alypius, as Augustine tells us,[89] he received a visit from Ponticianus, and they listened to his stories of Christian conversions to 'friendship with God',[90] which caused real confusion in their souls and a struggle to follow these examples. Both friends shared all their

[83] *Conf.* VI,12,22 (*CCL* 27, 88).
[84] *Conf.* VI,12,21 (*CCL* 27, 87).
[85] *Conf.* VI,10,16–17 (*CCL* 27, 84f.).
[86] *Conf.* VI,13,23 (*CCL* 27, 89).
[87] *Conf.* VI,12,21 (*CCL* 27, 87f.).
[88] *Conf.* VI,14,24 (*CCL* 27, 89): *Sed posteaquam coepit cogitari, utrum hoc mulierculae sinerent, quas et alii nostrum iam habebant et nos habere volebamus, totum illud placitum, quod bene formabamus, dissiluit in manibus atque confractum et abiectum est.*
[89] *Conf.* VIII,6,14–15 (*CCL* 27, 121–123).
[90] *Conf.* VIII,6,15 (*CCL* 27, 123).

secrets,[91] and thus they also shared this inner struggle. Alypius 'followed me step for step (*pedem post pedem*)',[92] as Augustine remembers, not only in a literal but also in a metaphorical sense; he remained 'sitting close by my side' (*Alypius affixus lateri meo*).[93] Together they read the apostle Paul's invitation to live honestly (Rom 13,13 – 14,1), even if each of the two friends applied another passage to his own life.[94] Together with Alypius, Augustine became a catechumen[95] and received baptism in Milan;[96] and later on, both friends established ascetic communities at Thagaste and Hippo, and shared ecclesiastical careers as bishops in Africa, heavily involved in the theological and political struggles of their time.[97] As Alypius participated in the anti-Pelagian campaign at the imperial court, he was even called 'a slave of Augustine's sins' (*vernula peccatorum eius*) by the Pelagian bishop Julian of Aeclanum.[98]

Augustine understood his younger friend Alypius not only as his pupil but also as a 'brother of his heart' (*frater cordis mei*),[99] since, according to his words in *Soliloquies*, he knew him as well or as little as his own heart.[100]

9. *Simul habitaturi placito sancto* (A Philosophical Community)

The philosophical commune, dreamed about with Alypius and Nebridius, and planned unsuccessfully with Romanianus and other Milanese friends, was finally realised by Augustine at Verecundius' estate at Cassiciacum during the autumn school holidays in 386. Besides Alypius, Augustine's mother Monnica, his son Adeodatus, his brother Navigius and two cousins of his, Lartidianus and Rusticus, as well as Romanianus' son Licentius and another young man from

91 *Conf.* VIII,8,19 (*CCL* 27, 125).
92 *Conf.* VIII,8,19 (*CCL* 27, 125).
93 *Conf.* VIII,11,27 (*CCL* 27, 130).
94 *Conf.* VIII,12,29–30 (*CCL* 27, 131f.).
95 *Conf.* IX,4,8 (*CCL* 27, 137).
96 *Conf.* IX,6,14 (*CCL* 27, 140f.).
97 In 394, Alypius became the bishop in his native Thagaste; see McNamara, *Friendship*, 109–112; Mandouze, *Prosopographie*, 53–65.
98 *C. Iul. imp.* I,7 (*CSEL* 85/1, 9). Julian accused Alypius of bribing the officials of the imperial court with eighty horses coming from Africa; cf. *ibid.* I,42 (*CSEL* 85/1, 30); III,35 (*CSEL* 85/1, 375).
99 *Conf.* IX,4,7 (*CCL* 27, 137).
100 *Sol.* I,3,8 (*CSEL* 89, 14).

Thagaste named Trygetius, also shared this society.[101] Augustine captured this leisure (*otium*) devoted to searching for wisdom in his early dialogues with his friends *Against Academicians*, *On the Happy Life*, and *On Order* and also in the *Soliloquies*, where he entered into discussion with the personified Ratio. In this last work, Augustine explains why he loves to be surrounded by friends: 'In order that we may together inquire into our own souls and search for God.'[102]

Later on, in Milan, Augustine's philosophical community was joined by Evodius, also originating from Thagaste, who had already received baptism and abandoned his secular career.[103] 'We were together, and together we were about to dwell with a holy purpose (*simul habitaturi placito sancto*).'[104] Looking for a place appropriate to their service to God, the friends decided to return together to Africa.

When they were waiting for a ship in Ostia, Augustine's mother Monnica died. In her, their community lost its 'mother' and 'daughter' at the same time,[105] and Augustine's own life 'rent asunder as it were, which, of hers and mine together, had been made but one', as he puts it in the *Confessions*.[106]

After returning to Africa in 388, Augustine established a 'monastery of philosophers'[107] in the house at Thagaste where he was born. He was accompanied, among others, by Alypius, Evodius, and his son Adeodatus until the latter's premature death in 388–390. This very talented young man received baptism together with Augustine and Alypius in Milan, and he also participated in their philosophical debates. When he was fifteen, Augustine discussed with him the topic of speech, and wrote down their dialogue *On the Teacher*,[108] in the same way as he had previously discussed with Evodius and written down their dialogues *On the Greatness of the Soul* and *On Free Choice of the Will*. The debates

[101] *De b. vita* 1,6 (*CCL* 29, 68).
[102] *Sol.* I,12,20 (*CSEL* 89, 31): *Ut animas nostras et deum simul concorditer inquiramus.*
[103] *Conf.* IX,8,17 (*CCL* 27, 143). On Evodius, later the bishop in Uzali in Africa, and a collaborator of Augustine, see McNamara, *Friendship*, 112–117; Mandouze, *Prosopographie*, 366–373.
[104] *Conf.* IX,8,17 (*CCL* 27, 143).
[105] *Conf.* IX,9,22 (*CCL* 27, 147).
[106] *Conf.* IX,12,30 (*CCL* 27, 150): *… quasi dilaniabatur vita, quae una facta erat ex mea et illius.*
[107] Cf. Henri-Irénée Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris: Boccard 1938), 167. On the community at Thagaste see further George P. Lawless, 'Augustine's First Monastery: Thagaste or Hippo?,' *Augustinianum* 25 (1985): 65–78.
[108] *Conf.* IX,6,14 (*CCL* 27, 141).

in Thagaste also motivated Augustine's above-mentioned collection of *Eighty-Three Different Questions*.[109]

Another member of the community in Thagaste was Possidius, later the biographer of Augustine, linked to him by a friendship of almost forty years, as Possidius tells us.[110] From his hand, we also have an account of this community, as well as of another monastery established by Augustine in Hippo Regius later on, when he became a priest and bishop of this town.[111] For these communities of educated laymen and priests respectively, Augustine probably wrote down his monastic rule or rules (one of them sometimes being ascribed to Alypius),[112] where the experience of the philosophical friendships of his early years can be traced.[113] The ancient idea of friendship might also have played a role in Augustine's theological concept of Christian love (*caritas*) loving *gratis*, as elaborated later on.[114]

10. Philosophical Inspirations

As we have seen, in meditating on friendship Augustine often used quotes from Latin classical authors, especially the very popular metaphor of only one soul which links friends to each other and makes one a second self for the other. A very important role was played by the Ciceronian ideal of friendship which loves for its own sake without any side interest.[115] We also found an allusion to the legendary friends

[109] Cf. above, n. 3. On the genesis of this collection, see *Retr*. I,26 (*CCL* 57, 74).

[110] Possidius, *Vita Aug*. 31,9 (Geerlings 106). On Possidius, see McNamara, *Friendship*, 121–124.

[111] Possidius, *Vita Aug*. 3,1–2 (Geerlings 32); 5,1 (Geerlings 34); 11,1–4 (Geerlings 42–44). Augustine mentions the monastery at Hippo Regius in *Ser*. 355,1,2 (*PL* 39, 1569f.), and *Ser*. 356 (*PL* 39, 1574–1581). He probably established two monasteries in this town, the first of them as a priest for a community of laymen, the other as a bishop for clerics. On Augustine's 'philosophical cenobitism', see Paul Monceau, 'Saint Augustin et saint Antoine. Contribution à l'histoire du monachisme,' *Miscellanea Agostiniana*, 2 (1931): 61–89.

[112] Cf. Luc Verheijen, *La Règle de saint Augustin*, II (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1967), 164.

[113] Cf. Luc Verheijen, 'Eléments d'un commentaire de la Règle de saint Augustin, VI,' *Augustiniana* 22 (1972): 469–510, here 484–507; White, *Christian Friendship*, 211–217.

[114] Cf. McNamara, *Friendship*, 220–223; John F. Monagle, 'Friendship in St. Augustine's Biography: Classical Notion of Friendship,' *Augustinian Studies* 2 (1971): 81–92, here 92; Eoin Cassidy, 'The Recovery of the Classical Ideal of Friendship in Augustine's Portrayal of Caritas,' in *The Relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity*, ed. Thomas Finan and Vincent Twomey (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1992), 127–140.

[115] See above, n. 20 and 51.

Orestes and Pylades, probably known to Augustine from Marcus Pacuvius and Cicero (or Ambrose?).[116]

When reading Augustine's remarks on friendship against the background of Cicero's writing on the same issue (*Laelius de amicitia*), we can observe, besides the similarities mentioned above, some differences.[117] Unlike Augustine, Cicero endorses the idea that we sometimes love our friends more than ourselves, as for the sake of friends, Cicero argues, we are often willing to do what we would never do in our own interest.[118] In the same vein as Augustine, Cicero believes that true friendship must be based on the 'agreement in all things, divine and human, together with favour and love',[119] or 'an agreement of wills, efforts, and opinions',[120] especially an effort for what is good, i.e. virtue.[121] However, he does not specify as clearly as Augustine does what the shared religion of friends should be like.[122] Although Cicero mentions a friendship which survives death,[123] he seems to have the memories of living friends in mind,[124] rather than a community of souls in God.

In a quote from Terence, an author loved by Augustine, too, we meet a false friendship and its negative influence, as presented by Cicero: 'He says "nay," and "nay" say I; he says "yea," and "yea" say I; in fine, I bade myself agree with him in everything.'[125] With these words, put in the

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[116] See above, n. 19.

[117] On Augustine's inspiration through Cicero, see Tarcisius J. van Bavel, 'The Influence of Cicero's Ideal of Friendship on Augustine,' in: *Augustiniana Traiectina*, ed. Jan den Boeft and Johannes van Oort (Paris 1987: Études augustiniennes), 59–72; on several differences between both authors, see Luigi F. Pizzolato, 'L'amicizia in sant'Agostino e il *Laelius* di Cicerone,' *Vigiliae Christianae* 28 (1974): 203–215.

[118] Cicero, *De amic.* 16,56–59. Cf. White, *Christian Friendship*, 190f.

[119] *De amic.* 6,20 (Combès 14): *Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio.* On this definition of friendship in Augustine see Bouton-Touboulic, 'Alypius,' 295 and 29–300.

[120] *De amic.* 4,15 (Combès 11): *… in quo est omnis vis amicitiae, voluntatum, studiorum, sententiarum summa consensio.*

[121] *De amic.* 6,20.

[122] On Augustine's idea of true friendship anchored in God, which replaces friendship based on virtue according to Cicero, see Vincent Zarini, 'Brèves remarques sur l'amitié chrétienne,' in: *La société des amis à Rome et dans la littérature médiévale et humaniste*, ed. Perrine Galand-Hallyn (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 113–119, here 117f.; Stefan Rebenich, 'Augustine on Friendship and Orthodoxy,' in *A Companion to Augustine*, ed. Mark Vessey (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 365–374, here 369f.

[123] *De amic.* 7,23.

[124] *De amic.* 27,104.

[125] *De amic.* 25,93 (Combès 56) = Terence, *Eunuchus*, 252f. (Marouzeau I, 239): *Negat quis: nego; ait: aio; postremo imperavi egomet mihi/ Omnia adsentari.* English

mouth of the 'parasite' Gnathon in 'The Eunuch' by Terence, Cicero does not illustrate the force of imitating a bad example in a group, so important in Augustine's narrative, but the danger of a flatterer who is not a real friend.[126]

Besides an intimate relationship of two or a few persons,[127] Cicero also knows a broader friendship. Unlike Augustine, however, he does not have a religious community in his mind but a community (*societas*) of a family, of a city, or of the entire human race.[128]

In Augustine's plan of friends living together in a philosophical commune, interpreters recognise a Pythagorean inspiration[129] or the influence of similar Manichean communities,[130] or compare it to Plotinus' project for Platonopolis.[131] In any case, the ideal of both a private philosophical friendship and a common life devoted to searching for wisdom was rooted in several schools of ancient philosophy, including, among others, Epicureanism, which was so attractive for Augustine in his early years.[132] In the Cassiciacum period of Augustine's life, the most important version of these ideas seemed to be Pythagoreanism. So we can surmise from his dialogue *On Order*, where, together with Alypius, he claims this inspiration, and he also states that the knowledge of Pythagorean doctrines has been transmitted to him by Varro.[133] Cicero, too, declares the ideal of friendship as a common effort for the good, and the connection of souls into one, to be Pythagorean.[134]According

translation William A. Falconer, Cicero: *De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione* (London – New York: Putnam, 1923), 201.

126 *De amic.* 25,94–95.

127 *De amic.* 5,20. Similarly Aristotle, *EN* IX,10, 1170b20–1171a20.

128 *De amic.* 5,19.

129 Pierre Courcelle, *Les Confessions de saint Augustin dans la tradition littéraire: Antécédents et postérité* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1963), 22–26; William H. C. Frend, 'Pythagoreanism and Hermetism in Augustine's "Hidden Years,"' in: *Studia Patristica* 22 (1989): 252–254.

130 Courcelle, *Recherches*, 178f.; Pierre Hadot, *Plotin ou la simplicité du regard* (Paris: Études augustiniennes 21973), 140; James McEvoy, '*Anima una et cor unum*: Friendship and Spiritual Unity in Augustine,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 53 (1986): 40–92, here 61.

131 Courcelle, *Recherches*, 179f.; Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, 115f.; McEvoy, 'Anima una,' 62. On Platonopolis, cf. Porphyry, *Vita Plot.* 12.

132 On friendship in ancient philosophical schools, see Ludovic Dugas, *L'amitié antique* (Paris: Alcan, ²1914); Jean-Claude Fraisse, *Philia. La notion d'amitié dans la philosophie antique* (Paris: Vrin, 1974); Suzanne Stern-Gillet and Gary M. (eds.), *Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship* (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 2014).

133 *De ord.* II,20,53–54 (*BA* 4/2, 322–324).

134 Cicero, *De off.* I,56.

to Iamblichus, Pythagorean religious philosophy greatly appreciated friendship (the term φιλία is believed to have been coined by Pythagoras),[135] and sought its sense in 'the union with God (πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἕνωσιν), the communion with intellect (τὴν τοῦ νοῦ κοινωνίαν) and with the divine soul'.[136] The more advanced adepts of Pythagoreanism (called *mathematikoi*, as opposed to the mere *akusmatikoi*) lived in a commune of shared property and philosophical discussion.[137] The Pythagorean principle 'For friends all is shared' (κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων),[138] understood either literally or metaphorically, became a basic characteristic of friendship in ancient philosophy.[139]

Augustine conserved for us a testimony about a very similar religious community of Manicheans[140] whose beliefs he shared for a long time, as did Alypius and Romanianus too. A note about a 'communism' of early Christians, probably inspired by the Greco-Roman idea of friendship, can even be found in the New Testament, cf. Acts 4:32: 'All the believers were one in heart and mind (V: *cor et anima una*). No one claimed that any of their possessions was their own, but they shared everything they had.'[141] Thus, Augustine's dream about a commune of philosophers might have been inspired by Manicheism at first and gradually adapted to Pythagorean philosophy and finally Christianity or could have been woven from all these sources of inspiration from the very beginning.

Conclusion

The picture of friendship in Augustine's *Confessions* is far from being unambiguous. On the one hand, we find philosophical friendship which loves *gratis* (i.e. without thinking about any profit) and shares

[135] Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 16,70.
[136] Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 33,240. On the Pythagorean concept of friendship, see the whole passage *Vita Pyth.* 33,229–240. Cf. Gregor Staab, G.: *Pythagoras in der Spätantike: Studien zu De vita Pythagorica des Iamblichos von Chalkis* (München – Leipzig: Saur 2002), 426–434.
[137] Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* 37; Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 18,81.
[138] Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* 33,2; Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 6,32; 19,92.
[139] Cf. Euripides, *Orest.* 735; *Phoen.* 243; Plato, *Phdr.* 279c6–7; *Lys.* 207c10; Aristotle, *EN* VIII,11, 1159b31; *EN* IX,8, 1168b7–8; Terence, *Adelphes* 804; Cicero, *De off.* I,51. Cf. Dugas, *L'amitié*, 24–34.
[140] *C. Faust.* V,5 (*CSEL* 25/1, 277f.); see *De mor.* II,20,74 (*CSEL* 90, 154–156).
[141] See also Acts 2,44f. Cf. Alan C. Mitchell, 'The Social Function of Friendship in Acts 2:44–47 and 4:32–37,' *Journal of Biblical Literature* 111 (1992): 255–272.

the common effort in the search for wisdom. As Augustine puts it in a letter to his friend Nebridius, such a friendship is based on a community of souls ascending to God. That is why their friendship even survives the death of both friends, since God, who 'keeps us in his memory', does not allow the friends to forget each other, as Augustine says about the prematurely deceased Nebridius in his *Confessions*. In Augustine's eyes, to love one's friend 'in God' is even a necessary element of a true friendship in which we love our friend for his or her sake (*gratis*), but not as if he or she should never leave this life (it is the lesson Augustine gained from the death of his nameless young friend).

Besides an individual form of friendship, represented by Nebridius, in Augustine's *Confessions* we also meet a broader community of friends who even plan a common life devoted to philosophical leisure and later to religious service. On behalf of such a community, Alypius discourages Augustine from marriage. He also faithfully accompanies his friend in his conversion to an ascetic life in the Milanese garden and later on in Christian service as monks and bishops in Africa. Augustine later attributes 'one soul' not only to his individual friends but also to this broader community, be it a monastic community (he explains the term *monachos* as a monk living in a community which has just one soul)[142] or even the whole body of Christ, i.e. the church.[143]

On the other hand, both individual and communitarian forms of friendship also have their negative sides in Augustine's *Confessions*. Friendship is not necessarily a common search for wisdom; it can also become a substitute for such an effort. Augustine's love for his nameless young friend is presented as an exaggerated relationship, where friends cling to each other as if they will never die and which is limited to the horizon of this life. Since their friendship was not anchored in the community of souls in God, as the relationship with Nebridius later was, it was broken off by death and left a desperate Augustine robbed of half of his own being. Although, when reading Augustine's *Confessions*, we probably cannot but take a liking to the sincerity of this youthful friendship, Augustine tries to show it as an example of what a true friendship should not be like.

What is more convincingly harmful is the impact of what he calls an 'unfriendly friendship' which makes 'shame not to be shameless'.

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[142] *Enarr. Ps.* 132,6 (*CSEL* 95/3, 327). Cf. McEvoy, 'Anima una,' 85f.
[143] See, e.g. *Ep.* 243,4 (*CSEL* 57, 571f.). Cf. Cassidy, 'The Recovery.'

We meet this behaviour in a group, even in a mob, several times in *Confessions* and find Augustine playing the role of both the seduced and the seducer. The clearest example of this unfriendly mechanism is the influence of Alypius' Roman friends who facilitate his giving in to his passion for the arena. Brought there by his friends, this young man of otherwise firm character is reduced to a powerless part of a screaming mob. To describe this mechanism, it is probably not enough to say with Aristotle that 'wicked men seek people with whom to spend their days, and shun themselves' since 'when they are with others they forget their own grievous deed'.[144] Augustine's young friends are not just a way of forgetting a grievous deed or the cherished goal instead of being companions on the way to wisdom, but their society incites him to an evil which he would never have committed without them. Theological interpreters can recognise the social effect of 'hereditary sin' here;[145] philosophers might be reminded of the unfortunate mechanism of the indefinite 'they' (das 'Man') as analysed by Heidegger.[146] In any case, here we meet the dark side of human nature and its effect on the human community, to which Augustine, as the author of *Confessions* and the theologian of hereditary sin, was very sensitive.

In Augustine's *Confessions*, friendship not only has two forms, an individual and a communitarian one, but it also has two faces, a positive and a negative one. In both directions, in the search for the good or falling victim to evil impulses, friends strengthen one's effort: 'Good friends help very much in the good, as bad friends do in the evil,' as Augustine puts it later.[147] In his experience, friendship is both an important comfort and a danger in human life.[148]

His closest friend Alypius shared with Augustine both good and evil, friendship as a consolation and comfort and friendship as a seduction. They experienced both friendship as individuals and friendship

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[144] Aristotle, *EN* 1166b13–17: ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν· … πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν … μεθ' ἑτέρων δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. T. Nawar applies this passage to the negative experience Augustine had with his friends; see Tamer Nawar, '*Adiutrix Virtutum*? Augustine on Friendship and Virtue,' in *Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship*, ed. Stern-Gillet and Gurtler, 197–225, here 209.

[145] Cf. Gerald W. Schlabach, 'Friendship as Adultery: Social Reality and Sexual Metaphor in Augustine's Doctrine of Original Sin,' *Augustinian Studies* 23 (1992): 125–147, here 130.

[146] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 151979), §§ 25–27.

[147] *Ser.* 87,10,12 (*PL* 38, 537): *Multum valent et boni amici ad bonum, et mali amici ad malum.*

[148] *Enarr. Ps.* 131,6 (*CSEL* 95/3, 296). Cf. Nolte, *Augustins Freundschaftsideal*, 28.

in a broader community of young philosophical friends and African monks and bishops. Not only in the famous scene of the Milanese garden but in all these situations, Alypius 'stood by his side' and 'followed him step by step'. He thus became for Augustine 'a brother of his heart' and a real substitute for the nameless friend lost in Augustine's youth. This time, however, it was a 'true friendship' in Augustine's eyes, anchored in God and surpassing death. To Jerome in 394/395, Augustine can write on Alypius' address: 'If he could see you, then I did, only through his eyes. He and I are not two by the soul but only by the body, as anyone who knows us will confirm.'[149]

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[149] *Ep.* 28,1,1 (*CSEL* 34/1, 104): … *cum te ille ibi videbat, ego videbam sed oculis eius. Non enim animo me atque illum sed corpore duos, qui noverit, dixerit.*

VARIA

THE ARCHETYPE OF THE WOMAN IN THE LIFE AND WORK OF PAUL EVDOKIMOV

KAREL SLÁDEK

ABSTRACT

The article presents the view of the Russian Orthodox theologian Paul Evdokimov on the topic of women. Evdokimov's theological reflections are framed in his own experience with women. The first chapter on the role of woman as mother as the inspiration of the icons of the Mother of God and God's Wisdom begins with the mention of Evdokimov's beautiful relationship with his own mother who gave him religious faith. He could not perceive a woman other than through this experience of maternal love. As an Orthodox thinker, he put the theme of woman as fiancée and wife in the sacramental unity of man and woman, modelled on the love of Christ and the Church, as discussed in the second chapter. The third chapter, again, deepens the topic in the example of the archetype of the woman as the Mother of God, and the archetype of the man as John the Baptist from the Deisis icon. The second and third chapters also mention his pain in the death of his first wife and his second marriage, which gave him the power to create. Evdokimov was critical of the history of subjugating women to men through ideologies, philosophies, and religions. Against this, he stressed that, in a Christian perspective, the woman, through her religious nature, is the stronger sex.

Keywords

Paul Evdokimov; Orthodoxy; Woman; Archetype; Icon

DOI: 10.14712/23363398.2020.60

Paul Evdokimov (1901–1970) was one of the most famous Orthodox Russian theologians among the 20th-century laity. He became the 'voice of Orthodoxy' in the West as he had emigrated to France after the Bolshevik coup. As a lay theologian, he dealt with the spirituality of the Christian layman, sacramental theology from a spiritual point

of view – especially the sacrament of marriage, and, finally, orthodox theology in openness to ecumenical efforts. Evdokimov was an active advisor to the Second Vatican Council and influenced some of its publications. The culmination of his work is the theology of beauty as analysed primarily in Orthodox icons.[1]

One reason he was especially interested in theological reflections on the question of women can be found in his reading of the signs of the times, understanding the woman's question – Do we want a woman's revolution? – as a challenge to the Church and trying to discern its spiritual dimension. He focused on the interdependence and complementary nature of female and male charismas, viewing man and woman through theological and spiritual lenses. The reductive approach, which analyses woman and man through mere biological conditionality without reflecting the spiritual goals of femininity and masculinity, was perceived as leading to distorted conceptions due to the fall of man. His reflections on woman put the subject within theological anthropology, into liturgical, biblical, dogmatic, iconic, and mystical perspectives.[2]

Evdokimov, however, was not only focused on theological trends of the past, especially in Orthodoxy, but also pursued the possibilities of enriching theology with knowledge of the humanities. He especially liked Jungian psychology and its concept of archetypes, which afforded him the necessary space to deepen the subject from a theological perspective. Here we need to make an initial distinction that Evdokimov was aware of: For Jungian psychology, in the process of identification, one consciously realises himself as a persona who selects from the collective unconscious the possibilities of his realisation – to an awareness of his essential Self. Man seeks 'models' and 'roles' of femininity and masculinity. Archetypal masculine and feminine images (anima, animus, mother, father, virgin, prostitute, etc.) are the mechanisms of communication between the conscious and unconscious, both being part of the collective unconscious. Thus, masculinity is a conscious part of the soul of a man and femininity that of a woman, while the man has

[1] Cf. Karel Sládek, *Cesty k boholidství* (Červený Kostelec: Pavel Mervart, 2012), 157–177. For a more detailed overview of Evdokimov's life and work see Olivier Clément, *Orient-Occident. Deus passeurs: Vladimir Lossky et Pavel Evdokimov* (Genève: Labor et Fides, 1985), 105–190; Jean-François Roussel, *Pavel Evdokimov. Une foi en exil* (Montréal: Médiaspaul, 1999); Giorgio Celora, *Evdokimov. Voce dell' ortodossia in Occidente* (Bologna: EDB, 1996).

[2] Cf. Olivier Clément, 'Předmluva', in *Žena a spása světa*, Pavel Evdokimov (Olomouc: Refugium Velehrad-Roma, 2011), 5–8.

an unconscious soul of femininity and a woman of masculinity. These theories do not make a clear distinction as to whether genetic or cultural conditionality is involved in the archetype realisation. Carl G. Jung himself was ambiguous on this issue.[3] At the same time, Jung did not answer the question of whether the archetypes are merely immanent to the human soul or have an objective, transcendental dimension. As a psychoanalyst, he was not interested in the philosophical or theological interpretation of the archetype, thus offering room for theologians to contribute. Evdokimov accepted the challenge and pointed out that the Christian tradition has creative archetypes for understanding the spiritual role of woman and man. On the one hand, man is born with biological conditionality, but he also becomes a woman and a man – and this is helped in the Christian interpretation by archetypes displayed, for example, on icons. For Evdokimov, archetypes are not only psychological but also ontological and dogmatic.[4]

It should be mentioned in the introduction that Evdokimov's theology of women was framed within his own experience with his mother and wives. Thus, the aim of the article is not to compare the views on Evdokimov's work with other authors or to confront his ideas with contemporary feministic (and theological) approaches or gender questions. The chosen method is not comparative, but it is primarily anchored in the methodology of spiritual theology. The main question thus is how Evdokimov's reflection about a woman mirrors his own spiritual theology based on the Revelation of Scripture, Orthodox tradition, the conclusions of contemporary human sciences, and especially his own Christian (sacramental) experience of life in marriage. The following text will follow the stages of his creative life, while mother-son, wife-husband relationships will be placed within the context of his theological considerations. Evdokimov loved his mother very much. He also suffered pain while attending to his dying first wife and was then married a second time. It was during these times that his core works on women were formed. The following is divided into three stages: woman as the archetypal mother in the icons of the Mother of God; woman as fiancée and wife in the sacramental perspective; and woman as a sign of salvation in the Deisis icon.

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[3] Cf. Patrick Vandermeersch, 'Archetypy: nová cesta ke svatosti', in *C. G. Jung a křesťanská spiritualita*, ed. Robert L. Moore (Praha: Portál, 1998), 118–132.

[4] Cf. Paul Evdokimov, 'C. G. Jung at la Téologie', *Contacts* no. 40 (1962): 34–48.

1. Woman as Archetypal Mother in Mother of God icons

As Evdokimov considered the archetype of woman as mother inspired by the icons of the Mother of God, then we will surely find many connections to his own experience in the relationship of mutual love with his mother. Paul Evdokimov grew up with only his mother, having lost his father, a nobleman and an officer who had been assassinated, at age six. His childhood and adolescence were spent in the care of his mother. He always remembered with love the beautiful religious atmosphere his mother had created at home. Thanks to his mother, he became aware of his belief in the presence of God in every moment. His religious ideas were shaped by the great Russian writers, especially Fyodor M. Dostoevsky. Following the family tradition, he entered cadet school but soon recognised his calling as a theologian. His studies at the Theological Academy in Kiev were interrupted by the Bolshevik coup and his forced exile to Paris.[5] His interrupted relationship with his home was replaced by the study of Orthodox theology.[6] He was also inspired by the theology of the beauty of icons, which, according to our theme, played an important role in expressing the maternal side of God the Father in a woman through the work of the Holy Spirit.

His sensitivity to the archetype of woman as mother manifested itself in his descriptions of icons depicting the Virgin Mary. When he considered one of the most popular Marian icons in Russia known as the Icon of the Mother of God Vladimirskaya, he opened his reflection by meditating upon the role of the woman and her spiritual mission. Our Lady freely accepts the work of the Holy Spirit in her life. Thus, God no longer acts outside man but within him. By opening herself to the infinite love of God, Mary she conceived a Son. As Evdokimov states, this icon combines two types of Marian icons: 'She that points the way' and 'The Tender Virgin'. He follows the delicate depiction of the hugs of Mother and Child. The child's view of the mother is that of tenderness and comfort. The mother's face speaks of maternal love. At the same time, her great eyes of open eternity are turned inward. Mother's eyes follow the fate of every person.[7] In his appeal to the archetype of woman

[5] Cf. Maria R. Langella, 'Pavel Nikolajevič Evdokimov (1901–1970)', in *Credere oggi. Teologi ortodossi del XX. secolo*, 2 (III-IV, 2004), 75–83.

[6] Cf. Paul Evdokimov, *Le buisson ardent* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1981).

[7] Cf. Pavel Evdokimov, *L'art de l'icône: théologie de la beauté* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970), 221.

as mother, Evdokimov wanted to emphasise the beauty of the unique relationship between mother and child which should not retreat into the background, while reflecting upon the role of the woman.

The symbolism of the icons is related to another, somewhat forgotten archetype of the woman inspired by the title, *Mary: Woman as Wisdom*. In this book, he recalled the Icon of God's Wisdom, in which, in his words, one can see a deep mystery. God's Wisdom is depicted in the Novgorod icon as an angel sitting on the throne. Behind the angel stands Christ, who places his hands on the angel. In the theological tradition, not only Christ, the Holy Spirit, the uncreated energies of the Trinity, and the Church, but also the Virgin Mary was considered to be an angel. According to Evdokimov, Wisdom encompasses all interpretations. The Virgin Mary became the embodied Wisdom as a privileged place for the Incarnation. The interconnection of Mary with Christ, the Holy Spirit, with the action not created by the energies of the Trinity, and with the Church creates a space for understanding the role of the mother's woman in the religious perspective and in the life of the Church.[8] The archetypal integrity of the woman is depicted in the icon as ontological purity, beauty, and maternal tenderness.[9]

A mother can fulfil not only the desire for the love of a particular person but also the desire for God and religious experience focused on the ultimate goal of man. Following the example of Mary, the woman is open to meeting God and man in a relationship of love.[10] Surely we will not be far from the truth by stating that, for Evdokimov, his own mother represented the archetype of Wisdom-Mary-Church.

2. Woman as Fiancée and Wife in Sacramental Perspective

Just as in the case of Evdokimov's wife-mother archetype, where his theological reflection was connected with the experience of his own mother's love, so in the case of a woman's archetype as fiancée and wife he was influenced by the experience of mutual love with his wife. His first wife was Natacha Brunel from a mixed French-Russian family.[11]

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[8] Cf. ibid., 293–300.

[9] Cf. Giorgio Celora, *Evdokimov* (Bologna: EDB, 1996), 241.

[10] Cf. Marco Paleari, *Il sacramento dell' eros. Una lettura simbolico-sapienziale dell' eros benedetto a partire da V. S. Solov' ëv e P. Evdokimov* (Roma: Pontificio Seminario Lombardo, 2003), 226–229.

[11] Cf. Jean-François Roussel, *Paul Evdokimov* (Paris: Médiapaul, 1999), 15.

He had two children with her, Nina and Michal. Evdokimov fully devoted himself to his family. His wife, however, developed cancer and died prematurely. As a loving husband, he accompanied her through the last moments of her life. In addition to his dissertation work, he focused primarily on the children and his household.[12] During this painful time, he focused on the topic of marriage and matrimonial love as a reflection of eternal unity.

In 1944, the year before the death of his first wife, he published the book *Marriage, The Sacrament of Love*, which he later edited and updated slightly as *The Sacrament of Love* with the subtitle *Wedding Secrets in the Light of Orthodox Tradition*. As a theologian, he came out of the spiritual interpretation of the Sacrament of Marriage as it is liturgically experienced in the Orthodox tradition. Before he touched upon the mystery of the Sacrament of Marriage, he realistically stated that the original paradise of the unity between man and woman had been torn. The man, in his interpretation, fell into pure reasoning, creating abstractions, and wanting to overcome every limitation. Among the limitations seems to be the overcoming of the relationship with a woman, thus losing the awareness of the need for the complementarity. The woman is perceived by the man as an inferior maid. Thus 'Adam's complex' is also manifested by the fact that the woman is to blame for everything – and the man embarks on a cursed path. After a historical analysis of the woman's subordination, he presents the fundamental charisma of a woman: Through her being, she can relate everything to God. Thus, she becomes a spiritual mother with overlap into eternity. The woman is saved by her motherhood in terms of the birth of a new age, aeon, eschatological holiness. In relation to a man, her love stands out because she loves him as he is and seeks to fulfil his need for love. The man wants to dream his need for love and often falls into overly romanticised ideas. A man wants to act while a woman wants to be – and thus bring everything to God. When Evdokimov continues to point out the differences between men and women, he does not want to confront them but, on the contrary, wants to emphasise that only in the complementary nature of man and woman can a man unite. A mysterious unification occurs in the Sacrament of Marriage. According to Evdokimov, marriage is new, an ontological creation that

[12] Cf. Václav Ventura, 'Kniha, která změnila můj život,' in *Epochy duchovního života*, Pavel Evdokimov (Olomouc: Refugium Velehrad-Roma, 2002), 5–19.

feeds human time forever.[13] Marriage underscores its spiritual and theological meaning.

The section *Love and the Sacrament of Love* goes into the depths of the meaning of love. Since man was created in the image of God as a unity of man-woman, the goal of the sacrament of marriage is to restore God's image by reuniting man and woman in the sacrament of marriage, which had already been established in paradise. It is the fulfilment of this mystery, the lost paradise of unity in the sacrament of marriage, that is more important to Evdokimov (who had been inspired by John Chrysostom) than the task of having children. Thus, there is also a spiritual sense of marriage in which husbands cannot bear children, even if they wish. In the New Testament perspective, the aim of conjugal love is to restore spiritual unity between man and woman, which is as strong as the unity in the relationship of love between Christ and the Church. The man in marriage represents Christ, and the woman represents the Church. In the Byzantine Rite Liturgy, during the celebration of the Sacrament of Marriage, this unity is emphasised by the so-called coronation of the spouses and the joyful 'dance' with the priest around the altar. Evdokimov sees every woman's vocation in Our Lady as the central archetype of the Church: 'The cult of the Virgin Mother expresses the vocation of every woman, her charisma of protection and care',[14] and a woman lay dying as he wrote these lines.

3. Woman as a Sign of Salvation on the Deisis Icon

Another woman in his life stood at the conception of Evdokim's reflection on women. He married, for the second time, the considerably younger Tomoto Sakai from a Japanese-English family. His second wife brought him to a new creative endeavour. His first book after his marriage could not concern any topic other than women.[15]

In 1958, Evdokimov published a sequel to his first book about a woman: *The Sacrament of Love* in the monograph *Woman and the Salvation of the World*. In the second part of the book, he opened the above-mentioned topic of masculine and feminine archetypes, the

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[13] Cf. Pavel Evdokimov, *Sacrement de l'amour: le mystère conjugal à la lumière de la tradition orthodoxe* (Paris: Editions de l'Epi, 1962), 60.

[14] Ibid., 168.

[15] Cf. Olivier Clément, *Orient-Occident Deus Passeurs: Vladimir Lossky, Paul Evdokimov* (Genève: Labor et fides, 1985), 114–115.

animus and anima in the human soul, which are for him the biblical Adam and Eve – who dwell in our collective unconscious. According to the biblical narrative, man as the archetype of all humanity was created in the initial unity of man-woman. Man and woman cannot be understood as two completely separate and isolated individualities. Each person is created for reciprocity and face-to-face sharing. In the narrative of the fall and the tearing apart of Adam and Eve's unity with God, the polarisation between man and woman arose, with increasing consciousness, between master and servant, and 'nothing will prevent a woman from appearing to a man merely as an object of pleasure or oppressive power.'[16] As a Christian theologian, Evdokimov saw the consequences of the fall in the light of sharing Jesus Christ because, as inspired by Pauline theology, there is no longer a man or a woman in Christ. Evdokimov is aware of the importance of emphasising God as the Father of the Almighty, the Saviour and the Comforter, with the centre of Revelation in the Father-Son relationship. Paradoxically, however, it emphasises the importance of the virginity of the Virgin in the salvation of the world, which is more in keeping with spiritual paternity than male conquerors, adventurers, and builders who do not have the 'paternal instinct as strong as the maternal woman'.[17] The echo of God's fatherhood is human motherhood.

The theologian goes even further into some very original ideas in which he claims that secularisation is a manifestation of the masculinisation of society, and that atheism is also essentially masculine, as well as Kant's rational ethics that ironise love or Augustine's sarcasm about love with rigid attitudes towards women. On the other hand, intuitive philosophy, an emphasis on emotional knowledge, and saints consecrated to the Mother of God testify to the true face of religion and the mother principle in ethics, manifested in purity, self-sacrifice, and the protection of the weak. In the contemporary world, it is the woman who has become the protector of religious values. In religious terms, therefore, the woman is the stronger sex.[18]

But the woman herself has some degree of bipolarity due to the fall. The archetype of the woman is Eve, who has two faces facing each other at the end of time: a prostitute in Babylon and a woman dressed in

[16] Paul Evdokimov, *La femme et la salut du monde* (Paris: Casterman, 1958), 142.
[17] Ibid., 148.
[18] Cf. ibid., 148–154.

the sun. This apocalyptic scene inspired Evdokimov to analyse the feminine revolution that was taking place before his eyes. The first image of a woman smells of nothingness. She is a masculine woman who seeks to come to terms with men and therefore takes on male vices and sins. Certain currents of the emancipation movement produce an aggressive and biased woman who neglects her children. Yet he was aware of the importance of the woman's spiritual revolution. In the book, he again reveals the history of women's subordination in dualistic philosophies where a woman is a passive and evil entity. He also recalled rabbinic anti-feminism and the ascetic singularity of some monks, Gnostics, and sectarians who saw salvation escaping from all women and perceived redemption as a deliverance from their sexuality, with a negative view of marriage as 'satanic repugnance'.[19] As noted, Evdokimov defended the sacrament of marriage and interpreted the woman's revolution as a spiritual challenge for the religious revival of society.

Then, looking toward his own archetypes of masculinity and femininity, with a view to relate both to Christ, he found them in the Orthodox tradition of icons. In the group of icons called Deisis, Christ is placed in the centre and, to the left and right of him, by the inclination of Christ, the Mother of God and John the Baptist intercede, or further, angels, apostles, and other saints.[20] The archetype of femininity becomes the Mother of God, and the archetype of masculinity is John the Baptist. The importance of the Mother of God was included by Evdokimov in the event of the Incarnation as a common and free work of God the Father in the power of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary. Mary revealed the archetypical fullness of humanity, holiness, and glory in the sense that the ultimate purpose and the purpose of all deification took place. Mary agreed with the Incarnation of her body and was likewise present at the descent of the Holy Spirit on the Pentecost. For humanity, she set the path and pointed the direction for Christ to the New Jerusalem.

> It can be said that femininity is inherently embedded in the sign of the Birth and Pentecost, the sign of the birth of a new creation and a new age. Masculinity is energetic – under the sign of the Resurrection, Transfiguration, and Parousia. The divine world marked by the sign of the Father

[19] Cf. ibid., 162–164.
[20] Cf. Jiří Novotný, *Světlo ikon* (Olomouc: Refugium Velehrad – Roma, 1997), 69–70.

> corresponds to the human world marked by the sign of the Mother. This means that the human world is maternal in the function of its virgin structure.[21]

In this quotation, femininity refers to masculinity and motherhood to the fatherhood of God the Father. As the archetype of the man in the composition Deisis, Evdokimov chose a figure on the opposite side next to Christ: John the Baptist. For him, Mary and John the Baptist are the archetypal integration of femininity and masculinity into Christ. Christ in the icon has a priest's insignia, blesses, and serves as a judge. John the Baptist is the Forerunner whose birth is also proclaimed, an ascetic, a friend of the Bridegroom who recognised Christ as the Lamb and who paves the way for Christ's second coming. It is the presence of a prophetic charisma that is sensitive to God's presence.[22] Thus, a man should also spiritually become a forerunner, an ascetic, a friend of Christ, a prophet.

In Christ, everything is united by the fall of the split, and the division into the soul of man also unites. For Evdokimov, every soul is a picture of Deisis; it contains the Mother of God and John the Baptist, being 'at the same time a servant and friend of the Bridegroom'.[23] Originally, a violent man serves the liturgy in this temple. Again, there is marital unity following the example of the love of Christ and the Church.

Conclusion

This article reflects the archetype of the woman in the life and work of Paul Evdokimov. Methodologically, Evdokimov drew from Carl G. Jung's knowledge and his doctrine of archetypes. He gave the archetypes a theological interpretation and turned them into the topic of female and male spirituality. Archetypes such as mother or prostitute have acquired biblical content: the mother as the Mother of God and the prostitute as the end-of-time prostitute from an apocalyptic perspective. Evdokimov appreciated the importance of the women's revolution. He sought to support women's efforts to break free from stereotypes and to offer a treatise on the true, spiritual charisma

[21] Paul Evdokimov, *La femme et la salut du monde*, 218.
[22] Cf. ibid., 222–243.
[23] Ibid., 247.

of the woman, in which the woman stands out above men. In the motherhood of the woman, he saw the reflection of God the Father more than men. He became a defender of women and greatly respected them in his private life.

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L'IDENTITÉ MASCULINE ET FÉMININE CHEZ JACQUES MARITAIN FACE AU DOCUMENT DE LA CONGRÉGATION POUR L'ÉDUCATION CATHOLIQUE SUR LE GENRE

LUKÁŠ JAN FOŠUM

ABSTRACT
The Masculine and Feminine Identity in the Work of Jacques Maritain with Regard to the Document of the Cogregation for Catholic Education on Gender

The recent document of the Congregation for Catholic Education on the question of gender 'Male and Female He Created Them' emphasises the importance of the sexual difference for the masculine and feminine identity. On the other hand, in his essay 'Faisons-lui une aide semblable à lui' written in 1967, Jacques Maritain insists that this difference is more a difference of the soul than a difference of the body and that it will last also when the bodies are resurrected after death. His concept of the masculine and feminine specificity is based both on biblical and philosophical arguments. Without inclining to feminism, Maritain underlines especially the way in which a woman is different from a man. This study tries to show, how Maritain's ideas about the sub-specificity of man's and woman's soul can be complementary to the anthropology of the above-mentioned document of the Congregation for Catholic Education. Furthermore, it shows also a critical point of view of Maritain's idea of manhood and womanhood with the emphasis on the philosophical terms which are used for the difference between man and woman.

Keywords:
Jacques Maritain; Philosophical classification of masculinity and femininity; Theological anthropology; Congregation for Catholic Education

DOI: 10.14712/23363398.2020.61

Le récent document de la Congrégation pour l'éducation catholique (CEC) qui réagit à « diverses formes d'une idéologie,

généralement appelée “genre”[1] » trouve dans la différence sexuelle entre homme et femme un donné fondamental. Ce document considère la différence corporelle comme liée à l’une des inclinations fondamentales de la nature humaine[2] et qui est ainsi un donné de cette nature. Chez Jacques Maritain, qui a renouvelé de façon importante la vision traditionnelle de la nature humaine, la différence des sexes semble n’être que l’expression d’une différence bien plus profonde entre l’homme et la femme, enracinée d’abord dans l’âme humaine. Dans cet article, nous tâcherons d’exposer plus en détail la position de Maritain sur ce sujet pour voir si elle est compatible avec les avancées du document de la Congrégation. Nous terminerons par une critique de la position maritainienne et nous montrerons pourquoi il faut continuer à chercher une caractéristique philosophique de la masculinité et de la féminité qui soit la plus précise possible.

1. Le document de la CEC

Le but du document de la CEC reste d’abord éducatif : comment garder dans l’éducation des jeunes, notamment dans les établissements de l’enseignement catholique, une vision claire et inchangeable de la famille humaine qui se fonde sur la bipolarité, sur la complémentarité et sur la fécondité du couple humain homme-femme, et cela dans un contexte qui relativise profondément ce donné de la nature humaine. Vis-à-vis du « genre » – qui cache non seulement une ou des idéologies, mais aussi une recherche sur l’identité humaine –, le document opte pour la « voie du dialogue – qui écoute, raisonne et propose».

Comment distinguer et articuler le genre et le sexe, la capacité de l’autodétermination libre et les données du corps, la culture et la nature ? Comment éviter « la négation d’un don originaire qui nous précède, qui est constitutif de notre identité personnelle et forme le fondement nécessaire de chacune de nos actions[3] » ? Comment faire promouvoir « une éducation à la citoyenneté active et responsable, où

[1] Congrégation pour l’éducation catholique (CEC), *Il les créa homme et femme*, 2019, n° 2.

[2] « La *nature humaine* – par un dépassement de tout physicisme ou naturalisme – doit donc être comprise à la lumière de l’*unité d’âme et de corps*, l’unité de ses inclinations d’ordre spirituel ou biologique et de tous les autres caractères spécifiques nécessaires à la poursuite de sa fin. » (CEC, *Il les créa homme et femme*, n° 32).

[3] *Ibid.*, n° 9.

toutes les expressions légitimes de la personne sont accueillies avec respect[4] », sans nier « la vérité de l'être[5] »?

Face à ce défi, le document pose la distinction principale entre le sexe et le genre : « Le sexe définit l'appartenance à une des deux catégories biologiques qui dérivent de la dyade originaire, femme et homme. En revanche, le genre est la manière dont on vit, dans chaque culture, la différence entre les deux sexes[6]. » Dans la formulation de cette détermination de l'identité personnelle de chaque être humain, ce texte magistériel fait écho aux notions traditionnelles de l'union de l'âme et du corps[7] ou de l'essence[8], mais son insistance sur la différence sexuelle qui est un donné du corps s'exprime davantage dans une perspective personnaliste qui s'appuie sur le don de soi : « La sexualité, en effet, est une richesse de la personne tout entière – corps, sentiments et âme – et manifeste sa signification intime en la portant au don de soi dans l'amour[9]. » L'intégralité des conséquences de la différence sexuelle montre qu'elle a une racine métaphysique[10]. En plus, dès que l'on commence à réfléchir sur la masculinité et sur la féminité à partir des récits de la Genèse, on réalise que la relation homme-femme se comprend non seulement dans les rapports horizontaux, mais aussi dans sa dimension verticale[11], qui intègre Dieu-Créateur, celui qui a créé l'homme et la femme à son image et à sa ressemblance.

Rappelons que le document de la CEC saisit la problématique de l'identité homme-femme dans le contexte des recherches contemporaines sur le genre et face aux idéologies avec lesquelles ces recherches peuvent se mélanger. La perspective reste d'abord celle de l'éducation pour laquelle la famille humaine est depuis toujours le premier lieu où elle s'effectue et l'objet d'une la perception juste : les enfants ont besoin d'un père et d'une mère pour grandir à leur tour comme des hommes et des femmes. Avec ce cahier des charges, le document du Magistère utilise aussi un langage philosophique pour caractériser la différence entre la masculinité et la féminité, mais il fait cela dans une certaine pluralité des approches sans préciser vraiment comment dans

[4] *Ibid.*, n° 16.
[5] *Ibid.*, n° 19.
[6] *Ibid.*, n° 11.
[7] Cf. *Ibid.*, n° 23, 32 et 38.
[8] Cf. *Ibid.*, n° 26.
[9] *Ibid.*, n° 38.
[10] Cf. *Ibid.*, n° 34.
[11] Cf. *Ibid.*, n° 33.

l'essence de l'être humain entre le fait qu'il soit un homme ou qu'elle soit une femme.

2. Pourquoi chercher chez Maritain ?

Bien que Maritain ait peu écrit sur le thème même de l'identité masculine et féminine, ses propos sont intéressants pour trois raisons au moins. 1) Comme philosophe chrétien, il a renouvelé l'anthropologie aristotélico-thomiste tout en en montrant les points faibles voire dépassés. 2) Parmi les questions anthropologiques, il s'est montré particulièrement attentif à ce qui est relatif et à ce qui est absolu dans l'égalité et la diversité des êtres humains[12]. 3) Grâce à une coopération intellectuelle étroite et fructueuse avec son épouse Raïssa, il a su relever d'une façon à la fois équilibrée et neuve la spécificité et les points forts de l'humanité féminine, surtout sur le plan intellectuel et psychique.

> La notion de la nature humaine comme culminant dans la masculinité, si aberrante qu'elle soit, n'a pas fini d'exercer son pouvoir dans notre inconscient, alors que la notion correcte est évidemment celle de la nature humaine comme *répartie entre masculinité et féminité, tout en gardant dans l'une et dans l'autre la même valeur et dignité*. […] L'avantage que je reconnais à la femme est en effet chèrement payé par le tribut, beaucoup plus lourd que celui de l'homme, que la nature lui impose en ce qui concerne la propagation de l'espèce.[13]

Dans l'article « Faisons-lui une aide semblable à lui », Maritain se distingue surtout de deux points de vue contraires sur les rapports femme-homme. Le premier point de vue qu'il corrige est celui des Anciens (y compris Thomas d'Aquin) qui regardaient la femme comme un être humain intellectuellement plus faible, dont la fonction principale était la génération de la descendance pour l'espèce humaine. L'autre point de vue, à l'opposé, est le féminisme contemporain présenté par exemple par Yvonne Pellé-Douël[14]. Dans les autres écrits où il

[12] Jacques Maritain, *Principes d'une politique humaniste*, in *Œuvres complètes*, Volume VIII (Paris : Éditions universitaires, Fribourg : Éditions Saint-Paul, 1989), 245–277.

[13] Jacques Maritain, « Faisons-lui une aide semblable à lui », in *Œuvres complètes*, Volume XIII (Paris : Éditions universitaires, Fribourg : Éditions Saint-Paul, 1992), 685. Cet article a d'abord été publié en *Nova et Vetera* 42 (1967), 241–254.

[14] Jacques Maritain, « Faisons-lui une aide semblable à lui », 688.

traite le problème de la masculinité et de la féminité, Maritain conteste les idéologies modernes collectivistes qui portent un regard réducteur sur l'humanité en la considérant uniquement sous sa fonction économique[15]. Il propose une réflexion complexe qui se forme à partir des récits fondateurs du livre de la Genèse et qui se lie avec la philosophie de l'âme humaine donne la base des arguments contre ces différentes sortes d'erreurs.

3. Méditation biblique, philosophique et théologique

Le fait de s'appuyer sur les premières pages de l'Écriture Sainte pourrait paraître banal, voire simpliste. Or, « la tradition judéo-chrétienne – justement dans l'ouverture grandiose du récit de la Genèse – donne une formulation décisive des notions d'humanité, de personnalité, d'identité, et elle le fait de manière égale pour l'homme ou pour la femme[16] ». De plus, « quelque chose du trésor anthropologique et théologique du récit de la Genèse et du Nouveau Testament est resté enfoui dans le champ de l'histoire ».[17]

L'article « Faisons-lui une aide semblable à lui » est la contribution principale de Maritain aux questions tant discutées aujourd'hui de l'identité sexuelle et de son fondement. Le titre laisse deviner que les récits bibliques de la création de l'être humain seront plus qu'un simple point de départ : ils constituent le fondement perpétuel de l'égalité et de la diversité de l'homme et de la femme. Maritain approfondit cette question par des éléments philosophiques et eschatologiques. Cela donne une vision d'ensemble de l'homme et de la femme dans leur vocation commune et partagée qui a comme but principal d'être à l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu. Cette conception se déploie en cinq thèses que nous allons maintenant présenter : les trois premières puisent directement dans les chapitres 1 – 3 de la Genèse. La quatrième est une thèse philosophique sur le rapport de l'âme au corps humain. Enfin, la cinquième thèse regarde ce que l'humanité a dans

[15] Cf. Jacques Maritain, « Humanisme intégral », in *Œuvres complètes*, Volume VI, 1984, 511–515.

[16] Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz, « La personnalité chez l'homme et la femme », in François-Xavier Putallaz, Bernard N. Schumacher (éd.), *L'humain et la personne* (Paris : Cerf, 2008), 384.

[17] *Ibid*, 383.

sa sub-spécificité masculine et féminine à voir avec la finalité propre de l'être humain.

Dans leur vocation d'êtres créés à l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu, l'homme et la femme sont égaux. Ce n'est qu'ensemble qu'ils sont porteurs de cette vocation. En Gn 1, 27, l'expression « "homme et femme il *les* créa", est synonyme de *l'Homme* (avec une majuscule), et le constitue dans sa plénitude ontologique ».[18]

Dans Gn 2, 21-23 il est présenté de quelle façon la femme se distingue de l'homme depuis le commencement. « Ève n'a pas été tirée directement comme Adam, du limon de la terre, mais d'une matière plus élaborée et plus raffinée, d'une chair déjà vivante et humaine, ce qui veut dire qu'elle a reçu en partage les qualités les plus délicates et du plus haut prix pour la race humaine ».[19]

La domination de l'homme sur la femme n'est pas le résultat de cette manière différente d'être créée. Il s'agit, d'après Gn 3, 16, de la conséquence du péché originel et cela est imposé aux êtres humains « à titre de châtiment ».[20]

L'âme spirituelle n'est pas « individuée *par* la matière », mais « *en ordre* à la matière ».[21] Par conséquent, la sub-spécificité masculine est davantage une propriété de l'âme que celle du corps.

La différence de l'homme et de la femme demeure, qu'ils accomplissent ou non leur vie conjugale et l'œuvre de la reproduction. Elle n'est pas seulement de l'ordre temporel, elle sera présente aussi dans le monde des ressuscités.

Si on regarde maintenant les trois premières thèses bibliques ensemble, il faut d'abord souligner que de tels phénomènes, présents tout au long de l'histoire – tels que la domination de l'homme sur la femme, son contraire que l'on trouve de nos jours dans le féminisme (ou déjà avec le matriarcat), la rivalité entre la femme et l'homme en général ou encore la tendance à accaparer les dons propres à l'autre – tout cela appartient aux effets du péché des origines, et non pas à la différence entre l'homme et la femme conçue par la Sagesse créatrice.

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[18] Jacques Maritain, « Faisons-lui une aide semblable à lui », 682.

[19] *Ibid*, 683.

[20] *Ibid*., 695. Dans *ST* I, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2, saint Thomas distingue deux types de sujétion de la femme à l'homme : une, qui est servile et comme une conséquence du péché, et l'autre, primordiale, qui vient déjà de l'état d'innocence : la femme est naturellement plus faible et moins digne que l'homme. Selon le livre de la Genèse, l'homme est le principe de la femme.

[21] *Ibid*, 692.

Dieu a voulu que l'homme et la femme s'aident mutuellement et réciproquement dans leur chemin vers la plénitude de la vie à l'image de Dieu. Cette complémentarité se manifeste dans les qualités psychiques plus encore que dans les différences corporelles : si la force d'âme masculine se retrouve dans la puissance conceptuelle, dans la capacité du gouvernement et dans l'exercice d'une autorité juste, l'âme féminine est quant à elle dotée de finesse et de capacités intuitives. Le fait d'être créée à partir de la matière plus fine, « chair de la chair », a donc des conséquences non seulement pour l'apparence du corps féminin, mais aussi pour le fonctionnement de son âme humaine.

La psychologie philosophique aristotélico-thomiste permet d'ordonner et d'articuler les propriétés psychiques et les propriétés corporelles : l'âme, qui est la forme et l'acte (*entelechia*) du corps, est à l'origine de la spécificité de l'être humain – qu'il soit homme ou femme. Les propriétés masculines ou féminines sont ainsi fondées davantage dans l'âme que dans le corps. Ainsi, les différences sexuelles ne sont qu'une manifestation d'une différence plus profonde qui est inscrite dans la sub-spécificité de l'âme spirituelle : celle-ci, à la différence de l'âme animale, ne s'individualise pas à partir de la matière (*ex qua*), mais dans la matière (*in qua*[22]) ou comme le dit Maritain : « *en ordre* à la matière et à un corps déterminé, mâle ou femelle[23] ». La différence sexuelle qui est liée aux fonctions temporelles du corps n'est pas donc ce qui est le plus essentiel à la sub-spécificité masculine ou féminine, car ces dernières sont d'abord les propriétés perpétuelles de l'âme qui demeurent les mêmes une fois que les fonctions unitives et reproductives des corps cessent d'être actuelles.Il s'agit selon Maritain d'une propriété *modale essentielle*. L'essence humaine reste une seule pour les hommes et pour les femmes. Elle est néanmoins dans chaque personne individualisée soit dans le mode masculin soit dans le mode féminin,[24] ce qui a des implications pour toute la personne humaine, son corps et son âme. P.-M. Margelidon résume ainsi la conception maritainienne de la masculinité et de la féminité :

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[22] « Individuation », in Philippe-Marie Margelidon, Yves Floucat, *Dictionnaire de philosophie et de théologie thomistes*, Bibliothèque de la Revue Thomiste (Paris : Parole et silence, 2016), 217–218.

[23] Jacques Maritain, « Faisons-lui une aide semblable à lui », 692.

[24] Maritain exprime cette bipolarité aussi avec un parallèle chimique : « l'âme d'un homme est dès sa création dextroversement individualisée et celle d'une femme lévoversement individualisée. » (*Ibid.*, 692).

> L'espèce humaine est constituée et partagée en deux types subspécifiques, le masculin et le féminin, qui ne sont pas purement fonctionnels mais qui correspondent à des différences ontologiques. Ces deux types subspécifiques sont d'ordre modal-essentiel, c'est dire qu'ils correspondent aux deux modes de l'essence humaine. Il y a donc une différence « de nature » entre féminité et masculinité selon que les caractéristiques de l'un et de l'autre affectent la nature humaine tout entière. Celles-ci relèvent plus profondément de l'ordre psychique et spirituel que de l'ordre corporel.[25]

Ce donné philosophique qui met en avant les propriétés de l'âme humaine avant celle du corps s'éclaire encore plus dans la thèse que nous appelons eschatologique. Maritain insiste : dès les origines de l'homme, qu'il s'agisse de la création elle-même ou de ce qui suit après le premier péché, la vie sexuelle et la reproduction des hommes n'est qu'une étape en vue d'« une vie spirituelle de plus en plus élevée » dont le but est d'« entrer finalement dans le royaume de Dieu et de la vision béatifique. »[26]

4. Les points saillants de la position de Maritain

Maritain veut surtout éviter que l'on considère « le sexe et la fonction génitale comme le fondement premier d'où dérivent et par où s'expliquent tous les autres caractères différentiels qui distinguent l'être-homme et l'être-femme[27] ». Pour cela, il s'appuie sur l'anthropologie philosophique fondée sur l'individuation de l'âme humaine non à partir du corps mais *en ordre* à un corps et sur les distinctions fondamentales entre l'homme et la femme révélées dans la Genèse. Sans verser dans l'extrême opposé à celui des siècles précédents, Maritain souligne surtout ce qui est propre à la femme comme à celle qui a été créée à partir de l'homme pour être son vis-à-vis.

Dans sa méditation « Faisons-lui une aide semblable à lui », Maritain insiste sur les propriétés sub-spécifiques de l'homme et de la femme

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[25] Philippe-Marie Margelidon, *Les Fins dernières*. De la résurrection du Christ à la résurrection des morts (Paris : Artège – Lethielleux, 2016), 85 cité par Isolde Cambournac, *La masculinité et la féminité à la lumière de l'anthropologie de Thomas d'Aquin*, Thèse du doctorat soutenue dans la faculté de théologie de l'Université de Fribourg, Fribourg, 2018, http://doc.rero.ch/record/324533, 259.

[26] Jacques Maritain, « Faisons-lui une aide semblable à lui », 689.

[27] *Ibid*, 694–695.

qui leurs sont données dès l'instant de leur création (on pourrait aussi dire : dès leur établissement dans l'humanité). Ces propriétés sub-spécifiques sont d'abord ancrées dans l'âme d'un être humain avant d'être exprimées dans son corps, car la spécificité sexuelle n'a qu'une fonction temporelle et elle est subordonnée à la finalité spirituelle. L'identité masculine et féminine est plus ancrée dans l'âme que dans le corps, parce que l'âme est le principe à partir duquel le corps se forme.

Dans son combat contre la réduction des différences aux signes sexuels, Maritain semble aller trop loin en parlant du sexe comme du *parasite de la personne* :

> Le sexe ne fonde que la différence animale, si importante qu'elle soit, et si immédiatement évidente ; il ne fonde pas les différences proprement *humaines* entre l'homme et la femme. Le sexe et la fonction de reproduction sont en effet *pour l'espèce* et pour la perpétuation de l'espèce, et *en ce sens* ce sont des parasites de la personne.[28]

C'est là où le propos de Maritain se distingue le plus de celui du document récent de la Congrégation pour l'éducation catholique qui, au contraire, pose la différence des sexes comme un des fondements de l'identité personnelle. Pour autant, dans les deux cas les auteurs s'efforcent d'intégrer l'identité sexuelle dans la personne humaine. Il faut donc voir maintenant quelles pourraient être les différences significatives entre Maritain et le Magistère contemporain dans leur compréhension de la personne humaine.

5. La différence de la perspective de Maritain de celle du document de la Congrétation

Si les deux perspectives ici mentionnées visent l'être humain comme une personne, la différence entre elles se dessine à partir de l'usage du concept « âme ». Après avoir établi que « du sexe, en effet, la personne humaine reçoit les caractères qui, sur le plan biologique, psychologique et spirituel, la font homme et femme, conditionnant par-là grandement son acheminement vers la maturité et son insertion dans la société », le document de la Congrégation élargit la perspective en affirmant qu'« une telle diversité, connexe à la complémentarité des

[28] Jacques Maritain, « Faisons-lui une aide semblable à lui », 686.

deux sexes, répond pleinement au dessein de Dieu selon la vocation à laquelle chacun est appelé ».[29]

Maritain de son côté intègre également la sexualité dans la personne humaine. Cette intégration s'effectue néanmoins à partir de l'individuation de l'âme ordonnée au corps et elle subordonne le pôle charnel au pôle spirituel :

> La personne humaine étant celle d'un animal doué de raison, et l'âme humaine étant individualisée en ordre à un corps déterminé, le sexe et la fonction de génération, avec tout ce qui leur est lié dans le fonctionnement interne de la vie organique – surtout chez la femme, qu'il s'agisse de l'espèce de complicité qui s'établit ainsi entre elle et la nature, ou qu'il s'agisse surtout de la gestation, où l'enfant est dans le sein maternel comme dans un nid naturellement sacré – créent dans l'animalité humaine une sorte de consonance ou de correspondance harmonique avec ce qui, au pôle spirituel, et du côté de l'âme et de ses qualités particulières, constitue la personne humaine dans l'être-homme ou l'être-femme.[30]

L'approche du document de la Congrégation recherche la signification du don de soi dans l'altérité je-tu et dont le corps est l'instrument[31], tandis que Maritain met davantage l'accent sur l'ordonnancement entre l'âme et le corps, le temporel et le spirituel. Le document de la Congrégation insiste sur la totalité et l'instantanéité du don du soi qu'on ne peut faire autrement qu'en accord avec son être tel qu'il est formé dès le sein maternel. Pour Maritain, ce qui est crucial, c'est la subordination du temporel au spirituel, celle de la manifestation charnelle à la sub-spécificité de l'essence. Le document de la Congrégation lutte contre le dualisme qui sépare « un corps réduit à la matière et une volonté qui devient absolue » et pour lequel « le *gender* (genre)

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[29] CEC, *Il les créa homme et femme*, n° 4. Et plus loin : « À la lumière d'une *écologie pleinement humaine et intégrale,* la femme et l'homme reconnaissent la signification de la sexualité et de la génitalité dans cette intentionnalité relationnelle et communicative intrinsèque qui traverse leur corporéité et les renvoie mutuellement l'un vers l'autre. » (*Ibid.*, n° 35).

[30] Jacques Maritain, « Faisons-lui une aide semblable à lui », 694.

[31] « Puisque le corps est le signe du don, il en est aussi l'instrument. En effet, il est instrument du don réciproque des époux, de la communion des personnes. » (Thibaud Collin, *La Théologie du corps de Jean-Paul II : quelle application à la sexualité contemporaine ?* in Denis Borel et Jean-Gabriel Goupil de Bouillé (éd.), *La Personne en débat*, Bibliothèque de la Revue Thomiste (Paris : Parole et silence, 2008), 239).

finit par être plus important que le *sex* (sexe)[32]. » Maritain formule une anthropologie équilibrée qui évite à la fois le dualisme et le monisme, et qui accorde moins d'importance aux seules différences corporelles entre la femme et l'homme que le document qui réagit face au *gender*.

Enfin, la différence subtile entre les titres des deux textes que nous comparons principalement ici est déjà significative. D'un côté « Il les créa homme et femme » (Gn 1, 27) dit que l'être humain est dès le début soit homme, soit femme, et que l'un et l'autre ont été créés pour être ensemble : la masculinité et la féminité sont créées dès le début par Dieu dans la complémentarité. De l'autre côté, « Faisons-lui un aide semblable à lui » (Gn 2, 18) montre la différence de la manière dont la femme a été créée et qu'il y a un chemin – Maritain dira « un progrès » que l'homme et la femme ont à accomplir.

Ainsi, la contribution de Maritain aux débats sur le « gender » consiste dans son insistance sur la perpétuité de la différence homme-femme qui est enracinée dans l'âme humaine. La bipolarité sexuelle avec les fonctions corporelles qui lui correspondent se trouve ainsi non relativisée, mais subordonnée à la vocation d'être à l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu qui s'étend au-delà de la vie conjugale et familiale. Maritain ouvre d'un côté la porte aux avis qui disent que les signes corporels ne sont pas si importants pour l'identité masculine ou féminine, de l'autre côté il absolutise la différence homme-femme comme celle qui est instituée par Dieu depuis la création de l'être humain et qui demeure jusqu'au monde des ressuscités et qui n'est donc pas une option que l'on pourrait manipuler. Maritain prend au sérieux l'enseignement du Magistère selon lequel l'âme est la forme du corps;[33] sur ce point, il souligne l'aspect de l'ordre qui est présent depuis le commencement jusqu'à l'éternité dans l'être humain.

6. La critique de la vision maritainienne de la sub-spécifité masculine et féminine

Après avoir saisi les différences principales entre les accents philosophiques, bibliques et eschatologiques de Maritain d'un côté, et l'approche de la phénoménologie du don du document récent de la Congrégation pour l'éducation catholique de l'autre côté, nous pouvons voir maintenant

[32] CEC, *Il les créa homme et femme*, n° 20.
[33] *Catéchisme de l'Eglise catholique*, , n° 365.

une critique de la position maritainienne qui procède davantage de la même école. Dans sa thèse doctorale sur la masculinité et la féminité, Isolde Cambournac revient à plusieurs reprises sur le point de vue de Maritain. Son argumentation contre la « sub-spécificité » masculine et féminine, promue par Maritain, est avant tout philosophique, fondée sur la méthode aristotélicienne de saint Thomas d'Aquin. Qu'est-ce la masculinité selon l'analyse catégorique de l'être ? Selon Cambournac, la masculinité et la féminité ne sont ni un accident inséparable comme disait Thomas d'Aquin, ni un type subspécifique humain, comme disait Maritain. La précision consiste dans le discernement sur les accidents prédicables[34] et sur les accidents prédicamentaux (ou prédicaments).[35]

> La masculinité est la puissance active d'engendrer, et la féminité est la puissance passive d'engendrer. Ces deux puissances sont complémentaires et nécessaires pour la génération. Cela répondait à notre question sur les prédicables : si la masculinité et la féminité sont des puissances d'engendrer, alors ce sont des propres. Ce ne sont ni des accidents inséparables comme le pensait Thomas, ni des types subspécifiques comme le pensait Jacques Maritain. Le propre se situe d'une certaine manière entre l'accident inséparable et le type subspécifique. Comme elles sont des propres, la masculinité et la féminité découlent des principes de l'espèce. Cependant, ce sont les seuls propres qui ne sont pas présents chez tous les individus de l'espèce humaine. La moitié des individus a le propre de la masculinité, et l'autre moitié le propre de la féminité : ce sont donc des propres disjonctifs.[36]

Ces propres disjonctifs, masculinité et féminité, ajoute Cambournac, ont leur principe dans l'essence de l'âme et leur sujet dans les organes de la génération[37]. Maritain avait donc, selon Cambournac, raison d'avoir fondé les différences entre l'homme et la femme dans

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[34] « Les prédicables sont des classes plus ou moins universelles. Ils permettent à l'intellect de situer des attributs par rapport à un sujet. En associant un attribut à une classe et donc à un prédicable, l'intellect peut savoir si cet attribut est plus ou moins universel par rapport au sujet. » (Isolde Cambournac, *La masculinité et la féminité à la lumière de l'anthropologie de Thomas d'Aquin*, Thèse de doctorat: Université de Fribourg, 2018, 254.).

[35] « On distingue dix prédicaments (ou catégories) : la substance et les neuf accidents (la quantité, la qualité, la relation, le temps, le lieu, la possession, la situation, l'action et la passion). Contrairement aux prédicables où l'on distingue le propre, il n'y a pas d'intermédiaire dans les prédicaments entre la substance et les accidents. » (*Ibid.*, 273) La puissance de la génération est une qualité.

[36] *Ibid.*, 355.

[37] *Ibid.*, 404.

l'essence de l'âme humaine, mais sa catégorie de la « sub-spécificité » ne semble pas être très précise : il est plus juste de classer la masculinité et la féminité entre les propres disjonctifs.

Le point le plus problématique de Maritain est donc ce terme de la sub-spécificité, parce qu'il met en question la définition de l'espèce humaine. Le fait de classer la masculinité et la féminité parmi les accidents n'implique point une réduction au temporel et négligeable. Qu'il soit un accident inséparable ou un propre disjonctif, dans les deux cas il s'agit d'un attribut durable avec des conséquences pour l'individuation. Par contre, l'usage du terme de « sub-spécificité » met sérieusement en question la différence spécifique : chez l'être humain, c'est la rationalité, aussi bien chez l'homme que chez la femme. Même si la rationalité peut avoir des tonalités différentes dont certaines[38] que l'on observe plus souvent chez les femmes que chez les hommes et vice-versa, elle reste en soi une propriété, une spécificité humaine qui nous tous, hommes et femmes, distinguent des autres animaux.

7. Ce que le texte de Maritain dit et ce qu'il ne dit pas

Si nous revenons à ce donné fondamental qui distingue l'homme de la femme et qui est cherché par le document de la CEC, et établi aussi à sa façon, par Maritain, le philosophe français ne relativise point « le pôle charnel » de la différence sexuelle : il le subordonne au pôle spirituel. A la différence du document de la CEC, Maritain ne développe pas une réflexion sur la sexualité humaine. En élevant la masculinité et la féminité au niveau de la sub-spécificité, il ne relativise pas la différence sexuelle (et cela est vrai malgré l'expression un peu malheureuse : « parasite de la personne »), mais il l'enracine dans la propriété éternelle de l'âme humaine.

Maritain soutient sa lecture de Gn 1, 26 et 2,18-24 avec la liste des propriétés de l'âme masculine et féminine, mais il ne les formalise pas comme des exclusivités qui impliqueraient qu'un homme ne pourrait pas naturellement avoir certaines caractéristiques de l'intelligence plutôt féminine et vice-versa sans que cela signifie une déviation.

A la différence d'Isolde Cambournac, Maritain ne dit pas où est le sujet de la masculinité et de la féminité dans l'être humain. Il semble

[38] Maritain attire particulièrement notre attention sur les propriétés typiquement masculines et féminines de l'esprit.

que selon lui, cette propriété de l'âme pénètre absolument tout le corps : l'être humain vit et fonctionne différemment dès le moment de sa création propre à l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu, qui est soit masculine, soit féminine.

Maritain de son côté part dès le début du donné biblique : l'homme et la femme sont créés à l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu. La capacité de la génération qui est transitoire dans la longueur de leurs existences éternelles ne peut donc pas être prise comme une distinction la plus fondamentale, comme le propre disjonctif, car elle n'est, selon Maritain, qu'une manifestation de la différence qui se trouve plus profondément enracinée dans l'âme.

On pourrait certainement reprocher à Maritain la négligence des donnés biologiques, si importants, dans les piliers de sa réflexion. Or, l'égalité de l'homme et de la femme que Maritain affirme, présuppose les connaissances de la biologie moderne et dépassent l'idée aristotélicienne, reprise par Thomas d'Aquin que la femme est dès l'embryogenèse « un homme manqué ».[39] Même si les connaissances biologiques que nous avons aujourd'hui sur les différences sexuelles et sur le rôle de l'homme et de la femme dans la génération changent considérablement le point de vue porté notamment sur la femme par rapport à la vision aristotélico-thomiste, Maritain part toujours de l'idée principale que les différences sexuelles et la fonction de la génération ne sont pas déterminantes et fondatrices dans la bipolarité homme-femme. L'évènement, le trait fondateur que le philosophe français traduit en « type sub-spécifique », c'est le mode d'être créé à l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu. Maritain prolonge dans la lumière des Ecritures cette différence jusqu'à l'éternité.

Conclusion

Les deux propos sur le fondement de la différence entre homme et femme que nous avons abordés dans cette étude se distinguent sans doute d'abord par ce à quoi ils réagissent. Le document récent de la Congrégation pour l'éducation catholique veut surtout préserver la détermination naturelle du sexe contre la fluidité et l'ambiguïté du « gender » qui se greffe sur un dualisme anthropologique. Maritain a de

[39] « Femina dicitur *mas occasionatus*, quia est praeter intentionem naturae particularis, non autem praeter intentionem naturae universalis. » (*ST* I, q. 99, a. 2, ad 1).

son côté réagi contre les tendances trop matérialistes qui réduisaient les différences entre homme et femme aux organes corporels et à leurs fonctions. Il s'efforçait d'éviter en même temps les deux extrêmes que sont l'extrême « traditionnel » de la préférence accordée à l'homme et l'extrême moderne du féminisme. Le philosophe français montre la force d'une réflexion qui articule données bibliques et instruments philosophiques. Il a su relever les points forts de l'humanité féminine et a rappelé en quoi consiste la finalité de chaque être humain, homme ou femme, clerc, religieux ou laïc. Il n'a pas développé de signification de la sexualité humaine, ni son intégration dans la personne humaine.

La critique de la position maritainienne a montré qu'un autre classement philosophique de la masculinité et de la féminité que la sub-spécifité de l'essence s'avère plus juste : la puissance de la génération, dont le principe est toujours l'âme humaine et le sujet les organes engagés dans la génération masculine et féminine, est un propre disjonctif. La formulation philosophique de la différence homme-femme du document de la CEC reste ouverte à la fois à un approfondissement du type « disjonctif propre[40] », car il utilise l'expression « différence sexuelle[41] », ainsi qu'au terme de la sub-spécificité, car il utilise aussi l'expression « formes complémentaires[42] » ou « les deux modalités selon lesquelles s'exprime et se réalise la réalité ontologique de la personne humaine[43] ». Cela montre que la classification philosophique plus précise de la masculinité et la féminité reste encore une question ouverte, même si on est loin de la relativiser et de la faire passer aux influences culturelles et aux choix individuels.

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[40] Cf. n° 34.
[41] Cf. n° 11, 21, 25 et surtout 26.
[42] Cf. *Ibid.* n° 34.
[43] Cf. *Ibid.*

‘ADAM LAY YBOUNDEN’: A MARIAN FELIX CULPA

FRANK G. BOSMAN

ABSTRACT

The 15th-century poem ‘Adam lay ybounden’ presents a ‘folk version’ of the paradoxical theology of the notion of *felix culpa*, Adam’s ‘happy fault’ by which the Incarnation of God in Jesus of Nazareth was unintentionally provoked. The poem is simple in its vocabulary, but elaborate in its invocation of theological notions such as the *descensus Christi as inferos*, the *felix culpa* and the *necessarium Adae peccatum*, both from the Easter prayer of the ‘Exsultet’, focussing on the role of Mary within the economy of salvation rather than on Christ’s. While having been researched only fragmentarily in the past, in this article, the theological content of this poem is analysed integrally for the first time.

Keywords:

Adam lay ybounden; Middle-English poetry; Mariology; Felix culpa; Descensus Christi ad inferos; Forbidden fruit; Primordial sin

DOI: 10.14712/23363398.2020.62

Blessed be the time that the apple was taken
therefore we may sing: thanks to the Lord.

In a unique manuscript, Sloane 2593, held by the British Library, a curious little poem from the beginning of the 15th century has been preserved. The poem is known from its first thee words as ‘Adam lay ibowndyn’, or in a slightly modernised spelling, as ‘Adam lay ybounden’. The poem, crammed in between rather vulgar songs about

the size of one's penis and songs posing a riddle to its listeners, 'Adam lay ybounden' succeeds in simultaneously being plain and simple in its vocabulary, while invoking complex theological notions and themes ranging from the *descensus Christi ad inferos* to *felix culpa*.

The poem, in various textual modernisations, has been popularised in our times by numerous musical settings, which are still performed today. 'Adam lay ybounden' has been used by composers, such as Peter Warlock (1923), John Ireland (1956), Boris Ord (1957), Philip Ledger (1980), Howard Skempton (2001), Giles Swayne (2009) and Robert Edward Smith (2018). Especially famous is Benjamin Britten's interpretation of the poem, which he included, as 'Deo Gracias', in his 'Ceremony of the Carols' from 1942.

The poet rejoices in the paradoxical idea that humankind should be thankful that Adam committed the first sin, eating the forbidden fruit of paradise: 'Blessed be the time that the apple was taken / therefore we may sing: thanks to the Lord.' The reasoning is astute and supple: 'Had the apple not been taken / our Lady would never have been heaven's queen.' If Adam had not sinned, God would never have been incarnated in Jesus, and Mary would never have become the Mother of God. It is a theological and 'Marian' turnaround reminiscent of the famous phrases of the Easter Exsultet, *O certe necessarium Adae peccatum / O felix culpa* ('O truly necessary sin of Adam / O happy fault').[1]

Although 'Adam lay ybounden' has been incorporated in a large number of anthologies on English lyric from the Middle Ages and has been briefly discussed by a variety of scholars, it was mostly reflected with regard to the poetic and not the theological elements, as we will discuss later on in this article. The theological complexity of this 'folk song' has never been fully analysed systematically.[2] In order to achieve a theological analysis of 'Adam lay ybounden', my analysis will be primarily synchronic.[3] This implies that I do not attempt to argue what the real author has intended with his poem (known as the 'intentional fallacy'), but that I wish to make an analysis of the actual theological

[1] Victor Haines, 'Felix Culpa,' in *A dictionary of Biblical tradition in English literature*, ed. David Jeffrey (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1992), 274–275; Jay Ruud, *Encyclopedia Of Medieval Literature* (New York: Facts on File, 2006), 6–7.

[2] James Dean, 'Adam lay bound,' in *The facts on file companion to British poetry before 1600*, ed. Michelle Sauer (New York: Facts on File, 2008), 1.

[3] Archibald van Wieringen, 'Methodological developments in Biblical exegesis. Author – test – reader,' *Analecta of the UCU* (forthcoming).

meaning of the present text and its intertextual relationships to other texts from Bible and tradition.[4]

In this article, I want to do a full theological examination of the medieval poem, considering it as an example of Marian folk spirituality, that is, a syncretic mixture of official ecclesiastical doctrines, on the one hand, and an amalgam of stories, legends, and poems on the other, which was distributed not so much by clergymen, but primarily by minstrels and story-tellers.[5]

In the first section, I will introduce the poem 'Adam lay ybounden', while the later sections are devoted to the four strophes respectively, focussing on the different theological themes like the *descensus Christi ad inferos*, the forbidden fruit, the *felix culpa*, and the portrayal of Mary as the new Adam. I will argue that 'Adam lay ybounden' could be considered as a 'commoner's' (*völkerisch*) version of the *felix culpa* doctrine from Christian theological tradition, focussing on the role of Mary within the economy of salvation, rather than on Christ's.[6]

All quotations from the Bible are taken from the New American Standard Bible (NASB) translation.

1. The song 'Adam lay ybounden'

The poem 'Adam lay ybounden' is found in Sloane Manuscript 2593 (folio 11), held by the British Library. The manuscript seems to be an amalgam of reverent religious songs, like 'I syng of a mayden' and 'Lullay, mone liking', both in honour of Mary, and more vulgar songs like 'I have a gentil cock'. 'Adam lay ybounden' is preceded by 'Omen gentes plaudit', which initially seems to refer to Psalm 47, but is actually a drinking song, and is succeeded by 'I have a young sister', an erotic riddle disguised in the form of a nursery rhyme.[7] The poem was written at the beginning of the 15th century, and is probably native to the region of East Anglia, more

[4] Graham Allen, *Intertextuality* (London: Routledge, 2000).

[5] Robert Wuthnow, *Meaning and moral order. Explorations in cultural analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 187–188.

[6] For a technical analysis of the qualities of the poem's lyrics, see: Stephen Manning, *Wisdom and number. Towards a critical appraisal of the Middle English religious lyric* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962), 6–7; Edmund Reiss, *The art of the Middle English lyric. Essays in criticism* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1972), 138–142; and Thomas Duncan, 'The Text and Verse-Form of "Adam Lay I-Bowndyn",' *The Review of English Studies* 38, n. 150 (1987): 215–221, doi: 10.1093/res/XXXVIII.150.215.

[7] F. Padelford, 'Transition English song collections,' in *Cambridge history of English literature 2. The end of the Middle Ages*, eds. A. Ward and A. Waller (Cambridge:

specifically Norfolk, as Kathleen Palti has argued.[8] Her transcription of the Middle-English text from Sloane 2593 runs as follows.[9]

1. Adam lay ibowndyn bowndyn in a bond
   fowr' þowsand wynter þowt he not to long
2. And al was for an appil An appil þat he tok
   as clerkis fyndyn wretyn in her' book
3. Ne hadde þe appil take ben þe appil taken ben
   ne hadde neuer our lady a ben heuene qwen
4. Blyssid be þe tyme þat appil take was
   þerfor' we mown syngyn deo gracia[10]

In modern English translation, the text would read something resembling this.

1. Adam lay bounden, bounden in a bond
   four thousand winters, he thought no to(o) long[11]
2. And all was for an apple, an apple that he took
   as clerics find written, (written)[12] in their book
3. Had the apple not been taken, the apple been taken
   our Lady would never have been heaven's queen
4. Blessed be the time that the apple was taken
   therefore we may sing: thanks to the Lord

Cambridge University Press, 1908) 387; and Douglas Gray, *Later medieval English literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 368.

[8] Kathleen Palti, 'Synge we now alle and sum. Three Fifteenth-Century collections of communal song. A study of British Library, Sloane MS 2593; Bodleian Library, MS Eng. poet. e.1; and St John's College, Cambridge, MS S.54. Part I: Thesis' (doctoral thesis, University College London, London, 2008), 71–73 and 104–123.

[9] Kathleen Palti, 'Synge we now alle and sum. A study of British Library, Sloane MS 2593; Bodleian Library, MS Eng. poet. e.1; and St John's College, Cambridge, MS S.54, part II: Appendices' (doctoral thesis, University College London, London, 2008), 389.

[10] The second of the two Latin words is misspelled as *gracia* instead of *gratias*.

[11] The text can be translated as either 'he thought not too long', meaning that Adam thought four thousand years as not being too long a wait for salvation, or 'he thought not to long', meaning that Adam, for four thousand years, did not dare to long for salvation. Both options are feasible within the larger framework of the poem. Maybe the ambiguity of the text was intended, but we can only speculate about that.

[12] Duncan suggested including a second 'wretyn' to repair the otherwise broken metric, a problem already noticed, but not solved, by Reiss. See: Duncan, 'Text,' 215–221 and Reiss, 'Art,' 139. I have chosen to follow his suggestion in my translation of the poem.

The poem is included in numerous anthologies concerning medieval English lyric. Sometimes the poem is only mentioned without any further comment or analysis.[13] Other ones give short descriptions of the poem, though not necessarily positive ones.

Theodore Silverstein summarises quite aptly that 'Adam lay ybounden' is essentially a 'reversal of expectations (…) in a brief poem of praise for Mary', connected to the theme of the *felix culpa* 'joyously acclaimed on Easter Eve'.[14] Paul Morris and Deborah Sawyer echo this sentiment, identifying the poem's theme as 'a type of "fall upwards"'.[15] Rosemary Woolf praises the poem for its lyrical structure, which is even appealing to modern readers, and points to several other medieval folk poems dedicated to Mary, that mention the idea of *felix culpa*, like 'A salutation to the virgin' and 'Regina celi letare'.[16] Marina Warner, in her monograph on Mariology, even identifies the anonymous author as a 'poet of genius'.[17]

The poem presents, indeed, a 'Marian' version of the *felix culpa* theology. Adam's sin is not so much forgivable or 'happy' because it resulted in the Incarnation of Christ, but because it made Mary his mother and therefore the queen of heaven. 'Adam lay ybounden' is not the only poem occupied with this theme. Lydgate's 'Regina Celi Letare' and 'On the image of the pity' do likewise, just as the anonymous 'Haile be thou' and 'Si pro peccato'.[18]

Edmund Reiss is more ambivalent in his qualification. According to him, the poem is 'on the surface, a naïve, unsophisticated ballad-like piece' that, nevertheless, 'still has a compelling quality that

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[13] Edmund and Frank Sidgwick, *Early English lyrics amorous, divine, moral & trivial* (London: Bullen, 1926), 102; and Thomas Wright, *Songs and carols from a manuscript in the British Museum of the 15th century* (London: T. Richards, 1861), 32–33.

[14] Theodore Silverstein, *English lyrics before 1500* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 100.

[15] Paul Morris, 'A walk in the garden. Images of Eden,' in *A walk in the garden. Biblical iconography and literary images of Eden*, eds. Paul Morris and Deborah Sawyer (Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 1992), 33.

[16] Rosemary Woolf, *The English religious lyric in the middle ages* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 290; Carleton Brown, *Religious lyrics in the XVth century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 30–33; and John Lydgate, *The minor poems of John Lydgate* (London: Oxford University Press, 1911), 293.

[17] Marina Warner, *Alone of all her sex. The myth and cult of the virgin Mary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 62.

[18] Lydgate, 'Minor poems,' 293 and 298; Brown, 'Lyrics,' 30; Haines, 'Fall,' 13 (quoted); Gary Waller, *The Virgin Mary in late medieval and early modern English literature and popular culture* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 71.

stems from its simple language and the combination of its rhythm and sounds'.[19]

Charlton Brown more or less disqualifies the theological dimension of the poem by firstly identifying 'Adam lay ybounden' together with 'Maiden Makeles' and 'The Child that Died for Us' as 'touch[ing] elbows with the popular ballads', and secondly contrasting those three with other texts in Sloane, that 'are sophisticated in tone and are characterised by verbal conceits and clever paradox', that 'owe no kinship to the ballad, but look forward, instead, to the poetry of the metaphysical school'.[20]

These and other scholars have identified multiple theological themes in the poem, which will be systematically addressed by a verse-by-verse synchronic analysis in the following sections.

2. Strophe I: The Descensus Christi ad inferos

In the first strophe, the figure of Adam is introduced and qualified as 'bounden in a bond' for a period of 'four thousand winters'. Depending on the interpretation of the Middle-English phrase 'þowt he not to long', Adam himself seems either unimpressed by the number of years, possibly relative to his insight of the magnitude of his own sinful action damning all of humankind, or is surprised because of the so desired, but still unexpected, the arrival of his redemption.[21]

The 'bonds' mentioned in the text are a reference to metaphorical shackles with which Adam is said to have been held in imprisonment in the underworld since his regretful transgression of God's commandment (Genesis 2:17), but also to a kind of contract, or even 'covenant', God is held to have made between fallen humankind and himself in order to ensure its eventual redemption and return to paradise.[22] While the covenant metaphor could be taken from Biblical vocabulary – found both in the Hebrew Bible (for example Genesis 9:9) and in the New Testament (emphatically found in Hebrews 9) – the idea that Adam's fall could have caused or even provoked such a 'deal' involving God's Incarnation in Jesus to atone for Adam's sins (and for those of all humankind collectively), is certainly not.

[19] Reiss, 'Art,' 139.
[20] Brown, 'Religious lyrics,' xxv.
[21] See footnote 8.
[22] Dean, 'Adam,' 1.

The idea that Adam's sin – the consumption of the forbidden fruit – was paradoxically something humankind could retrospectively be happy about, a notion commonly referred to as *felix culpa*, will be addressed in more detail later in this article. The notion that Adam was 'located' somewhere between his natural death after his expulsion from Paradise and Jesus' death and resurrection is known in the Christian tradition.[23] Adam's soul and those of the pious from the Biblical history were thought to be collected in the *limbus partum* ('the limbo of the patriarchs') to await the salvific arrival of the Christ. The liberation of those souls from Limbo is known as the *descensus Christi ad inferos*, literally 'Christ's descent into the underworld', in English also known as the 'harrowing of hell'.[24] The harrowing itself is thought to have taken place between Jesus' death on the cross and his resurrection from the grave three days later, although no sources of such an event are present in the New Testament.[25]

In the 'Exsultet', the Easter prayer (originating from the end of the 4th, beginning of the 5th century), which features the *felix culpa* and the *necessarium Adae peccatum* (see below), phrases can also be found about the harrowing of hell.[26]

> Haec nox est,
> in qua, destructis vinculis mortis,
> Christus ab inferis victor ascendit.
> (…)
> O vere beata nox,
> quae sola meruit scire tempus et horam,
> in qua Christus ab inferis resurrexit!

[23] Reiss, 'Art,' 140.

[24] Marcel Sarot, 'The scope of redemption on finding meaning in Christ's descent into hell,' in *The Apostles' Creed. 'He descended into hell,'* eds. Marcel Sarot and Archibald van Wieringen (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 185–206.

[25] Archibald van Wieringen, 'Descent into the netherworld. A biblical perspective,' in idem, 9–32.

[26] Guido Fuchs and Hans Weikmann, *Das Exsultet. Geschichte, Theologie und Gestaltung der österlichen Lichtdanksagung* (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1992), 61 and 71–72.

In English translation:

> This is the night,
> in which, destroying the chains of death,
> Christ has risen from the underworld victoriously.
> (…)
> O, truly blessed night,
> that earned alone to know time and hour,
> in which Christ rose from the underworld.

The Easter night is celebrated as the moment in which the *vincula mortis*, the 'chains of death' are broken (the same bonds that keep Adam 'ybounden' in the first strophe of the poem) by Christ who triumphed not only over his own death but over the death of all the faithful from the past, present, and future, through descending into and ascending from the Limbo of the pre-Christian saints.

The number of years Adam had to wait until he was freed from the underworld mentioned in the poem, 'four thousand winters', or 4000 years, seems somewhat randomly chosen initially. There is a number of possible interpretations. Reiss argues – simply – that it is a reference to the four weeks of the Advent, the liturgical preparational period for Christmastide.[27] Since many commentators and editors have classified 'Adam lay ybounden' mainly as a nativity song, probably because of the physical proximity of other songs more explicitly connected to Christmas contained in the Sloane manuscript, and since it (therefore) has been frequently performed within the Christmas repertoire of the English choir tradition, among others in Britten's aforementioned 'Ceremony of the Carols', the association is likely.

Patrick Diehl argues that several numbers concerning the time between the Fall and Redemption circulated in medieval German, French, Italian, and English literature and poetry, ranging from 4000 via 5000 to 5200.[28] The last one is supposed to be a reference to a total of 52 weeks in a regular year.[29] James Dean opts for a slightly different interpretation, relating the four millennia of 'Adam lay ybounden' to the idea of the *sex aetates mundi*, the notion of the 'six ages of the world' as

[27] Reiss, 'Art,' 140.
[28] Patrick Diehl, *The Medieval European religious lyric. An ars poetica* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 155.
[29] Diehl, 'Lyric,' 156.

described, among others, by Augustine of Hippo in his *De Catechizandis rudibus* (par. 22).[30]

Brian Murdoch suggests yet another possible source for the number of four thousand years in the poem: the apocryphal Gospel of Nicodemus.[31] The Gospel of Nicodemus, written in the 5th or 6th century, incorporates the 'Acts of Pilate' and the 'Christ's descent into Hell'.[32] The Acts describe, among other things, John the Baptist preaching before the patriarchs in the *limbus patrum*. John serves as the last prophet of the 'Old Testament' since he is the only prophet who has seen and identified Jesus as the messiah (for example, John 1:29).

After a while, Seth – Adam's third son – re-tells an intriguing little story. When his father was ill, Seth had an encounter with an angel, who sent him back to Adam to tell him: 'after the completion of 5500 years from the creation of the world, the only-begotten Son of God shall become man and shall descend below the earth.'[33]

Another possible option is provided by Douglas Gray, who suggests a connection to Dante's *Divine Comedy*.[34] In canto xxvi of 'Paradiso' (lines 118–120), Adam reveals to Dante that his stay in Limbo lasted 4302 years.[35] Again, the numbers are not precisely the same, but it is safe to say that, as Dean and Diehl have suggested, the 'divine arithmetic' should not be taken literally but spiritually, indicating God's meticulous planning on behalf of fallen humankind.

3. Strophe II. The Forbidden Fruit

The second strophe of the poem connects Adam's predicament – laying in bonds for four millennia – to his transgression, thus linking the crime with its punishment. The poet simply states that Adam took an apple, as 'clergymen found written in their book'. The combination of

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[30] Dean, 'Adam,' 2.

[31] Brian Murdoch, *Adam's grace. Fall and redemption in medieval literature* (Woodbridge: Brewer, 2000), 12; and Brian Murdoch, *The Medieval popular Bible. Expansions of Genesis in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 16.

[32] J. Eliott, *The apocryphal New Testament. A collection of apocryphal Christian literature in an English translation based on M.R. James* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 165.

[33] Wilhelm Schneemelcher, *The New Testament Apocrypha. Volume 1. Gospels and related writing* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1990), 523.

[34] Douglas Gray, *A selection of religious lyrics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975), 98.

[35] Dante Alighieri, *La divina commedia (The Divine Comedy). Paradiso* (Bruckman: s.l., 2011), 570–571; Robert Durling, *The divine comedy of Dante Alighieri* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 535.

the identity of the forbidden fruit and the Bible, or the Vulgate more specifically in this instance, is interesting since the book of Genesis does not give any indication about what kind of fruit Adam was supposed to have left unconsumed. The identification of the fruit as an apple is, however, virtually universal in both medieval and modern literature, and is only challenged in scholarly circles.[36] Intriguingly enough, the poem gives a hint as to where we can find the source of this odd identification: the clerics' book, that is, the Vulgate.[37]

First of all, the Latin word in the Vulgate for 'apple' and 'evil' is, in both instances, *malum*. And since there is no greater evil than Adam's primordial sin, damning all of the humankind within it, it is feasible to think of the unnamed fruit of Genesis as 'an apple'.[38] However, there is more to it. In the Hebrew Bible, at least in its Latin translation, apples are connected to love and sexuality, especially in the Song of Solomon.

> Like an apple tree [*malum*] among the trees of the forest, / so is my beloved among the young men. / In his shade I took great delight and sat down, / and his fruit was sweet to my taste. (Song of Solomon 2:3)

> Sustain me with raisin cakes, / refresh me with apples [*malis*], / because I am lovesick. (Song of Solomon 2:5)

> I said, 'I will climb the palm tree, / I will take hold of its fruit stalks.' / Oh, may your breasts be like clusters of the vine, / and the fragrance of your breath like apples [*malorum*]. (Song of Solomon 7:8)

One (Latin) verse from the Song of Solomon contradicts this positive association between love and apples, turning it into its opposite. The Vulgate translates the notoriously difficult verse 8:5 as: 'Sub arbore malo suscitavi te ibi corrupta est mater tua ibi violata est genetrix tua,' which can be translated as: 'Under the apple tree I have raised you up; there your mother was corrupted; there she was violated, your birth-mother.' The NASB gives something entirely different: 'Beneath

[36] Murdoch, 'Bible,' 16–17.
[37] John Speirs, *Medieval English poetry. The non-Chaucerian tradition* (London: Faber & Faber, 1971), 65.
[38] George. Scheper, 'Apple,' in *A dictionary of Biblical tradition in English literature*, ed. David Jeffrey (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1992), 50.

the apple tree I awakened you; / there your mother was in labor with you, / there she was in labor and gave you birth.' The significant differences in the various translations, both modern and classical, are indicative of its difficulty.

From the perspective of the Vulgate, one can understand that the *sub arbore malo*, the tree under which bad things happened to an unnamed woman, a mother, is linked to the tree from Eden, under the branches of which Adam and Eve sinned for the first time.[39] The correlation between apple, evil, love, and sexuality is a recurring theme in Christian theological tradition, especially in relation with the doctrine of original sin.[40] The 'apple that Adam took' from the poem invokes not only the act of initial transgression on the part of Adam but also conjures up the whole corpus of Biblical texts, translations and interpretations linking Adam's sin with sex. The bondage from which Adam is finally rescued is not only a 'physical' one in the *limbus patrum* but also a moral one: saved from the bondage between sexual intercourse and the transmission of original sin.

One more element regarding the notion of the apple tree from Eden has to be dealt with. Within Christian theology, three trees have been associated with one another: two in Genesis, the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil and the Tree of Everlasting Life, and one in the gospels, the 'tree' of the cross.[41] 'Adam lay ybounden' – again – takes this idea one step further. Adam's apple from the poem is not only substituted with the wood of the cross, but the two are morphed into one: the apple has become the reason for Christ's Incarnation, execution, and resurrection.

4. Strophe III. The Heavenly Queen

As Reiss has already observed, one significant figure is noticeably absent from the poem's narrative: Jesus Christ.[42] The whole poem is

[39] Murdoch, 'Bible,' 16.

[40] James Gailey, *Sex, war, and 'sin'. Humanity's path from the garden towards the city of a holy God* (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2012), 73–76; Patricia Williams, *Doing without Adam and Eve* (Fortress Press: Minneapolis, 2000); Pier Franco Beatrice, *The transmission of sin. Augustine and the pre-Augustinian sources* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[41] Réné Guénon, *The symbolism of the cross* (Gent: Sophia Perennis, 2004), 54–61; Alva Steffler, *Symbols of the Christian faith* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2002), 125.

[42] Reiss, 'Art,' 139.

dedicated to the Virgin Mary, who is praised as the 'heavenly queen' and as the whole blessed outcome of Adam's *felix culpa*. If Adam had not taken the apple, Mary would never have become the mother of Jesus, and – by extension – the Mother of God. And it is through her that the unmentioned Jesus Christ was born, who would eventually break Adam's bonds, and – by equal extension – the bonds of sin that bound all of humankind.

The transition from the notion of the apple and its connotations of the forbidden fruit (sex) from strophe II to the focus on Mary's role in the economy of salvation in strophe III is all the more interesting because of Mary's special theological status in regard to original sin and to human sexuality. In Roman Catholic tradition, Mary is considered to be *semper virgo*, having maintained her virginity before, during, and after giving birth to Jesus.[43] Furthermore, even though the idea of Mary's immaculate conception was only officially and dogmatically defined in Pope Pius IX's *Ineffabilis Deus* (1854), the veneration of Mary as such holds much older papers.[44] Both Marian dogmas work together to establish Mary as being as far removed from Eve as possible, especially concerning sex and sin, and are, at the same time, the result of this estrangement.

The change of focus in 'Adam lay ybounden' from Jesus to Mary – classified as 'fresh' by Reiss – is part of both a more significant theological development to juxtapose Jesus/Mary with Adam/Eve, and a slightly lesser one involving the conception of a 'Marian *felix culpa*'.[45] As Haffner summarises: 'The Patristic writers of East and West referred to Mary as the "new Eve", who co-operated with Christ the "new Adam".'[46] This re-focus of the *felix culpa* on Mary is found throughout the medieval religious lyrical tradition.[47]

The contrast between Eve and Mary is also present in the fruit they present. Eve is the presenter of the forbidden fruit, as we have established earlier in this article, that produces death, while Mary 'produces' the new Adam, the fruit of her womb, that provides eternal life.[48] It is

[43] Donald Calloway, 'Theology of the body and Marian dogmas,' in *The virgin Mary and theology of the body*, ed. Donald Calloway (West Chester: Ascension Press, 2007).
[44] Kathleen Coyle, *Mary in the Christian tradition. From a contemporary perspective* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2006), 35.
[45] Murdoch, 'Adam's grace,' 12.
[46] Paul Heffner, *The mystery of Mary* (Chicago: Hillenbrand Books, 2004), 75.
[47] Woolf, 'Lyric,' 291.
[48] Sally Cunneen, *In search of Mary. The woman and the symbol* (New York: Ballantine Books,1996), 63–69.

a far, but noticeable, echo of Elizabeth's greeting to Mary, 'blessed are you among women, and blessed is the fruit of your womb' (Luke 1:42), anchored in Roman Catholic piety by its inclusion in the prayer 'Hail Mary' as 'blessed art thou amongst women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb, Jesus'.[49]

Since the chastity of Mary and its role in the economy of salvation is so important and since 'Adam lay ybounden' is connected to the idea of *felix culpa*, as it is expressed in the 'Exsultet' prayer, it is interesting to point out an old, but now disused part of that prayer involving an appraisal of bees, responsible for the production of the waxen Easter candles, because of their supposed chastity.[50]

Nearing the end of the 'Exsultet', the candles are blessed, ignited 'for God's honour, a fire into many flames divided, yet never dimmed by sharing of its light'.[51] The light, the prayer continues, is 'fed by melting wax' (*alitur liquantibus ceris*), and 'drawn out by mother bees' (*apis mater eduxit*). Originally, the prayer would have continued with a praising of the bees, but since the 16th century, it has disappeared from the official liturgical texts.[52] Taking direct inspiration from Virgil's fourth Georgic ode (83 and 162–164), the texts described the honey-centred life of the bees.[53] The bees' appraisal ends with the following exclamation, linking the bees to Mary:

> O vere beata et mirabilis apis, cuius nec sexum masculi violant, foetus non quessant, nec filii destruunt castitatem; sicut sancta concepit virgo Maria, virgo peperit et virgo permansit.
>
> O truly blessed and wonderful bee. Their males do not violate their sexual organs. Their unborn ones do not disturb the sexual organs.[54] Their children do not destroy their chastity. Just like the holy Maria has conceived as a virgin, has brought forth as a virgin, and has remained a virgin.[55]

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[49] Dean, 'Adam,' 2.
[50] Anna Taylor, *Epic lives and monasticism in the Middle Ages, 800–1050* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 233.
[51] If not stated otherwise, the English text of the 'Exsultet' is taken from: The Roman Missal, London 2010.
[52] Fuchs, 'Exsultet,' 94.
[53] Thomas. Kelly, *The Exsultet in southern Italy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 51.
[54] Another possible but less comprehensive translation of this section would be: 'They do not disturb their unborn ones.'
[55] I would like to thank my friend Bas Suikerbuik for his help with the translation.

Based on the idea, predating Christianity itself, that bees do procreate without having sex with one another, the Church Fathers were keen on identifying them as a metaphor for the virginal Mother of God.[56] So again the idea is promoted that it is was apt that Mary should give birth to Jesus Christ, indeed because she was thought to have not been tainted by either Adam's original sin or the sexual intercourse associated with it: her fruit was pure and eternal, where Eve's was tainted and temporal. Interestingly enough, 'Adam lay ybounden' does not simply repeat this pattern by linking Adam to Christ and Eve to Mary, but juxtaposes Adam to Mary. This is both an indication of the 'Marian turn' in medieval theology, and surprisingly 'feminist' in nature since it re-focusses the guilt of the fall away from the female (Eve) to the male (Adam).[57]

5. Strophe IV. The Felix Culpa

The fourth and final strophe marks the culmination of the dramatic movement. The poet blesses Adam and his transgression: 'deo gracia'. The insertion of a Latin phrase, although not spelled entirely correctly, in combination with the accompanied phrase 'therefore we may sing', conjures up a liturgical discourse. The benediction *Deo gratias* is well known within and without the Roman Catholic liturgy of medieval times, and it has been used, at least since the 10th century, as a responsorial to the threefold *Lumen Christi* ('the light of Christ') prior to the 'Exsutet'.[58] But even without this liturgical reference, virtually all commentators of 'Adam lay ybounden' connect the poem to the notion of the *felix culpa* from the great Easter hymn.

The whole *pointe* of the poem is the paradoxical idea that we may rejoice in Adam's original sin, because it resulted in, triggered, or provoked the Incarnation of God in Jesus through Mary. As observed before, 'Adam lay ybounden' focusses on Mary rather than on Christ, but the reasoning is the same: Adam resulted in Christ, sin resulted in salvation. In the 'Exsultet', it is formulated as:

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[56] Fuchs, 'Exsultet,' 94.

[57] Tina Beattie, *God's mother, Eve's advocate. A Marian narrative of women's salvation* (London: Continuum, 2002), 164–193.

[58] Kelly, 'Exsultet,' 53 and 136.

O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est!
O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!

O truly necessary sin of Adam that is destroyed by Christ's death!
O happy fault that deserved to have so great a Redeemer!

Fuchs traces this idea back to theologians as Ambrosius ('felix ruina, quae reparatur in melius', 'happy fall, that is repaired for the better'), who was traditionally credited as the author of the 'Exsultet', and Zeno of Verona ('o damnatio necessaria', 'o necessary damnation').[59] These phrases are not without theological problems. For example, abbot Hugh of Cluny (d. 1109) purged the phrases from the Cluniac Easter rite.[60]

The translation of the word *necessarium* is especially contested. Bonifatius Fisher has argued that, in medieval Latin, the word can be translated as *nützlich* ('useful' or 'serviceable'), followed later by Gerard Lukken's comparable suggestion of 'profitable;' Odo Casel suggested *liebenswürdig* ('love-worthy'), and Haines proposed 'inevitable', while others have pleaded for *heilbringend* ('salvation-bringing').[61] Other commentators have even tried to defuse the potential dogmatic bomb by classifying the *necessarium Adae peccatum* as a 'poetic hyperbole', a solution supported by Fuchs who stressed the poetic, rather than the dogmatic, character of the 'Exsultet'.[62]

The true 'sting' of this kind of reasoning is the subjectification of sin. If Mary's queenship is caused and justified by Adam's transgression, including the massive amount of other moral monstrosities, wars, and the suffering of countless individuals it has brought about, then

[59] Fuchs, 'Exsultet,' 67 and 135.

[60] Barbara Newman, *Medieval crossover. Reading the secular against the sacred* (Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 2013), 14.

[61] Bonifatius Fischer, 'Ambrosius der Verfasser des Österlichen Exultet?,' *Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft* 2 (1952): 69; Gerard Lukken, *Original sin in the Roman liturgy* (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 391–392; Odo Casel, 'Der österliche Lichtgesang der Kirche,' *Liturgische Zeitschrift* 4 (1931/32): 187; Victor Haines, 'Drawing evil with a happy face. The iconography of the Felix Culpa,' in *The problem of evil. An intercultural exploration*, ed. Sandra Wawrytko (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 82; G. Langgärtner, 'Bewusst beten. Das Osterlob "Exsultet". Ein theologischer Kommentar,' in *Weizenkorn Elemente zur Feier der Gemeindemesse. Lesejahr B, Heft 3*, ed. H. Ritt (Stuttgart 1985), 158.

[62] Heinrich Zweck, 'Osterlobpreis und Taufe. Studien zu Struktur und Theologie des Exultet und anderer Osterpraeconien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Taufmotive (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1986), 61; Fischer, 'Ambrosius,' 96; Fuchs, 'Exsultet,' 70.

what does this mean for the sins of individuals, and more pressingly, their moral value and/or judgement? If Adam's sin – unintentionally – brought forth such a great blessing as the Incarnation was, then my own sins can – at least possibly – be the reason for greater good later on down the road. This re-frames sins not so much as evil deeds which are to be condemned, but as necessary, if not unpleasant, conditions for the realisation of a greater good, and which one should be considerate enough to not judge too negatively. This offers a problem to orthodoxy that was seldomly missed in mainstream Christian theology.

6. The Marian 'Felix Culpa'

The text of 'Adam lay ybounden' is a playful combination of official church theology and more or less officially sanctified legends and folk piety. The first strophe speaks about Adam being bound in the netherworld, from which he is only saved when Christ himself descends into it and saves him. The *Descensus Christi* is well-anchored within the Christian tradition, but lacks any scriptural base, only to be found in apocryphal texts. The content of the second strophe, about Adam taking the forbidden food, is – by contrast – very much grounded in scripture and as is its identification as an apple in the Christian tradition. Even though the poem mixes scriptural and traditional elements, it claims to be of the first kind by adding 'as clerics have found written in their book'. Also the idea of Mary being the queen of heaven (and earth) stems from the tradition and not from the Bible, as is that of the *felix culpa*.

It is precisely this mixture of Biblical, pious legends, and folk spirituality, half sanctioned, half opposed by official church doctrine and professional theologians, that gives the poem its specific charm. It taps into a larger narrative complex on the grand history of humankind, from the creation of the universe and the fall from paradise through the death and resurrection of Christ to the continuation of this state of renewed grace in the coronation of Mary as eternal queen. It is a history of grace, for which the poet praises God in the last sentence, converging all of scriptures and legends into one great liberation story. If humankind used to live in an era conquered by disgrace, through Christ's *descensus* it entered a new one under Mary's governance.

Folk songs and popular piety do not care too much about the finesses of academic theology or the subtleties of ecclesiastically condoned

practices. They see on the stained-glass windows of the cathedrals Adam sinning with his apple in paradise, and Mary nurturing her baby Jesus, who is stretching out his arms to humankind whom he will later save by his death and resurrection. Christ has been replaced by his mother in this poetic history of salvation, by which the divine grace flows from God to humankind through Mary's loving care.

'Adam lay ybounden' is, last but not least, a tribute to the theological idea of the *nexus mysteriorum*, the idea that all Christian articles of faith are interlocked and interconnected. Creation, fall-from-grace, the Old Testament, Christ's death, *descensus* and resurrection, humankind's restatement into grace, Mary's queenship of heaven and earth: if one wants to understand any of the constituting parts, one has to understand its relationship to all the others. 'Adam lay ybounden' is a theological potpourri, a melting pot of parts and shades of the grand stories of the Christian salvational history.

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INTERPRETIERTES CHRISTENTUM? KRITISCHE RELEKTÜRE VON RATZINGERS *EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS CHRISTENTUM*

LUCIE KOLÁŘOVÁ

ABSTRACT
Christianity Interpreted? A critical re-reading of Ratzinger's *Introduction to Christianity*

Ratzinger's early work *Introduction to Christianity* presents an attempt at rational understanding of what theology considers to be crucial for Christianity and what should be thought over in the context of the (then) new challenges. The open character of the book can be understood in light of the fact that anthropological discourse was already well established in post-Council theology. For Ratzinger, this seems to be connected with a necessity to outline clear contours for Christianity. The book is one of the author's significant works with a wide impact, and which also represents Ratzinger's way of thinking in its relation to philosophical thought.

The title of this contribution is also its point: Ratzinger's book offers a certain interpretation of Christianity and provides at the same time a sort of defence of Christianity against a never-ending chain of interpretations. It is just that which should be subjected to interpretation.

Keywords:
Christianity; Theological anthropology; Credo; Philosophy; Interpretation

DOI: 10.14712/23363398.2020.63

Ratzingers Buch *Einführung in das Christentum* wurde in seiner Zeit (Erstausgabe in 1968) zum theologischen Bestseller. Etwas später hat es mit Küngs *Christ sein* (1974) und Rahners *Grundkurs des Glaubens* (1976) um die Gunst der Leser gewetteifert. Es wurden viele Exemplare verkauft, das Buch erwarteten wiederholte

Veröffentlichungen. Schon nach acht Jahren war es in zwölf Sprachen übersetzt.[1] Noch in 2000, also mehr als dreißig Jahre später, stimmte Joseph Ratzinger, damals Kardinal, einer unveränderten Veröffentlichung zu. Das erregt Aufmerksamkeit.

Mit einem inmitten Studentenmeutereien der sechziger Jahre und unmittelbar nach dem Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil geschaffenen Buch, von dem man gerecht vermuten kann, es zeige das „geöffnetere" Antlitz seines Autors, identifiziert sich der „spätere Ratzinger" ohne zu zögern. Also derjenige, der inzwischen rückhaltlos skeptisch der Methode nie zu endenden Interpretationen des christlichen Glaubens gegenübersteht und für den jeder weitere Stoß von Aggiornamento vor allem mit der Bedrohung verbunden ist, die Wahrheit relativiere sich. Im einleitenden Essay zur Neuausgabe bekennt R. sich zur Grundorientierung des Werks und setzt dieses frühe Bündel gar in die Kontinuität seines Denkens ein,[2] also auch der Bücher, die eine Anklage gegen die moderne Theologie mitklingen lassen.[3] *Einführung* kann man so zu Recht für „ratzingerisch wesenseigen" halten: es repräsentiert nämlich sein theologisches Denken eines bestimmten philosophischen Zuschnitts und widerspiegelt seine theologische Tiefeneinstellung. Von der er selbst nachgerade sagt, die habe sich nie wirklich geändert.[4]

Den anklagenden Ton hört man gleich im Vorwort zur ersten Auflage mit. Die Ausgangsfrage nach Inhalt und Sinn des christlichen Glaubens in unsicheren Zeiten wird hier direkt von Befürchtungen vor Ausverkauf des Christentums begleitet. Attraktiv versteckt hinter dem Volksmärchen „Hans im Glück", dabei aber deutlich anwesend als Befürchtung davor, das Christentum werde sich unter Wert verkaufen, werde leer.[5] In weiteren Kapiteln drängt sich dem Leser die aufgeworfene Befürchtung auf und profiliert sich gleichsam zum epistemologischen Faden, sozusagen

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[1] Vgl. Hansjürgen Verweyen, *Joseph Ratzinger – Benedikt XVI. Die Entwicklung seines Denkens* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007), 43.

[2] Vgl. Joseph Ratzinger, „Einführung in das Christentum – gestern, heute, morgen". Vorwort zur Neuausgabe 2000, *Einführung in das Christentum* (München: Kösel, 2007), 9–26.

[3] Z.B. *Unterwegs zu Jesus Christus* (Augsburg: Sankt Ulrich Verlag, 2003); *Der Gott Jesu Christi. Betrachtungen über den Dreieinigen Gott*, (München: Kösel, 2006).

[4] Vgl. Joseph Ratzinger, *Zur Lage des Glaubens*, ein Gespräch mit Vittorio Messori (München: Neue Stadt, 1986), 16. Auch z.B. S. Wiedenhofer konstatiert keinen prinzipiellen Unterschied zwischen R.s früherer und späterer Theologie – weder im Inhalt noch in der Form. Vgl. Siegfried Wiedenhofer, *Die Theologie Joseph Ratzingers/Benedikts XVI. Ein Blick auf das Ganze* (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2016), 21, 27, 91–92, 136.

[5] Vgl. Joseph Ratzinger, *Einführung in das Christentum* (München: Kösel, 1968), 9.

zum Schattenmotiv des ganzen Buches. Gerade dieses Bewusstsein ermöglicht bei kritischer Lesung eine tiefere Orientierung in dem scheinbar zugänglichen und gut verständlichen Text, der doch ein Labyrinth bleibt – weil im Hintergrund von bestimmten axiomatischen, nicht immer offen konzeptualisierten Voraussetzungen geführt, die als solche kaum zu Dialog gestellt werden, wonach das Buch – vorgelegt als eine Art Aufforderung – sonst strebt.[6]

Wieso ist dann redlich zu vermuten, *Einführung* erschließe jenes geöffnete Antlitz seines Autors? Anscheinend ist es R. gelungen die gerade zu der Zeit reifen Fragen anzurühren. Einen der Zugangsschlüssel zur Verständigung bietet die hermeneutische Deutung, die es als Zeugnis von der katholischen Theologie der sechziger Jahre erfasst. Diese Theologie hat schon, mehr oder weniger, die anthropologische Wende durchgemacht[7] – so, wie sie sie in ihren wiederherstellenden Strömungen seit den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts ansteuerte und wie diese dann durch das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil besiegelt wurde.[8] Die methodologische Nutzung dieses Faktes – da die Wende in der Theologiegeschichte zweifellos zu einer greifbaren Tatsache wurde – ermöglicht uns ein Instrument zu gewinnen, um R.s Buch rückwirkend in einen anthropologischen Kontext zu setzen und es in ihm neu zu lesen. Denn gerade auch dieses Buch ist ein Beleg dafür, dass die gegebene Wende im Rahmen des theologischen Denkens tatsächlich eintraf, dieses Denken verwandelte und unter anderem verursachte, dass theologische Antworten im öffentlichen Raum neu resonierten.

Im ersten Schritt werde ich daher – ohne Vollständigkeit zu beanspruchen – analysieren, worin der anthropologische Ansatz des Textes liegt. Der zweite Schritt soll die zugrundeliegende Struktur des Buches überprüfen und im dritten Schritt untersuche ich die philosophischen Wurzeln des jeweiligen theologischen Entwurfs. Somit glaube ich einen kritischen Zugang zur Lektüre von R.s Buch vorlegen zu dürfen. Der Text konzentriert sich fast ausschließlich auf das verfolgte Buch und bringt somit eine nur verknappte Sicht, die um einen breiteren Kontext zu ergänzen wäre. Zum Stand der Kirche und Theologie heuzutage kann nur sporadisch hingewiesen werden.

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[6] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, z.B. 64–66.
[7] Vgl. Karl Rahner, *Schriften zur Theologie* VIII. (Einsideln: Benzinger Verlag, 1967), 43.
[8] Vgl. namentlich die pastorale Konstitution *Gaudium et spes*.

1. Die anthropologische Art des Buches

R.s Ausgangspunkt ist Subjekt in seiner Einstellung zu Gott, Subjekt unter der Bekehrungsanforderung. Einem Supranaturalismus gegenüber, wo die Offenbarungsinhalte dem Menschen angebracht werden, thematisiert R. den Glauben primär als eine freie personale Tiefenentscheidung. Sein Ansatz zum religiösen Glauben ist existenziell.[9]

Verglichen mit der vorkonziliaren Dogmatik, die stark ecclesiozentrisch orientiert war, argumentiert R. verschiedentlich fundamental anthropologisch:

wenn er zwischen „Religion" und „Glauben" unterscheidet: zwischen *Religion* als einer Lebensordnung bzw. einem System von bestimmten rituellen Formen, Gepflogenheiten und deren Einhalten einerseits, und zwischen *Glauben* als einer Haltung, die nicht der Relation Wissen/Machen, sondern der von Stehen/Verstehen entspricht anderseits;[10]

wenn er zwischen „Vernunft" und „Glauben" unterscheidet: zwischen *Wissen*, dessen Evidenz durch Beschränkung auf das Erscheinende, Sichtbare und somit die Wirklichkeit Verschmälernde erkauft ist, und *Glauben*, der gerade nicht auf der Ebene der Erkenntnis, sondern der tiefst menschlichen Existenzialität vortritt;[11] so dass dann behauptet werden kann: „Jeder Mensch muß in irgendeiner Form zum Bereich der Grundentscheidungen Stellung beziehen, und kein Mensch kann das anders als in der Weise eines Glaubens tun. Es gibt einen Bezirk, der keine andere Antwort als die eines Glaubens zulässt, und gerade ihn kann kein Mensch ganz umgehen. Jeder Mensch muß auf irgendeine Art 'glauben'."[12];

oder wenn er betont, das Christentum sei – anderen möglichen Entscheidungsformen des menschlichen Geistes gegenüber – „vor allem auch eine Option für den Menschen"[13], inklusive seiner Transzendenz. Diese andere, von R. nur angedeutete Formen meinen die von der Menschheit immer wieder bereitgestellten Deutungsmuster (wie etwa kosmisches Chaos, Schicksalhaftigkeit, Determinismus, Nihilismus, kollektives Wohlergehen, Reinheit einer bestimmten Gemeinschaft u.a.), die dem Menschen als freiem Wesen mit unbedingter Würdigkeit nicht Genüge tun.

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[9] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 27–28.
[10] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 25–26n., 43f.
[11] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 33–52.
[12] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 46.
[13] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 121.

Die anthropologische Argumentation ist nachspürbar im der Trinität gewidmeten Kapitel. Den Ausgangspunkt der Problematik legt R. ins Gebiet der Erfahrungen, mitnichten des Spekulativen. Erfahrungen bestimmter Art, die Menschen im Zusammenhang mit Glauben erlebten, streben an einem historischen Augenblick danach, auf zugehörige theologische Weise abgehandelt zu werden.[14]

Deutlich ist die anthropologische Verankerung in den christologischen Teilen des Buches, wo nicht irgendwelches, vom gläubigen Christen anzunehmendes System zum Ausgangspunkt wird, sondern die Person Jesu Christi. In ihr ist Existenz identisch mit Sendung, Botschaft, Wort. Der statischen und einbahnigen Inkarnationschristologie gegenüber ist für R. der Kreuz richtunggebend: Jesus opfert sich selbst, die Kreuzigung wird zu Herrschaft, Herrschaft beruht in der Kreuzigung.[15] Der springende Punkt lässt sich hier vielleicht so formulieren: von Anthropologie ist nicht die Rede weil Gott Mensch geworden ist, sondern weil er als Mensch Gott war. Dasjenige, was auf der rein menschlichen Ebene zu Abgang würde, bekommt auf der Ebene der Beziehung zwischen Gott und Mensch sogar die entgegengesetzte Bedeutung.

Auch dort, wo R. die Stichhaltigkeit kirchlicher Struktur verteidigt, zeigt sich die anthropologische Lage als fundamental. Gott soll sicher nicht in Institutionen, Ereignissen, Worten, Riten verweilen. Er berührt zuallererst jeden Menschen in seinem Inneren und braucht im Prinzip keine vermittelnden Zwischenstufen. Dies ist dennoch nicht in subjektivistischer Verengung zu verstehen. R. eilt sich, zu unterstreichen, der wirkliche Mensch sei kein atomisiertes Individuum, er kommt gar nicht in den Blick als eine Einsamkeit des Ich. Zu sich selbst kommt der Mensch nur als leiblich beteiligt an dem Ganzen, als Mit-Sein. Natürlich ist Gott unabhängig von den äußeren Apparaturen, aber Christen nähern sich ihm geschichtlich in dem an, was ‘Tradition’ genannt wird.[16] Es steckt eine Dialektik in R.s Argumentation: einerseits hört man im Appell an die Größe der Gemeinschaft eine radikale Orientierung auf den Einzelnen mitschwingen („Kirche und Christentum überhaupt sind um der Geschichte willen da, der kollektiven Verstrickungen wegen, die den Menschen prägen; sie sind

[14] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 125f.
[15] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 164–165.
[16] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 198–207.

auf dieser Ebene zu verstehen. Ihr Sinn ist es […] das kollektive Gitter aufzubrechen oder zu verwandeln, das den Ort menschlicher Existenz bildet.“[17]), andererseits soll das Netz der menschlichen Gegenseitigkeit vor der Falle des Individualismus schützen („Weil das Christentum auf das Ganze bezogen ist und nur von der Gemeinschaft her und auf sie hin verstanden werden kann, weil es nicht Heil des isolierten einzelnen, sondern Indienstnahme für das Ganze ist, dem er weder entfliehen kann noch darf, eben darum kennt es in letzter Radikalität ein Prinzip ‘einzelner’.“[18]) Die Pointe dieser Dialektik liegt ersichtlich darin, dass das Institutionelle, die Strukturen, wie solidarisch sie auch immer sein mögen, nie ohne den Einzelnen auskommen.

Allerdings stellt R. den anthropologischen Ansatz immer wieder unter das Primat der Gottesoffenbarung, unter das Geheimnis Gottes verborgener Anwesenheit. Die tiefste Schicht jedes Menschen stellt Gott dar – der führt ab von allerlei künstlichen Konstruktionen, Rekonstruktionen, Schöpfungen, Interpretationen, klugen Erklärungen, in denen der Mensch nur um das herumkreist, was in Wirklichkeit angenommen werden soll.[19] Gott ist der Ausgangspunkt und der Höhepunkt des Menschen, Theologie ist die Letztbegründung der Anthropologie. In dieser Logik geht die anthropologische Perspektive nie in den Humanismus über, weil sie in keinem Moment aufhört, eine theologische Perspektive zu sein. Nicht überraschend im Gewirbel der sechziger Jahre, vielleicht aber überfokussiert, bricht R. der Theologie durchgehend ihre potential anthropozentrische Spitze ab, damit die Sache des Menschen nicht ihre eigenen Limiten überwuchern würde. Der dazu gebrauchte Hinweis zu Gottesoffenbarung dient R. trotzdem nicht als Alibi für die Entmachtung des Menschen, wie weiter ersichtlich wird.

Die anthropologische Sichtweise tritt im Text ebenfalls dort ein, wo zwischenkonfessionelle Themen berührt werden. Sie wird zum Hauptnenner für Größen, die zu R.s Zeit als inkompatibel verstanden wurden. Im Moment, wo es im Bereich der Ökumene so gut wie keinen Fortschritt gab – und dazu im Kontext, in dem Konfessionalität, Erbe der Neuzeit und Moderne, die grundlegende theologische Perspektive (und natürlich auch Kontroverse) war – überschreitet R. die konfessionelle Optik und spricht explizit von „Christentum“, nicht „Katholizismus“.

[17] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 202.
[18] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 204.
[19] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 137–139.

Er selbst reagiert eher schon auf eine andere, mehr aktuelle Kontroverse der späten Moderne, nämlich auf die Frage des Glaubens bzw. Unglaubens. Diese geht er existenziell an: „Niemand kann dem andern Gott und sein Reich auf den Tisch legen, auch der Glaubende sich selbst nicht. Aber wie sehr sich auch der Unglaube dadurch gerechtfertigt fühlen mag, es bleibt ihm die Unheimlichkeit des 'Vielleicht ist es doch wahr'. […] Der Glaubende wie der Ungläubige haben, jeder auf seine Weise, am Zweifel *und* am Glauben Anteil […]. Keiner kann dem Zweifel ganz, keiner dem Glauben ganz entrinnen […]."[20] Die Frage nach der konfessionellen Zugehörigkeit verschärft R. als Frage nach dem Menschen: „Nicht der konfessionelle Parteigenosse ist der wahre Christ, sondern derjenige, der durch sein Christsein wahrhaft menschlich geworden ist. Nicht derjenige, der ein Normsystem sklavisch und einzig auf sich selbst gedacht einhält, sondern derjenige, der frei geworden ist zur einfachen, menschlichen Güte."[21]

Der anthropologische Ansatz des Buches wird so unter anderem durch Orientierung an Subjekt und Personalität, existenziellen Zugang, Erfahrungsbasis, Überkonfessionalität oder Rücksichtnahme auf den zeitgenössischen und aktuellen Kontext und die damit verbundene Offenheit für gelebte Dimension der Realität gekennzeichnet.[22] Nur dass es mit Kennzeichen schwierig ist. Sie können nicht materialisiert werden, das Verfahren ist nicht schematisch. Zum Gegenstand weiterer Untersuchung soll die mehr oder weniger versteckte Epistemo-logik R.s Textes sein.

2. Zur Schattenstruktur

Die sichtbare Buchstruktur folgt dem Inhalt vom Apostolischen Glaubensbekenntnis als *regula fidei* nach. Parallel lässt sich eine subtile Linie erkennen.

Die jeweilige Wahl erklärt R. dadurch, dass das *Credo* sehr früh im Zusammenhang mit Taufspendung beheimatet wurde und man an ihm den anfänglichen Sinn von Lehre, Bekenntnis und Dogma sieht.[23]

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[20] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 23–24.
[21] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 221.
[22] Zur Charakteristik R.s Theologie insgesamt vgl. den kurzen Überblick von Josef Kreiml, „‚Mitarbeieter der Wahrheit.' Theologische Grundüberzeugungen des Papstes Benedikt XVI.," in *Christliche Antworten auf die Fragen der Gegenwart. Grundlinien der Theologie Papst Benedikts VXI.*, ed. Josef Kreiml (Regensburg: Pustet, 2010), 9–34.
[23] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 58–59.

Es ging um einen in Rom verwendeten Text, dessen endgültige Form jedoch nicht im Laufe des zweiten oder dritten, sondern definitiv erst neunten Jahrhunderts fixiert wurde, wenn Karl der Große ihn zur Festigung seines Reiches als vereinigenden Faktor nutzte. H. Verweyen erinnert daran, dass die Angelegenheit also nicht frei von politischen Konnotationen ist, wie übrigens aus der darauffolgenden Entwicklung zur Uniformität der „römischen" Kirche abzulesen ist.[24]

Das *Credo* selbst wird von R. nicht reduktiv dargestellt – etwa als ein ausschließlich verbindlicher, lehramtlicher Text. Er bringt ihn komplex dar: ein Symbol, das zwar auch die Lehre oder das später genannte Dogma einschließe, primär aber als Symbol des Glaubens da ist. Es enthalte die ganze anthropologische Breite des Glaubens. In ihm gehe es um die Antwort des Glaubens auf den zu Aufforderung gewordenen Jesus. In dem Symbol erklinge der ursprüngliche Dialog zwischen Gott und Menschen und zwischen Menschen untereinander – im Rahmen des Taufgeschehens. In ihm verberge sich das Wort als gehört, gesprochen, geschrieben, in ihm verberge sich Bekenntnis, es sei der Grund der Einheit, die es bewirke.[25] Die politische Dimension der Sache wird nicht in Kauf genommen. Das *Credo* repräsentiere den christlichen Glauben nicht als politisches Manöver, nicht als philosophische Idee, sondern als Leben.

Wer aufmerksam liest, registriert, dass innerhalb einzelner Kapitel Gedanken ausgespielt werden, die mit der vorgelegten und als solcher gut zugänglichen Struktur nicht direkt zusammenhängen, oder wo der Zusammenhang gerade vorausgesetzt wird, ohne angedeutet, geschweige thematisiert zu sein. Dem dadurch beunruhigten Leser bleibt es dies aufzudecken. In einer in der *Theologischen Revue* (1969) veröffentlichten Rezension schrieb W. Kasper lapidar: „Die Darstellung ist eher meditativ und intuitiv als argumentierend und reflektierend. R. umkreist sein Thema, spielt mit den verschiedenen Motiven und führt sie dann meist überraschend zur Synthese […]. Auf diese Weise entwirft er ein eindrucksstarkes Bild, aber die harten Konturen des logischen Gedankengangs sind nicht immer leicht herauszufinden. Der Leser erhält relativ wenig Information über den Stand der Diskussion, über Gründe und Gegengründe, sowie objektive Beurteilungskriterien. Dem theologisch nicht informierten ist es deshalb wohl nicht immer

[24] Vgl. Verweyen, *Joseph Ratzinger – Benedikt XVI.*, 45.
[25] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 54–69.

deutlich, was sichere These und was bloße Hypothese, was gemeinsame kirchliche und theologische Lehre und was persönliche Theologie des Verfassers ist. Dadurch ist er der oft recht persönlich geprägten Sicht des Autors weitgehend ausgeliefert, zumal andere Meinungen oft von vorneherein in recht gezielter Akzentuierung zu Wort kommen."[26]

Findet man in der *Einführung* eine Erklärung, um das Gesagte abzuschwächen? Im Vorwort spricht R. zwar von den den Charakter des Buches prägenden Umständen, die aber nur die äußeren sind: der Text ist aus den Vorlesungen für Tübinger Studenten, Hörer aller Fakultäten, im Sommersemester 1967 hervorgegangen, wissenschaftliche Belege wurden nur insoweit angefügt, als sie unmittelbar zur Vorbereitung des Verfassers dienten.[27] Angesichts der oben angeführten Kritik bleibt der Eindruck etwas verlegen. Ja, die Verweise auf Literatur sind eher enthaltsam, nicht selten vermittelt,[28] offenbar geht es insgesamt um eigene Besinnungen des Autors, sicherlich gebaut auf den von ihm schon früher interiorisierten Kenntnissen theologischer, philosophischer und historischer Art. Der wirkliche Stolperstein, den Kaspers Kritik trifft, liegt voraussichtlich woanders. Auf der ersten Ebene spricht R. offen und zugänglich, der Unterton ist jedoch konfrontativ. Als ob er sich von jemandem und etwas abgrenzen, gegen etwas kämpfen würde. Dargebrachte Verknüpfungen sind stellenweise mit dem *Credo*inhalt verbunden, oft wurzeln sie aber im Motivationsboden ihres Verfassers.[29] Gerade dann identifiziert man sie als Antworten auf unausgesprochene

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[26] Walter Kasper, „Das Wesen des Christlichen," *Theologische Revue* 65, 3 (1969): 182–188, hier 184.

[27] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 10.

[28] Z.B. auf M. Luther wird via P. Hacker hingewiesen (168, Anm. 12); Aristoteles wird via H. Meyer zitiert (208, Anm. 43); einige Seiten werden dem Beitrag des Teilhard de Chardins gewidmet, aber die Fußnoten weisen auf C. Tresmontant hin und seine Einleitung in das Denken des jeweiligen Theologen (191–194 und Anm. 26–33). Der präsentierte de Chardin ist ziemlich verwässert, es geht um R.s Interpretation von Tremontants Interpretation, jedoch mit dem Anspruch, es handle sich um eine unmittelbare Paraphrase. Es wird auch nicht kritisch reflektiert, dass sowohl bei de Chardin (mit seinem unbestreitbaren Genie), als auch bei Tresmontant (in seiner Inklination zu ideologisierenden Deutungen) an die methodologischen und epistemologischen Grenzen gestoßen wird.

[29] S. Wiedenhofer weist darauf hin, dass R. primär keine großen systematischen Entwürfe entwickelt, sondern es bei ihm wesentlich um eine situative und kontextuelle Theologie geht, um Gelegenheitsschriften, die auf konkrete Herausforderungen und Situationen reagieren. Im Rahmen des Handlungszusammenhangs ist R.s Theologie großenteils als „Krisenbewältigung" und „Orientierungskontroverse" zu verstehen. Vgl. Wiedenhofer, *Die Theologie Joseph Ratzingers/Benedikts XVI.*, 23–24.

Fragen, Rechtfertigungen gegen imaginäre Kläger, Ausfallschritte auf Gegner. Ich weise auf einiges hin.

2.1 Die Figur des Dilemmatischen

Im ersten Kapitel, auf dem Hintergrund des Dilemmas „traditionelle Theologie versus moderne Welt", eröffnet R. die Metapher von einem Clown-Theologen, der – anstatt Theologie zugänglicher zu machen – mittels seiner Gewänder die Aufmerksamkeit anderer zu sekundären Wahrnehmungen ablenkt.[30] Es wird richtig gezeigt, dass es letztendlich nicht um Formverwandlung gehen kann, die durch irgendeinen visuellen Trick Theologie modernisieren würde. Es wird jedoch nicht ausgearbeitet, worin die echte Verwandlung wohl liegen könnte, bzw. sollte, ohne im gegebenen Dilemma stecken zu bleiben. Der Autor thematisiert nur, worin die echte und tiefe Theologie liegt, nämlich im „Scandalum". Falls es weiterhin um das Christliche gehen soll, so R.s Annahme, darf keine theologische Verkleidung das primäre Ärgernis beseitigen. Theologie kann sich nie wirklich anpassen und es entsteht die Frage, ob ein zeitgemäßes Design überhaupt nachzustreben ist, oder ob vielleicht schon die Bestrebung um das Aggiornamento als solche die Entleerung der Theologie mit sich bringe… Aus zugespitzten Aussagen („Wenn etwa irgendwo ein Theologe erklärt, ‚Auferstehung der Toten' bedeute nur, dass man täglich unverdrossen von neuem ans Werk der Zukunft zu gehen habe, so ist der Anstoß sicherlich beseitigt."[31]) wird der Leser nicht erfahren, wie man das Aggiornamento wohl machen kann, ohne sich am Christlichen zu veruntreuen. R.s Gedankenablauf lässt allmählich einsehen, dass gerade wegen der – unveränderlichen – Substanz des Christentums nicht einmal die Aufhebung des einschlägigen Dilemmas wünschenswert ist. Als ob Theologie für die Welt inakzeptabel bleiben sollte.

Das aufgeworfene Dilemma ist für R. nicht bloß ein methodisches Hilfsmittel, sondern eine grundsätzliche Aussage. „In der Fremdheit des theologischen Unterfangens den Menschen unserer Zeit gegenüber wird der, der seine Sache ernst nimmt, […] die bedrängende Macht des Unglaubens inmitten des eigenen Glaubenswollens erfahren und erkennen."[32] Auch wenn sowohl Gläubigen als Ungläubigen

[30] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 17–19.
[31] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 32.
[32] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 19.

sich in nicht sehr unterschiedlicher Situation befinden, gibt es hier eine spezifische Fremdheit der Theologie, bzw. des Glaubens. Verursacht diese vielleicht, dass der Gläubige, sich des Ärgernisses des Christlichen bewusst, sich inmitten der „modernen Ungläubigen" dementsprechend fremd fühlen muss? Aber was mit denen, die den Glauben ernst nehmen und sich fremd fühlen inmitten der „unmodernen Gläubigen"? Soll dies zu Beweis werden, dass sie die Sache nicht ernst genug nehmen? Ist das Dilemma, das die durch Ärgernis gezeichnete Theologie notwendigerweise mit sich bringt, gerade das tatsächlich Maßgebende für die Sache Christi? Könnte es nicht eher so sein, dass der ernst erlebte Glaube den Menschen gerade zum Leben zwischen anderen Menschen befähigt – und also auch zwischen seinen Zeitgenossen, die die altmodische Theologie nicht verstehen?

Das attraktiv angespielte Thema des Glaubens in der gegenwärtigen Welt klingt bei R. halbwegs skeptisch, sogar abwertend. Seiner Furcht gegenüber, das Christentum sei billig verkauft, kann die Furcht vor einem kompromisslosen, entmenschlichten Christentum gestellt werden. Die abschreckende Möglichkeit eines Christentums ohne Religion erwähnt R. sattsam. Aus der Geschichte kennt man aber auch die umgekehrt abschreckende Möglichkeit des „Übermaßes am Religiösen", angebracht oder nicht. Das Risiko einer oberflächlichen Weitergabe berechtigt als solches die Instandhaltung des *Status quo* nicht. Die Eigenschaften des Tiefen/Oberflächlichen, des Authentischen/Unglaubwürdigen, des Wahrhaftigen/Falschen folgen keiner Dichotomie zwischen früher/jetzt oder dem Traditionellen/Modernen[33], sie überqueren sie. Im Prinzip findet bzw. vermisst man das Ärgernis sowohl bei Theologie in den längst aus der Mode gekommenen Kleidern, als auch in der Verkleidung eines Clowns, der zum Lachen bringt, auch wenn er es ernst meint. Gerade weil die Essenz woanders liegt, braucht man einem modernen oder alternativen Gewand keine magische Macht zuzusprechen, geschweige es zu fürchten.

2.2 Die Figur des Oppositionellen

Einem dualistischen Schema entsprechend taucht an vielen Stellen des Buches „ein Gegner" auf – oft in Gestalt eines Angehörigen der „weltlichen Welt", öfters aber als ein Christ bestimmter Prägung. Den

[33] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 29f.

weltlichen Gegner betreffen verschiedene Randbemerkungen, die ihn als einen Fortschrittler („wie wenig das [die christliche Eschatologie] in Wahrheit mit fröhlicher Fortschrittsromantik zu tun hat“)[34] oder gar als verkörperten Marxist zeigen.[35] Es kann auch um einen – einigermaßen schematisierten – Kritiker der Kirche gehen, unabhängig ob weltlich oder christlich geprägt: „Im Grunde ist immer ein versteckter Stolz wirksam, wo die Kritik an der Kirche jene gallige Bitterkeit annimmt, die heute schon anfängt, zum Jargon zu werden.“ Es wirkt verstimmend, dass solche Sätze einer Überlegung über der unheiligen Heiligkeit der Kirche folgen. Warum, fragt der Leser, an dieser Stelle wieder ein Geplänkel?! „Leider gesellt sich nur allzu oft eine spirituelle Leere dazu, in der das Eigentliche der Kirche überhaupt nicht mehr gesehen wird, […]. Die wirklich Glaubenden messen dem Kampf um die Reorganisation kirchlicher Formen kein allzu großes Gewicht bei. Sie leben von dem, was die Kirche immer ist.“[36] R. darf hier eine spirituelle, zumeist an die Kritik der Kirche gebundene Leere diagnostizieren. Insgesamt legt er Kritik der Kritik vor, die leider auch von der galligen Bitterkeit gekennzeichnet zu sein scheint. Dabei, nur einige Seiten vorher, hat er gleichsam revolutionär getönt: „Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil selbst hat sich dazu durchgerungen, nicht mehr bloß von der heiligen, sondern von der sündigen Kirche zu sprechen; wenn man ihm dabei etwas vorwarf, so höchstens dies, daß es noch viel zu zaghaft darin geblieben sei.“[37] Die „Dogmatik der Sündigkeit“ ist, R. zufolge, vor allem deswegen sehr gut nachvollziehbar, weil sie mit der Erfahrung jedes von uns übereinstimmt.[38] Warum vermag dann derselbe R. die Kritik in die eigenen Reihen nicht zu ertragen, die er darüber hinaus selbst pauschal in den Mund der hypothetischen Kritiker hineinlegt?

Der Gegner aus den christlichen Kreisen begehe am häufigsten die Flucht in die Historie, zum historischen Jesus, reduziert auf bloß menschliches Phänomen. Anstatt in den seit Jahrhunderten gültigen Glauben zu vertrauen, fange dieser nachträglich an zu rekonstruieren, was nicht rekonstruierbar sei – da es nämlich nicht um Lehre oder Taten gehe, sondern letztendlich um das Annehmen der Person Jesu

[34] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 196.
[35] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, z.B. 218–219.
[36] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 286.
[37] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 282.
[38] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 282–287.

als Christi.[39] Es ist fraglich, inwieweit R. die historische Frage nach dem irdischen Jesu für implizites Teil der Theologie hält. Dass „hohe Christologie" ohne die reale historische Person Jesu von Nazareth zur Ideologie werden könnte, befürchtet er nicht so sehr.[40] Dafür äußert er die Angst, die historische und phänomenologische Methode bedecke die Tiefe des Menschen und Gottes, und die „Exaktheit" – ähnlich wie bei der naturwissenschaftlichen Methode – werde mit Wahrheitsverlust bezahlt.[41] Gilt es aber nicht, die verschiedenen Ansätze in ihren unterschiedlichen Methoden und den damit verbundenen Ansprüchen zu respektieren? Möglicherweise begeht R. hier den Fehlgriff, aus einer methodologischer Einstellung der Historie („ohne Wahrheit") auf eine prinzipielle Folgerung („Wahrheit gibt es nicht") ihrerseits zu schließen. Doch, wenn „Wahrheit" im methodologischen Rahmen eines Ansatzes nicht als eine Kategorie da ist, kann sie hier auch nicht verlorengehen.[42]

2.3 Die Figur der Konfrontation

R. zählt sich selbst wohl zu den Theologen, die die Resultate der historisch-kritischen Exegese für die systematische Theologie für brauchbar halten. Darin unterscheidet er sich von denen, die ohne sie auskommen – wie Barth, von Balthasar oder auch Rahner.[43] Wenn er aber die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus als modernes Klischee paraphrasiert, tut er es spöttisch und mit Bissigkeit: „Halten wir uns nicht dabei auf, dass eine so inhaltslose Botschaft, mit der man vorgibt, Jesus besser zu verstehen, als er sich selbst verstand, schwerlich jemandem

[39] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 158–164.

[40] Zu diesem Problem siehe Edward Schillebeeckx, *Mensen als verhaal van God* (Baarn: H. Nelissen, 1989), 123–124.

[41] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 154–156.

[42] R. Deines macht darauf aufmerksam, R. verteidige als sachlich angemessen eine Diktion, wo es zwischen historischer Rekonstruktion und theologischer Interpretation nicht sauber getrennt und unterschieden wird. So seien die Heilstatsachen historisch. Vgl. Roland Deines, „Der ‚historische' ist der ‚wirkliche' Jesus. Die Herausforderung der Bibelwissenschaften durch Papst Benedikt XVI. und die dadurch hervorgerufenen Reaktionen," in *„Mitarbeiter der Wahrheit." Christuszeugnis und Relativismuskritik bei Joseph Ratzinger/Benedikt XVI. aus evangelischer Sicht*, ed. Christoph Raedel (Göttingen: Brunnen, 2013), 20–66, hier 37–42. In seiner Untersuchung der Rolle des Historischen in R.s Werk (vor allem das Jesus-Buch des Papstes) bringt Deines die Problematik nuanziert dar und weist andererseits auch auf das Berechtigte und Aufforderne in R.s Vorschlag des „schlichten" Zugangs hin, der den christlichen Wahrheitsanspruch im historischen – fleischgewordenen Gottessohn – Jesus zu bewähren sucht. Vgl. ders., 59–63.

[43] Vgl. Verweyen, *Joseph Ratzinger – Benedikt XVI.*, 51–52.

etwas hätte bedeuten können. Hören wir lieber einfach zu, wie es weitergegangen sein soll. Aus Gründen, die nicht mehr recht zu rekonstruieren seien, sei Jesus hingerichtet worden und als ein Scheiternder gestorben. Danach sei auf eine auch nicht mehr recht erkennbare Weise der Auferstehungsglaube entstanden […] Alsbald – so sieht es unser Klischee – sei aber dann die Botschaft aus der semitischen Welt in die hellenistische übergangen. […] Im hellenistischen Bereich waren diese Kategorien unverständlich; man habe folglich dort zu hellenistischen Vorstellungsmodellen gegriffen. […] Das Ganze ist für den historisch Denkenden ein absurdes Gemälde, […], für meinen Teil gestehe ich […] lieber und leichter zu glauben imstande bin, dass Gott Mensch wird, als dass ein solches Hypothesen-Konglomerat zutrifft."[44] R. unterstellt der Theologie, „das Christliche in wohlklingende Allgemeinheiten aufzulösen"[45]. Ihm zufolge wurde Jesus „gleichsam auf das Gespenst des bloßen Dass abgemagerten historischen Jesus"[46] verringert und gerade das sollte gezeigt haben, „dass uns der Rückweg zu einem bloßen Jesus unwiderruflich versperrt ist. […] Die Jesus-Romantik ist deshalb im letzten […] zukunftslos und gegenwartsleer."[47] Der Streit zwischen Historikern scheint für R. verwirrt zu sein, jedenfalls will er „dem eilfertigen Subtraktionsverfahren"[48] in der Jesusforschung mit gebührender Kritik gegenüberstehen. Man kann sich natürlich fragen, ob es überhaupt in den Kräften der liberalen „Jesuologie-Vertreter" sein konnte, Jesus zum Philanthropen zu machen, der durch seine Versöhnlichkeit, auf Kosten der Wahrheit, Widersprüche ausgleiche. Setzen vielleicht die aus der Jesusforschung hervorgegangenen und benannten Aspekte die Botschaft Jesu herab? Kann die Missachtung wirklich dieser Ebene entspringen? Es gibt doch eine ganze Skala theologischer Interpretationen, die den Kern des Christlichen, das Scandalum, verschieden behandeln ohne es weg zu interpretieren.

Man kann mit R. restlos übereinstimmen, im Grunde gehe es immer um Sinn und Wahrheit[49] – gerade diese Voraussetzung ermöglicht es übrigens von Vereitlung, Missbrauch oder Entleerung zu reden. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit scheint jedoch bei R. an Angst gekoppelt zu

[44] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 171–173.
[45] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 198.
[46] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 159.
[47] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 160.
[48] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 164.
[49] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, z.B. 33, 47, 50, 69, 299.

sein. Seine späteren Werke bringen hervor, dass die in diesem Buch identifizierbaren Anläufe sich bei ihm allmählich zu Angst vor Relativierung der Wahrheit profiliert haben. Auch wenn die Risiken einer Relativierung deutlich sind und wenn aus der christlichen Sicht eine Pluralität, die nicht unterscheidet, Toleranz erfordert und diese vielleicht sogar mit Achtlosigkeit gleichstellt, unakzeptabel ist, steht das ganze Phänomen der theologischen Forschung und der damit verbundenen Pluralität noch nicht unter Verdacht, die Reinheit des Glaubens zu bedrohen,[50] und soll daher auch nicht als ein relativistisches Unternehmen disqualifiziert werden. Wenn R. den Relativismus später als eine gemeinsame Diagnose nahezu aller Krankheiten von Welt, Kirche und Theologie stellt,[51] ist es inzwischen immer deutlicher, dass hier faktisch nicht zwischen einem dogmatistischen und verantworteten Relativismus unterschieden wird.[52] Die Zurückweisung einer verantworteten Relativierung kommt dann selbst dogmatisch vor.

Dies alles lässt ahnen, warum R. dem Konzept der Geschichtlichkeit skeptisch gegenüber steht, oder beziehungsweise Theologie als politisch negiert.[53] Die Welt lasse sich nämlich weder als *factum* erklären, noch als *faciendum* schaffen. Allerlei Wissenschaften, von

[50] „Ich bewundere da immer wieder die Gewandtheit von Theologen, denen es gelingt, genau das Gegenteil von dem zu vertreten, was in klaren Dokumenten des Lehramtes geschrieben steht, um dann doch diese Umkehrung mit geschickten dialektischen Kunstgriffen als die ‚wahre' Bedeutung des betreffenden Dokumentes hinzustellen." Ratzinger, *Zur Lage des Glaubens*, 24.

[51] Joseph Ratzinger, *Glaube – Wahrheit – Toleranz. Das Christentum und die Weltreligionen* (Freiburg: Herder 2004), 94–98f. Joseph Ratzinger, *Werte in Zeiten des Umbruchs. Die Herausforderungen der Zukunft bestehen* (Freiburg: Herder, 2005), 51f., 114.

[52] Der unverantwortlichen Willkür gegenüber hält der verantwortete Relativismus oder Pluralismus am Wahrheitsanspruch fest, andere Ansätze werden aber nicht als bedrohlich wahrgenommen. Vgl. Konrad Hilpert, *Zentrale Fragen christlicher Ethik* (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2009), 240–242. Die jeweilige Unterscheidung macht z.B. auch K. Koch nicht, der – übereinstimmend mit R. – ausschließlich von „Diktatur des Relativismus" spricht. Vgl. Kurt Koch, „‚Was ist Wahrheit?' – Dogma des Relativismus oder Frage auf Leben und Tod? Versuch einer Replik," in „*Mitarbeiter der Wahrheit*," 221–237.

[53] Aufs Ganze gesehen gehört Geschichtlichkeit schon zu einem bleibenden wichtigen Thema bei R., das freilich verschieden rezipiert wird. Es gebe gelegentlich nicht nur zu viel Dogmatisches im Historischen, wie im oben genannten Sinn (Anm. 42), sondern „Geschichte" trete bei R. auch an die Stelle der Gnade, womit – auf Kosten des Übernatürlichen – eine ungeheuerliche Profanierung begehen werde. Vgl. Paul Hacker, „Joseph Ratzinger und die Zerstörung des Dogmas," in *Zur Philosophie und Theologie Joseph Ratzingers*, ed. Wigand Siebel (Saarbrücken: SAKA, 2005), 14–30, hier 16.

der Tendenz zur Geschichte betroffen, kommen mit Rekonstruktionen an, die doppeldeutig und immer mit Zweifel verbunden sind.[54] Die Schöpfungswirklichkeit erkenne der Mensch nur auf der Ebene bloßer Fakten und „[…] nur die Erde der Fakten bleibt in seinen Händen zurück“[55]. Auch die historisierende Theologie laufe diese Gefahr. Sie resultiert in eine Pluralität irgendwie mangelhafter Deutungen. Nicht einmal das folgende Programm wird geglaubt: „Das Factum hat das Faciendum, das Gemachte hat das Machbare und Wiederholbare, Nachprüfbare aus sich entlassen und ist nun um seinetwillen da.“[56] Welt kann man nicht rekonstruieren, nicht schaffen. Den Glauben auf der *Faciendum*-Ebene zu verstehen heißt für R. die Versuchung, die Techne auch in die Theologie einzusetzen – und somit zu vergessen, dass der Mensch sich nie zu Gott machen kann. Als theologisch problematisch befürchtet R. jede Manipulation mit dem Menschen und weigert sich, Theologie als Mittel zur Verwandlung der Welt zu politisieren.[57]

Geschichtlichkeit ist ihm eine Falle. Was wirklich bleibt, sei der Glaube. Glaube, der zu mir von außen kommt, den ich nicht restlos erklären und auf keine Weise schaffen kann, der – von seiner tiefsten Art her – ein Empfangen ist. Glaube als Angebot, ursprünglicher als Denken.[58] Theologie kann nicht anders als den Glauben denken, bei R. auf kontroverse Weise.

3. Über den philosophischen Hintergrund

Innerhalb der Frage, welche Stelle in R.s theologischer Besinnung die Philosophie einnimmt, sollen es zwei Ebenen unterschieden werden: seine eigene philosophische Position und (s)eine Metareflexion bezüglich Philosophie in ihrem Bezug auf Theologie.

3.1 Ratzingers philosophische Position

R. selbst bekennt sich im Buch zu keinem konkreten philosophischen Hintergrund, so dass der Leser hier über keinen Vor-zugang

[54] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 36–40.
[55] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 38.
[56] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 40.
[57] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 39–41.
[58] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, z.B. 47–48, 61f., 217–220.

verfügt; der Text jedoch scheint ausgeprägt platonisch zu sein.[59] Das gilt nicht nur dort, wo explizit philosophische Fragen behandelt werden, sondern gerade auch für den theologischen Kontext. R. entdeckt in Platon ein prophetisches, bis zu Christus angreifendes Potenzial und vermutet, Platons ernst philosophisches Denken habe als ob von vornherein etwas von den Offenbarungswegen erahnt.[60] Infolge jeweiliger Einstellung kommen im Buch häufig dualistische Kategorien vor: das Nichtzusehende/das Sichtbare, Geistliches/Materielles, Geist oder Seele/Körper,[61] die mehr als bloße Instrumente einer epistemologischen Unterscheidung seien: „Man begreift jetzt, wie der Glaube für ihn [R.] zu einem geradezu weltanschaulichen Bekenntnis zum Primat des Logos über die bloße Materie, des Geistes über den Bios zur gedanklichen, ja logischen Struktur des Seins, zur Welt als objektiver Geist, zur Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Ursinn von Einheit und Vielheit, von absolut und relativ […] werden kann.“[62]

Es scheint problematisch zu sein, dass R. diese Kategorien als „gegeben“ positioniert, ohne die Berechtigkeit einer solchen Annahme zu erklären, geschweige zu widersprechen. „Der latente Idealismus und Säkularismus in R.s Einführung ist letztlich in seinem platonisierenden Ausgangspunkt begründet, durch den das eigentliche christliche Scandalum des ‚*Logos sarx egeneto*‘ [Joh 1,14] gegen den immer wieder erklärten besseren Willen des Autors und trotz seiner ständigen Betonung der Positivität des Christlichen doch immer wieder unter die Vorherrschaft und unter die Gesetzlichkeiten des Wirklichkeitsbegriffs der griechischen Philosophie gerät. Die nachträgliche idealistische Synthese von Vernunft und Geschichte erlaubt es dann R. […] das eine Mal existenzial, das andere Mal geschichtlich-leibhaftig zu interpretieren. Im gewissen Sinn wird er dadurch unangreifbar, weil er jedem Widerspruch gegen die eine Stelle eine andere entgegensetzen kann. Doch damit hebt sich die herausgestellte Positivität des Christlichen selber auf. R.s Intentionen widerstreiten der immanenten Logik seiner Kategorien und Argumente. Philosophische Grundsatzüberlegungen lassen sich in der Theologie nicht ungestraft übergehen. Wer meint, keine

[59] Zu Grundlinien des philosophischen Denkens bei R. vgl. Ralph Weimann, *Dogma und Fortschritt bei Joseph Ratzinger. Prinzipien der Kontinuität* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2012), 79–117.
[60] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 240–242.
[61] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, z.B. 27–28, 34, 48, 119–120, 190, 199–200, 208, 267f.
[62] Kasper, *Das Wesen des Christlichen*, 185.

Philosophie zu haben, bei dem wirken sich bestimmte Philosopheme um so unkontrollierter und verhängnisvoller aus."[63]

Ein Indiz R.s philosophischer Präferenzen findet man in einer Fußnote, wo er zwischen den antiken Philosophen, die alle polytheistisch waren, Atheisten und Monotheisten unterscheidet, und sich zugleich darüber beschwert, dass dieser Tatbestand „unter der Herrschaft einer einseitig philosophiegeschichtlichen Betrachtungsweise selten genügend gewürdigt wird."[64] Erst vor so einem Hintergrund sei nämlich das Revolutionäre der christlichen Haltung offensichtlich, da in ihr „die philosophische und religiöse Orientierung identisch werden."[65] Methodologisch fragt das Letztgenannte jedoch nach Differenzierung: das metaphysische System, ein Konstrukt, ist nicht dasselbe wie Monotheismus; der allerletzte Grund des Seins ist nicht identisch mit dem einzigen Gott als Objekt der Ehrfurcht und des Glaubens. Die Frage nach dem Unterschied zwischen dem platonischen absoluten Sein (Begriff) und dem Gott des biblischen Glaubens stellt sich R. schon,[66] die Antworten wirken dennoch pauschalisierend. Im Buch verstreut, basieren sie anscheinend auf einer vorausgesetzten Deutungsformel: die frühe Kirche hat eine historische Wahl im Rahmen der antiken Kultur gemacht, da sie sich für den Logos, gegen den Mythos, entschieden hat, und Gott, als das Sein selbst, mit dem philosophischen Grund alles Seins identifiziert hat. R. ist der Überzeugung, dass gerade die Ankoppelung vom Gott des Glaubens an den Gott der Philosophen eine glückliche war, infolgedessen die Welt und Religion definitiv entmythologisiert wurden. Und das Christentum wurde vor einem Zusammenbruch bewahrt.[67] Nur dass in dieser Sichtweise die Selbsttragfähigkeit des auf der Person Jesu Christi gestellten Christentums geschwächt ist und die Ontologisierung der Theologie als beinahe unentbehrlich postuliert ist.[68]

Nur eine bestimmte Art Philosophie scheint so für R. relevant zu sein. In seinem Buch findet man keine Spur von kantischer Tradition, so maßgebend für die moderne Epoche, deren Erben R. anzusprechen

[63] Kasper, *Das Wesen des Christlichen*, 185.
[64] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 78, Fußnote 7.
[65] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 78, Fußnote 7.
[66] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 96v.
[67] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 103–105v.
[68] Weiteres zum Verhältnis Glaube/Vernunft und zur Rolle der patristischen Theologie und Ontologie/Metaphysik in R.s Theologie vgl. Wiedenhofer, *Die Theologie Joseph Ratzingers/Benedikts XVI.*, 242–273f, vor allem 258.

versucht. Als ob für ihn die Genialität der griechischen Philosophie bzw. des sogenannten philosophischen Monotheismus einen Bogen nur noch ins Mittelalter zieht und nachher nur mehr in ausgewählten Traditionen durchscheint – in Hegels oder Kierkegaards Philosophie. Die Umgestaltung des philosophischen Ausgangspunkts seit der Neuzeit wird nicht thematisiert.

3.2 Suchen nach der Verortung von Philosophie

Wenn R. die Eigenart des Glaubens darstellt, tut er das unter anderem durch die Auseinandersetzung mit Philosophie. Während es im Glauben „einen Vorrang des Wortes vor dem Gedanken" gibt, „geht in der Philosophie der Gedanke dem Wort voraus".[69] Daran zeige sich die essenzielle Differenz zwischen ihnen: Philosophie geht aus der Initiative des Menschen hervor, so dass das von ihm ausgesprochene Wort – das Resultat eines privaten Wahrheitssuchen – immer nur sekundär bleibt und als solches durch andere Wörter ersetzbar ist. Im Glauben kommt demgegenüber das Wort zum Menschen „von außen", aus der Wirklichkeit. Solche Differenz macht einen wesentlichen Unterschied in Struktur aus: einmal individuell (der Einzelne sucht erst nachher Anhänger für seine Gedanken), einmal dialogisch (Gott ruft zuerst den Menschen).[70]

Philosophie als Gedankenspiel kann nicht die Tiefe des Glaubens erreichen. Denn im Glauben geht es um innerliches Ringen, um Schutzschaltung gegenüber der Vergöttlichung des Weltlichen, um die Kraft, Leid zu ertragen.[71] Für Philosophie ist Denken der absolute Wert, für Glauben steht die (absolute) Liebe am höchsten. Bezogen auf Wahrheit schreibt R. es folgendermaßen um: „Wenn Platonismus eine *Idee* von der Wahrheit gibt, so gibt christlicher Glaube die Wahrheit als *Weg*, und erst indem sie zum Weg wird, ist sie des *Menschen* Wahrheit geworden. Wahrheit als bloße Erkenntnis, als bloße Idee bleibt ohne Kraft; des Menschen Wahrheit wird sie erst als Weg, der ihn beansprucht, den er betreten kann und muß."[72] Zur Verteidigung der Philosophie ist jedoch zu erwähnen, originär soll auch sie einen Weg (zur Weisheit) darstellen.

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[69] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 62.
[70] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 62–66.
[71] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 79–83.
[72] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 69.

Die Wendung „kann und muss betreten“ verweist weiter auf R.s Thema der Freiheit, die zum Unterscheidungsmerkmal des Christentums wird. Der christliche Glaube sei einmal eine Philosophie der Freiheit, einmal eine persönliche Wahl, nie eine (kosmisch-naturgesetzliche) Notwendigkeit. Genauer gesehen thematisiert R. die Freiheit weniger als eine subjektive Wahlmöglichkeit, dafür aber als Wahlmöglichkeit für etwas. Die letztere wird durch eine bestimmte objektive Dringlichkeit gekennzeichnet, denn das Leben in der Welt bringt schon von seiner „Konstruktion“ her diese Wahl notwendig mit sich.[73] Jenseits strikter philosophischer Argumentation scheint in diesem Zusammenhang R.s kühner Vorschlag, es sei die Quadratur des Zirkels der Theologie realisierbar. Das Christentum müsse vom Menschen angenommen werden, das von außen zukommende Ereignis werde das dem Menschen Notwendige: „Das Inkognito Gottes als Mensch in der Geschichte ‘muß’ sein – mit der Notwendigkeit der Freiheit.“[74] Appelliert R. hier an das Annehmen des christlichen Angebots als eine freie Entscheidung, oder geht es darum, sich dem zu unterwerfen, was unvermeidlich ist? Kasper zufolge erweist R. hier – zusammen mit Schelling und Hegel – das geschichtlich Zufällige als das Notwendige.[75] Der Imperativ einer als notwendig thematisierten Freiheit scheint tatsächlich die Freiheit des Glaubens in das gerade Gegenteil umzukehren.

Durch dieses Paradox der Freiheit weist R. weiter darauf hin, dass Philosophie als solche durch den Glauben überschritten wird. Freiheit sei letztendlich nicht eine gedankliche Kategorie. Da die Welt keine Mathematik, sondern Liebe ist, kann das „mathematische Weltverständnis“ hier höchstens einen Gott der Philosophen finden.[76] Das theologische Denken im Kontext des Glaubens ist – aufgrund der relationalen Natur Gottes – schöpferisch und sein absoluter Wert heißt soviel wie lieben.[77] Durch die Wette auf die philosophische Ratio habe das Christentum eine epochale Entscheidung genommen und das philosophische Reflexionsniveau gehöre somit untrennbar zum christlichen Erbe. In ihrem autonomen Wert wird Philosophie desungeachtet von R. nur sparsam bedacht. Er setzt sich mit ihr verhältnismäßig dienstlich und markant selektiv auseinander. Verweyen zufolge ist dieser Status

[73] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 121–123.
[74] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 220.
[75] Vgl. Kasper. *Das Wesen des Christlichen*, 184.
[76] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 116, 123.
[77] Vgl. Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 112.

quo in der späteren Entwicklung bei R. nicht überwunden, so dass er gerade auch einen polemisch kritischen Ton der Philosophie gegenüber angibt, mit der er sich vermutlich nicht einmal näher bekannt gemacht hat.[78]

Schluß

In *Einführung* bringt R. eine bestimmte Interpretation vom Christentum an. Gleichzeitig stellt das Buch auch den objektiven Inhalt des Christentums in seinem universalistischen Anspruch dar. Es scheint mir evident zu sein, dass die – deklarierte oder faktische – objektive Textebene tatsächlich noch nicht eine Interpretationsabwesenheit heißt, sosehr dies für R. im Widerspruch stehen möge. Im Buch spielt nämlich sein Begriff mit, der objektive Kern des Christentums wäre an sich verfügbar, als eine Art Harddisk, auf der normative Richtlinien abzulesen sind. R. selbst ist aber ein Beispiel davon, dass dieser objektive Kern in Wirklichkeit nie anders als durch eine Interpretation verfügbar ist.

R. würde sich lieber ohne das behelfen. Das Kriterium liege in Wahrheit, direkt zugänglich: „Aber was nur noch durch Interpretation bestehen kann, hat in Wirklichkeit aufgehört zu bestehen. Der menschliche Geist wendet sich mit Recht der Wahrheit selbst zu und nicht dem, was mit der Methode der Interpretation auf Umwegen als mit der Wahrheit noch vereinbar erklärt werden kann, selbst jedoch keine Wahrheit mehr hat.“ Die Vernunft hat zwar die Rationalität der Wahrheit zu verteidigen, um den Rückzug „in einen Bereich bloßer Frömmigkeit, bloßen Glaubens, bloßer Offenbarung“ zu vermeiden, gleichzeitig darf sie aber nicht von der Wahrheit abführen, in einem Verfahren, das R. „abkürzend als Interpretationschristentum bezeichnen möchte. Hier wird mit der Methode der Interpretation der Skandal des Christlichen aufgelöst und, indem es solchermaßen unanstößig gemacht wird, zugleich auch seine Sache selbst zur verzichtbaren Phrase gemacht, zu einem Umweg, der nicht nötig ist, um das Einfache zu sagen, das hier durch komplizierte Auslegungskünste zu seinem Sinn erklärt wird“[79].

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[78] Vgl. Verweyen, *Joseph Ratzinger – Benedikt XVI.*, 52.
[79] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 107. Es gilt für alle drei anschließende Zitate.

Stimmt das theologisch? Eine Interpretation muss das christliche Ärgernis nicht unbedingt beseitigen, sie kann zu ihm auch – authentisch – herführen. Und andersrum. Das Scandalum des Christentums kann ebenfalls durch eine vermutliche Nicht-Interpretation verwischt werden, da die Übertragung des konservierten Kerns, den es in Wirklichkeit nie uninterpretiert gab,[80] an dem lebendigen Brennpunkt der Botschaft Jesu Christi auch total vorbeizugehen vermag. Konsequent durchdacht müsste man vor dem christlichen Kerygma schweigend stehen und ihm durch die Radikalität unserer Lebensgeschichten huldigen. Es wäre schwierig auch die Existenz der Kirche legitim zu verteidigen, die seit Anbeginn dieses Kerygma unter anderem dadurch bewahrt und weitergegeben hat, indem sie es interpretierte… Warum klassifiziert R. gleich im Vorwort als Gedankenlose jene, die „das Neue unbesehen jederzeit auch schon für das Bessere halten“[81]? Kann nicht auch das Alte vorgefasst für das Bessere gehalten werden?

Die Analyse zeigt, dass R. mit seiner Kritik des Interpretierens vor allem einen Anspruch bekämpft, den er dem interpretierenden Verfahren selbst zuerkennt: als ob eine Interpretation das Recht mit sich bringe, im Prozess des Interpretierens den Sinn dessen zu schaffen, was interpretiert wird. Während – so R. – der Sinn lediglich anzunehmen ist. Ist dieses Dilemma aber treffend? Der Sinn wird erst recht in einer Interpretation erschlossen. Es gehört zur Aufgabe der Interpretation, den Sinn zu entdecken und immer wieder zu aktualisieren, ja auch mit dem Risiko, es gelinge nicht besser. Das Christentum kann, soll, ja sogar muss sich selbst interpretieren, damit es immer wieder angeeignet werden könnte. Mit guten Interpretationen dient man hoffentlich der Sache Gottes, mit schlechten Interpretationen bringt man sie nicht zu Fall. Gerade ein solches basales Vertrauen ist es, was wohl im Buch mangelt.

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[80] Vgl. Schillebeeckx, *Mensen als verhaal van God*, 54–63.
[81] Ratzinger, *Einführung*, 9.

REVIEWS & NEWS

Josef Mikulášek, *Dynamická církev: Promýšlení ekleziologie J. B. Metze na prahu třetího tisíciletí*, Červený Kostelec: Pavel Mervart 2019, 208 stran, ISBN: 978-80-7465-399-5.

PAVEL FRÝVALDSKÝ

Johann Baptist Metz (1928–2019) patřil k významným poválečným katolickým teologům. Jeho dílo není u nás zcela neznámé, přesto v české prostředí chybí hlubší reflexe a ucelenější prezentace jeho originálního myšlení. Můžeme proto s potěšením uvítat knihu *Dynamická církev* od mladého teologa Josefa Mikuláška, který českým čtenářům přibližuje Metzovu teologii, zvláště jeho ekleziologii. Autor ve své práci neusiluje jen o prezentaci Metzovy teologie, nýbrž se pokouší ji promýšlet a tvořivě rozvinout v kontextu nových výzev, před kterými dnes teologie a církev stojí. Vznikla tak živá interpretace díla nedávno zesnulého křesťanského myslitele, který vybízí ke kladení nových otázek a ke kritické reflexi křesťanského života a praxe.

První kapitola knihy představuje Metzovu biografii jako pramen jeho teologie. Tragická zkušenost druhé světové války vedla mladého teologa k tázání se po křesťanské odpovědnosti za politické a společenské události, jež vedly k válkám a k hrůzám holocaustu. Mikulášek ukazuje na tento důležitý kontext vzniku Metzova projektu „nové politické teologie“. Německý myslitel se odklání od ahistorické metafyziky katolické teologie, která opakuje „neměnné pravdy“ bez vztahu ke konkrétním dějinám. Kritizuje však i dědictví osvícenské racionality, jež náboženství umisťuje do individuální sféry lidského subjektu. I v tomto případě křesťanská víra ztrácí svůj kritický společenský apel, protože je uzavřena v emocionalitě a úzké racionalitě „přirozeného rozumu“ jednotlivce. Můžeme říci, že Metz patřil k mladé generaci pokoncilních teologů, kteří byli přesvědčeni, že válka nezničila jen starý svět, ale i dosavadní způsoby myšlení. Bylo by zajímavé srovnání Metzovy teologie s dalšími autory ať už katolickými, nebo protestanskými, kteří si kladou otázku, jak je možné hovořit o Bohu po Osvětimi. Toto srovnání však není záměrem Mikuláškovy knihy, která se zaměřuje na východiska Metzovy teologie. Tato teologie se odvrací od ahistorického nebo zúženě individualistického myšlení a uvažuje člověka jako bytost sociální a politickou zasazenou v konkrétní dějinnosti. V této perspektivě teologie klade otázky po společenské relevanci lidského jednání, tedy po konkrétní praxi člověka, jenž není izolovaným subjektem, nýbrž subjektem mezi subjekty, zodpovědným za běh dějin. Mikulášek poukazuje na toto Metzovo pojetí lidské existence, které do konkrétní sféry lidského subjektu zahrnuje sociální prostor a kolektivitu. Právě tento intersubjektivní rozměr bývá opomíjen v existencialistické a personalisticky orientované teologii, která tak není dostatečně schopná zohlednit důležitý praktický a sociální kontext.

Mikulášek dále ukazuje, jak Metzova teologie je otevřená k interdisciplinárnímu přístupu, zvláště k poznatkům sociální věd. Nutno však říci, že Metzova ekleziologie zůstává teologií, jejím východiskem je Bůh jednající v dějinách. Křesťanský Bůh však nejedná jen *na člověku*, jako na objektu, ale též skrze člověka a *s člověkem*, jenž zůstává svobodným adresátem, tudíž subjektem a spolupracovníkem Božího díla v dějinách. V centru Metzovy teologie zůstává klasické pojetí křesťanství jako následování Ježíše Krista, ovšem v novém výkladu, který klade důraz na celistvou historicko-konkrétní dimenzi lidského života. Velmi zajímavé téma představují Metzovy tři základní kategorie, jimiž interpretuje křesťanskou praxi: „vzpomínka“, „vyprávění“ a „solidarita“. Právě paměť církve je nebezpečnou kritickou pamětí, protože ve vzpomínce na Kristův kříž a na jeho solidaritu s trpícími připomíná člověku, na co by rád zapomněl, totiž na nezměrné utrpení svých bratří a sester. Paměť církve, která není předně vzpomínkou na vítěze, ale na poražené, má svou důležitou společensko-kritickou funkci, obrácenou nejen ven, ale i dovnitř církve a nabízející orientaci pro konkrétní praxi lidské solidarity.

Tyto Metzovy úvahy vedou Mikuláška k reflexi nad podobou církve, která podle slov II. vatikánského koncilu je „sacramentum“, neboli „znamením a nástrojem vnitřního spojení s Bohem a jednoty celého lidstva“ (LG 1). Církev tady není sama pro sebe, ale je poslána, aby v Kristu byla služebnicí lidstva. Koncilní učení tak souzní s důrazem, který současný papež klade na vycházení církve k druhým, zvláště k trpícím a lidem na okraji společnosti. Ačkoliv papež František nezmiňuje Metze mezi autory, kteří by ho ovlivnili, určitě bychom nalezli mnoho konvergencí mezi oběma autory. Mikuláškova kniha k tomu nabízí několik důležitých podnětů. Metz i papež František usilují o dynamickou církev, tedy o církev, která není uzavřená ve své spokojenosti, nýbrž je neklidná v pohledu na lidské utrpení a která tvořivým způsobem ve svém životě a v konkrétní praxi zpřítomňuje památku Krista: jeho umučení, smrt a zmrtvýchvstání. Pouze taková církev se stává nadějí pro svět.

Mikulášek dále v dialogu s dalšími teology rozvíjí své úvahy o důsledcích Metzova pojetí církve, která není nad-subjektem, nýbrž společenstvím subjektů. V této perspektivě se ukazuje v novém světle otázka identifikace s církví, jelikož církev není pouze organizací reprezentovanou hierarchií, nýbrž je Božím lidem, ke kterému se lidé nejenom hlásí, ale aktivně ji vytvářejí. S tímto pojímáním církve se pojí ocenění plurality v křesťanství, i jinakosti druhého.

Je patrné, že Mikuláškova studie rozvíjí mnoho teologických perspektiv a přináší důležité impulsy pro promýšlení křesťanského života dnes. Přes nespornou kvalitu díla lze přesto litovat, že autor nezmínil teology, kteří zaujali vůči Metzovi kritický postoj. Kdyby s nimi Mikulášek vedl dialog, vznikl by více plastický obraz Metzovy teologie, a bylo by tak možné hlouběji nahlédnout do teologické debaty po II. vatikánském koncilu. Čtenář se například může ptát, zda není příliš schematické tvrzení, že teologie vázaná na klasickou metafyziku je ahistorická, abstraktní a akritická. Ve skutečnosti mnoho katolických teologů usiluje o propojení metafyzického myšlení s konkrétní lidskou dějinností.

Výsostně křesťanský přechod od „substance“ k „relaci“ (s. 77–78) znamená jistě „metafyzickou revoluci“, ale není koncem, nýbrž proměnou metafyziky. Vztahové pojetí církve, která překračuje sebe sama na cestě k druhému a která má svůj zdroj a předobraz v trinitárních vztazích Boha, je nakonec metafyzickou výpovědí o podstatě církve, jež se v proměnných dějinných situacích může stávat stále nově tím, čím ontologicky (svátostně) v Kristu je, totiž „znamením a nástrojem vnitřního spojení s Bohem a jednoty celého lidstva“.

V této souvislosti by bylo také vhodné lépe ozřejmit Metzovo pojetí vztahu mezi kontemplací a akcí. Metz usiluje o překonání „gnostické“ kontemplace, v tomto smyslu „*homo contemplativus* bude muset být transformován na *homo activus*“ (s. 121). Nejedná se však o odmítnutí kontemplace, nýbrž o to, aby se křesťanská spiritualita stala „mystikou otevřených očí“, tedy spiritualitou neutíkající z konkrétního světa, nýbrž politicky a společensky zodpovědnou (s. 155). V tomto ohledu by bylo zajímavé srovnání s dalšími autory 20. století, jako je např. Romano Guardini a Joseph Ratzinger. Tito myslitelé hovoří vedle nesprávné kontemplace, která zavírá oči před problémy druhých, také o lidské činnosti, jež jedná utilitárně a věcně, je však „slepá“ vůči základním otázkám dobra a zla. Metafyzické otázky týkající se poslední pravdy a smyslu tudíž nejsou vůbec nepraktické, ale nabízejí světlo „otevřeným očím“ k správnému jednání. Zdá se, že v Metzově uvažování je upozaděna tato potřeba smyslu, kterou hledá „aktivní“ člověk, když stanovuje cíle svého jednání. Přitom se dnes nejedná jen o otázku správné praxe, ale o celkovou budoucnost lidstva. Jak ve svých knihách dosvědčuje např. R. Brague, metafyzické tvrzení o dobrém stvoření a smysluplnosti lidského života představují „kotvu v nebesích“ tváří v tvář radikální skepsi moderního člověka, který má dnes technologické prostředky k zničení života na zemi. Domnívám se tedy, že je třeba hovořit nejen o správné dynamice církve, ale též o její „statice“ spočívající v autentické ukotvenosti víry v přesvědčení o pravdě a dobrotě jediného Boha Stvořitele a Vykupitele.

O těchto a jiných otázkách lze diskutovat a je dobře, že Mikuláškova kniha k debatě vybízí. Krom toho v českém prostředí nabízí doposud málo známých podnětů pro promýšlení současné podoby teologie a církve. Je psána odborným jazykem a na čtenáře klade často velké nároky, dokonce i na teologicky poučeného. Lze ji však vřele doporučit, představuje pro teologii nesporné obohacení a snad také vyvolá nový zájem o teologii J. B. Metze, jehož dílo by si zasloužilo, aby bylo více do češtiny překládáno.

doi: 10.14712/23363398.2020.64

Ctirad Václav Pospíšil, *I řekl Bůh: Trinitární teologie stvoření*, Praha: Karolinum 2019, 356 stran, ISBN 978-80-246-4261-1.

PAVEL FRÝVALDSKÝ

Téma stvoření světa a člověka představuje důležitou, avšak náročnou oblast teologie. V současné době můžeme hovořit o několika výzvách k novému promýšlení otázek spojených s problematikou teologie stvoření. Jsou to nejprve prastaré a velké otázky, jako například: Odkud člověk pochází a kam směřuje? Jaký je počátek a cíl lidských dějin? Již z těchto otázek vysvítá spojení mezi počátkem a cílem, teologicky řečeno mezi protologií a eschatologií. Současné myšlení, které se většinou vyhýbá těmto velkým metafyzickým otázkám, je přinejmenším v souvislosti s ekologickou krizí podněcováno k promýšlení vztahu člověka k přírodě. Tato problematika je živá rovněž v teologické reflexi a odráží se i v magisteriu papeže Františka, především v jeho encyklice *Laudato sì*. Chce-li dnes teologie objasnit pobyt člověka na zemi, jeho postavení ve světě a jeho vztah k přírodě, nemůže se vyhnout novým poznatkům přírodních věd a evoluční teorii. Není proto divu, že se většinou teologická pojednání omezují na snahu vyjasnit vztah mezi teologií a přírodními vědami, popřípadě na pokusy uvést v soulad biblickou zprávu o stvoření světa se současným přírodovědeckým bádáním. Nutno však říci, že takto teologie zůstává v půli cesty, nebo lépe řečeno, že zůstává pouze v první fundamentálně teologické rovině, kterou by měl rozvinout a prohloubit systematický výklad ze strany dogmatické teologie. Ukazuje se totiž, že křesťanské chápání stvoření potřebuje širší horizont, který je utvářen nejen poznatky přírodovědeckými, biblickými a filosofickými, ale také znalostí dogmatické teologie zvláště christologie, soteriologie a trinitární teologie.

O tento teologický výklad tématu se pokusil Ctirad V. Pospíšil ve své nové knize *I řekl Bůh* s podtitulem *trinitární teologie stvoření*. Tato publikace navazuje na předchozí monografie autora: *Zápolení o pravdu, naději a lidskou důstojnost*, mapující reakce české katolické teologie v letech 1850–1950 na výzvy přírodních věd, a *Průkopníci a jejich odpůrci*, pojednávající o světové katolické teologii v počáteční fázi debaty o evolučním vzniku člověka. Tyto knihy společně vytvářejí jakýsi triptych, v němž první dvě nejsou pouze důležitým připomenutím dnes často zapomenutých teologů, kteří připravovali cestu k postupně se prosazujícímu teistickému chápání evoluce v katolické církvi, ale představují také fundamentálně teologický základ pro následné pojednání o tajemství stvoření z pohledu dogmatické teologie. Jak podtitul knihy *I řekl Bůh* napovídá, autor volí především trinitární perspektivu, která nabízí nové možnosti výkladu a řešení mnohých aporií, jež provází teologii dostatečně nereflektující trojiční obraz Stvořitele. Autor ve své knize o stvoření zúročil

poznatky ze svých předchozích prací z oblasti christologie a trinitární teologie. Právě tato Pospíšilova rozvinutá a promyšlená trinitární teologie nabídla interpretační klíč k originálnímu a systematickému výkladu stvoření. Z tohoto důvodu bude pro čtenáře užitečná předchozí znalost autorova díla, především pak jeho monografie z trinitární teologie *Jako v nebi, tak i na zemi*.

Kniha *I řekl Bůh* je rozdělena do šesti kapitol, což má jistě i symbolický význam odkazující na biblickou zprávu o stvoření v šesti dnech. V první kapitole autor mapuje českou i současnou světovou teologii stvoření a poznamenává, že nenalezneme důsledně pojatý trinitární výklad tématu, třebaže existuje mnoho dílčích inspirací. Ukazuje se tak, že tvrzení *Katechismu katolické církve*, že tajemství Otce, Syna a Ducha svatého je „zdroj všech ostatních tajemství víry a světlem, které je osvěcuje" (KKK, čl. 234, cit. s. 48), se stále nedostatečně promítlo do současné teologie. V tomto ohledu mají teologové ještě mnoho práce před sebou. Příčinu tohoto opomíjení trinitárního základu Pospíšil spatřuje v dědictví západní teologie, která inklinuje pojímat Trojici jako jediný princip jednající navenek bez rozlišení specifických úloh jednotlivých osob v díle stvoření. Je třeba říci, že západní teologie, zvláště středověká, stvořitelskou Trojici zcela neopomněla, přesto v západním křesťanství prakticky převládlo chápání Stvořitele jako jediného jednajícího subjektu a není proto divu, že představa Boha jako „monolitu" je mezi věřícími stále velmi rozšířená. Tato představa však neodpovídá biblickému svědectví a neumožňuje vidět stvořenou účast konečného bytí na trinitární harmonii vztahů mezi Otcem, Synem a Duchem svatým.

V druhé kapitole autor přesvědčivě argumentuje, že pouze trojjediný Bůh je nutným předpokladem stvoření. Vždyť pouze vnitřně vztahový Bůh může vstupovat do vztahů navenek, ke světu a člověku. Odlišnost a jednota osob v Trojici se promítá do díla stvoření, které má svou svébytnost a v člověku dosahuje plné svobody a přitom od Boha není odtrženo, ale naopak povoláno k jednotě lásky. Prolnutí Boží transcendence a imanence ve vztahu ke světu nemůže být nakonec jinak objasnitelná, než odkazem na tajemství Boží perichoreze, tedy přebýváním jedné Boží osoby v druhé v dynamické jednotě, která neruší, ale konstituuje identitu Otce, Syna a Ducha svatého. Mnozí autoři poukazují na to, že biblický teismus je cestou mezi dvěma extrémy: na jedné straně deismem, který neguje Boží imanenci ve světě a na druhé straně panteismem, který popírá Boží transcendenci. Toto tvrzení, však není samo o sobě teologicky objasněno, proto je nutno vyzdvihnout Pospíšilův trinitární výklad.

Třetí kapitola představuje rozvinutí autorových úvah a můžeme říci, že je hlavním těžištěm knihy. V tomto oddílu autor hovoří o stvořitelské svobodě Otce, Syna a Ducha svatého, která je archetypem veškeré lidské svobody. Stvoření, které není emanací Božství, ani utvářením preexistující materie, ale svobodným Božím dílem vyjadřuje teologie konceptem „*creatio ex nihilo*". Tvrzení o „stvoření z ničeho" má své důsledky antropologické, protože člověk, jenž není produktem nutného procesu, ani nahodilého vržení do existence, nýbrž je povolán k bytí svobodným Bohem, může sám být svobodný a mít svou

nezaměnitelnou důstojnost. Také zde platí, že Bůh může být ve svém díle svobodný a zároveň věrný sám sobě, jelikož mu stvoření nepřidává novou kvalitu vztahu, ani není prostorem jeho sebeuskutečňování, ale je „promítnutím" plnosti jeho života do konečného bytí. V této perspektivě Bůh Otec tvoří vše ve svém Synu v daru Ducha svatého. Autonomie světa a lidská svoboda je tak naší stvořenou účastí na Božím synovství, na samostatnosti Syna, přičemž tato svébytnost není autokratická, nýbrž dialogická a vše navracející k Otci, v síle Ducha lásky a darovanosti.

Na základě své teologie stvoření může Pospíšil ve čtvrté kapitole pojednat o tajemství souběhu působení Otce, Syna a Ducha svatého se stvořenými druhotnými příčinami (*concursus divinus*) a o otázce Boží prozřetelnosti (*providentia Dei*). Boží respekt k lidské svobodě i za cenu jejího zneužití a obrácení se proti dobru, je věrností Boha vlastní imanentní svobodě. Podle krásného Pospíšilova vyjádření: „Stejně jako Otec ctí a respektuje Syna, tak také respektuje stvořená živá a neživá jsoucna, která by měla dospívat po Synově vzoru ke stejnému analogickému ‚respektu' k Otci, v síle Respektu, který je osobou, tedy v síle Ducha svatého" (s. 160). Tajemství tohoto respektu je tak klíčem k pochopení Boží trpělivosti s lidským hříchem a zlem, které jsou zakomponované do Stvořitelovy prozřetelnosti, jež vede dějiny ke konečnému završení, aniž by byla narušena autonomie světa a lidská svoboda.

V páté kapitole se Pospíšil pokouší o trinitární výklad antropologie s důrazem na lidskou svobodu, která coby stvořená podle trojičního vzoru není svévolí ani libovůlí, nýbrž je zaměřená k zodpovědnosti. Dialogickému antropocentrismu ze strany Boha, který do středu svého stvoření staví lidského tvora, má odpovídat dialogický teocentrismus ze strany člověka, který na Boží obdarování odpovídá svou vděčností a starostlivostí a péčí o ostatní tvory. Z Pospíšilova výkladu vyplývá, že bez takto pojaté antropologie se současný člověk bude zmítat v nebezpečné dialektice mezi lpěním na vlastní titánské svobodě a kořistnické vládě nad přírodou (monologický antropocentrismus) a neschopností odlišit se od ostatních živočišných tvorů a nalézt vlastní důstojnost (biocentrismus, zoocentrismus). Je patrné, že teologie stvoření, jak ji Pospíšil předkládá, má důležitý praktický, takřka existenční význam, protože se týká základních otázek lidského života na zemi.

Autor se dále ve své knize dotýká tajemství zla na zemi, věnuje se otázce prvotního hříchu a dědičné viny a poslední kapitolu věnuje problematice Zlého. Toto pojednání je užitečné, protože se na jedné straně setkáváme s popíráním reálné existence zlého ducha, tak s přehnaným zdůrazňováním jeho působení ve světě. Pospíšil správně poznamenává, že také ďábel byl stvořen jako dobré osobní bytí podle vzoru trojjediného Boha, ale tím, že se obrátil proti svému dialogickému určení a zpronevěřil se vlastní synovské identitě, rozpadá se do jakési těžko pojmenované „neosoby". Kniha však neústí do pojednání o zlu, nýbrž ukazuje přes všechna dramata v dějinách lidstva i jednotlivců na velký dar lidské svobody a na náš úkol realizovat své plné lidství ve společenství s Trojicí.

Závěrem bych chtěl ocenit autorův živý a srozumitelný výklad náročné, ale neopominutelné problematiky. Můžeme být vděčni za podnětné úvahy a za zpracování tématu způsobem ojedinělým v české a do značné míry i světové teologické literatuře. Knihu můžeme považovat za důležitý krok k trinitárnímu prohloubení dalších oblastí dogmatické teologie, zvláště antropologie a eschatologie. Domnívám se, že v souvislosti s tématem se nabízí potřeba nově uchopit soteriologickou kategorii „nového stvoření" přítomnou především v pavlovské teologii a akcentovanou v patristické a středověké epoše. Pospíšilova monografie je založena na Písmu svatém, opírá se o magisterium, čerpá z myšlení starých mistrů, jako byl svatý Bonaventura, udržuje dialog se současnými autory, a přitom otevírá nové obzory v teologii, nelze si tak přát nic jiného, než aby nalezla dostatek vnímavých čtenářů.

doi: 10.14712/23363398.2020.65

ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE
THEOLOGICA 2020, Vol. 10, No. 2

Charles University
Karolinum Press
Ovocný trh 560/5, 116 36 Praha1
Czech Republic
www.karolinum.cz
Typeset and printed by Karolinum Press

Published twice a year
ISSN 1804-5588 (Print)
ISSN 2336-3398 (Online)
MK ČR E 19775